The Lede

How Bots Took Over Our Lives

机器人如何接管了我们的生活
During the 2016 election, much of the country was introduced to the concept of internet bots for the first time. Now, just a decade later, it feels like they’re everywhere.
2016年大选期间,这个国家的大多数人第一次接触到互联网机器人的概念。如今,仅仅十年之后,它们似乎已经无处不在。
A hand is visible in the dark bright lights fall on it.
Photograph by Vincent Forstenlechner / Connected Archives

All the way back in 2016, when Donald Trump won his first Presidential election, many people had trouble understanding how, exactly, it could have happened. The line of inquisition extended to the political class, where recriminations from talking heads on MSNBC about Hillary Clinton’s ineffective campaigning and tone-deaf messaging abounded. Others, though, gravitated toward a more sinister conspiracy, which involved foreign interference and a network of automated agitators spreading disinformation at scale. The bots, this emerging coalition said, were to blame for Trump’s rise.

早在2016年,当唐纳德·特朗普赢得他的第一个总统任期时,许多人难以理解这究竟是怎么发生的。质疑的矛头延伸到了政治阶层,MSNBC的评论员们纷纷指责希拉里·克林顿竞选活动效率低下、信息传递脱离群众。然而,另一些人则倾向于一个更阴险的阴谋论,涉及外国干预和一个大规模散布虚假信息的自动化煽动者网络。这个新兴的联盟说,机器人是特朗普崛起的罪魁祸首。

During the past decade, so-called bots, a slippery concept from the start, have gone from a conspiratorial curiosity to a familiar force in our daily lives. In the popular imagination, they are suddenly everywhere and seem designed to annoy the hell out of people. Consider the familiar indignity of buying concert tickets only to find that, immediately after a sale opens, every ticket has been purchased by an army of bots, only to be listed on a resale site with a markup of hundreds or even thousands of dollars. This is their function: bots operate on a scale and speed that gives them an unfair advantage over humans, who have to fumble around with mouse clicks and thoughts. They hoard inventory on e-commerce sites to frustrate customers and torture retailers, and scan real-estate websites so they can send automated text messages to homeowners with lowball offers. They trawl the internet to scrape e-mail addresses and then fill inboxes with phishing attempts and spam.

在过去十年里,所谓的“机器人”——这个概念从一开始就模糊不清——已经从一种阴谋论的好奇心,变成了我们日常生活中一股熟悉的力量。在大众的想象中,它们突然无处不在,而且似乎专门设计来把人烦得要死。想想那种熟悉的屈辱感:你等着买演唱会门票,结果开售后瞬间,所有票都被一支机器人大军抢购一空,转眼就出现在转售网站上,加价几百甚至几千美元。这就是它们的功能:机器人运作的规模和速度,让它们相对于那些还得笨手笨脚地点鼠标、动脑子的人类,拥有了不公平的优势。它们在电商网站上囤积库存,让顾客沮丧,折磨零售商;它们扫描房地产网站,好向房主发送自动短信,报出极低的报价。它们在互联网上大肆搜刮电子邮件地址,然后用钓鱼邮件和垃圾邮件塞满收件箱。

But the impulse to treat bots like digital mosquitoes that need to be swatted away minimizes their role in making the internet work. At their most basic, bots are bits of programming built to run a certain function automatically until something or someone stops them. They are tools, and as much as general attitudes toward them have become negative they are most often used for mundane tasks. Still, our reflexive reaction to bots on social media is irritation and suspicion—to call something a “bot” is to label it as unthinking and nonhuman. That instinct partly originated in the blame game following Clinton’s narrow loss in the 2016 election, with the rise of a general if somewhat vague consensus that a web of coördinated political agitators based in Russia had used social-networking sites like Facebook and Twitter to sow disorder and distrust in the American electorate.

但是,把机器人当作需要拍死的数字蚊虫,这种冲动低估了它们在维持互联网运转中的作用。在最基本的层面上,机器人是一些编程代码,旨在自动运行某项功能,直到有东西或有人阻止它们。它们是工具,尽管人们对它们的普遍态度已变得负面,但它们最常被用于平凡的任务。尽管如此,我们在社交媒体上对机器人的本能反应仍是恼怒和怀疑——称某物为“机器人”,就是给它贴上无思想、非人类的标签。这种本能部分源于2016年克林顿惜选之后那场推卸责任的游戏,当时形成了一种普遍但有些模糊的共识,即一个以俄罗斯为基地、相互协调的政治煽动者网络,利用Facebook和Twitter等社交网站,在美国选民中散播混乱与不信任。

The accusation wasn’t without merit. Following Trump’s victory, the Internet Research Agency, a St. Petersburg-based “troll farm,” was accused of interfering in American elections, a detail revealed in the Mueller report. According to the report, the I.R.A. had been planning this digital-agitprop campaign for several years prior to the election, even travelling to the U.S. to take photos to use in their posts. They deployed bots to pose as American grassroots political organizers, eventually making virtual contact with Trump supporters and campaign officials, and to spread bogus headlines targeted at voters in swing states. According to the report, the I.R.A.’s strategy evolved from a generalized attempt to destabilize American politics to, per the report, “a targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.”

这项指控并非毫无根据。特朗普获胜后,位于圣彼得堡的“巨魔农场”——互联网研究机构(Internet Research Agency)被指控干预美国大选,这一细节在穆勒报告中有所披露。根据该报告,互联网研究机构在大选前数年就开始策划这场数字宣传战,甚至派人前往美国拍照,用于他们的帖子。他们部署机器人冒充美国基层政治组织者,最终与特朗普的支持者和竞选官员建立了虚拟联系,并散布针对摇摆州选民的假新闻标题。报告称,互联网研究机构的策略,从最初泛泛地试图破坏美国政治稳定,演变为“到2016年初,一项偏袒候选人特朗普、贬低候选人克林顿的有针对性的行动”。

This meant that the disappointed liberals who had grown convinced that Russia tilted the election toward Trump were right—or at least half right. The degree to which the Russian efforts were effective is still an open question, and some reports have cast doubt on social media’s ability to drive political outcomes. A study published in 2023 by N.Y.U.’s Center for Social Media and Politics, in Nature Communications, found that Russian bots on Twitter had limited influence, with one per cent of users being exposed to seventy per cent of the posts created by Russian troll accounts. There was also a study conducted by professors at Dartmouth, Princeton, and the University of Exeter in 2017 which found that the majority of “fake news” promoted on sites like Facebook was being consumed by hard-line conservatives who likely would have voted for Trump anyway. But it didn’t matter. The Mueller report and the spectre of Russian influence provided an easy answer for a stunning political defeat, and the modern mythology of the bots was born.

这意味着,那些逐渐确信俄罗斯使大选偏向特朗普的失望自由派是对的——或者至少对了一半。俄罗斯的这些努力究竟有多大效果,仍是一个悬而未决的问题,一些报告对社交媒体驱动政治结果的能力提出了质疑。纽约大学社交媒体与政治中心2023年在《自然·通讯》上发表的一项研究发现,Twitter上的俄罗斯机器人影响力有限,1%的用户接触到了俄罗斯巨魔账户创建的70%的帖子。达特茅斯学院、普林斯顿大学和埃克塞特大学的教授在2017年进行的一项研究也发现,在Facebook等网站上推广的“假新闻”,大部分被那些无论如何都可能投票给特朗普的强硬保守派消费了。但这都无关紧要了。穆勒报告和俄罗斯干预的幽灵,为一场惊人的政治失败提供了一个简单的答案,于是,关于机器人的现代神话就此诞生。

In the years since 2016, bot networks have become only more sophisticated, and the proliferation of A.I. technology promises to widen their scope. Analysis from the internet-infrastructure giant Cloudflare estimates that nearly sixty per cent of internet traffic is nonhuman. In practice, that means that many exchanges on the internet are just bots talking to other bots in an automated loop. Years ago, as virtual assistants were first taking off, a video recording of what happened when a human asked two Alexa-equipped devices at the same time to start a psychotherapy session. They end up in an infinite recursion of questions without making any progress. Now imagine that process scaled up to the size of the internet, and you have an approximation of the bot-saturated social-media platforms. Researchers at one A.I. company estimated that of a sample of more than a million accounts on X, sixty-four per cent could be bots, a finding that requires no stretch of the imagination, given the sheer inanity of interactions on the site. Under any number of viral posts, you can find accounts responding with a sequence of increasingly brainless rehashings of the original content, like a series of photocopies that slowly deteriorate in quality.

自2016年以来的这些年里,机器人网络只会变得更加复杂,而人工智能技术的普及必将扩大其范围。互联网基础设施巨头Cloudflare的分析估计,近60%的互联网流量是非人类的。实际上,这意味着互联网上的许多交流只是机器人与其他机器人在自动化循环中对话。几年前,当虚拟助手刚刚兴起时,有一段视频记录了一个场景:一个人同时让两台装有Alexa的设备开始心理治疗。它们最终陷入了无休止的递归提问,毫无进展。现在,想象一下这个过程扩大到整个互联网的规模,你就能大致了解充斥着机器人的社交媒体平台是什么样子了。一家人工智能公司的研究人员估计,在X平台上超过一百万个账户的样本中,64%可能是机器人。考虑到该网站上互动内容极其愚蠢,这一发现无需任何想象力。在任何一条爆款帖子下,你都能发现一些账户在回应,内容是对原始内容一系列越来越没脑子的复述,就像一系列质量逐渐退化的复印件。

The quantity of bots on Twitter was a key sticking point for Elon Musk during his purchase of the company in 2022, and his subsequent, unsuccessful attempt to back out of the deal. He estimated that twenty per cent of the site was made up of automated accounts, a dynamic that had overvalued Twitter and should therefore allow him to walk away from his hasty acquisition. Twitter, at that point, claimed that the ratio was closer to five per cent. But bots aren’t just sitting around talking to each other; they are also a major factor in what posts become popular, facilitating virality by clustering around certain subjects and liking and reposting specific posts, creating a flywheel of engagement that spreads whatever message someone might be amplifying.

Twitter上机器人的数量,是埃隆·马斯克在2022年收购该公司及其随后试图退出交易未果的一个关键症结。他估计该网站20%的账户是自动化账户,这种状况高估了Twitter的价值,因此应允许他放弃这次仓促的收购。当时,Twitter声称这个比例接近5%。但机器人并非只是闲坐着互相聊天;它们也是决定哪些帖子能流行起来的一个主要因素,通过聚集在某些主题周围,点赞和转发特定帖子来助推病毒式传播,制造出一个参与度的飞轮,传播某人可能正在放大的任何信息。

This strategy of manufacturing a froth of interest around a given subject, from Nicki Minaj’s political perspectives to Sydney Sweeney’s jean ads, has recently been especially effective, and has moved culture-war fights from the trenches of bot-infested social networks into more mainstream channels. A New York Times investigation into the social media fracas found that there were relatively few mentions of Sweeney on X until several days after the début of her infamous American Eagle commercial, and less than ten per cent of those early posts were directly critical. It wasn’t until a couple of posts that compared the ad to Nazi eugenics propaganda ended up going viral that the outrage cycle began, and conservative influencers attempted to paint what was essentially a fringe perspective on the ad campaign as a liberal consensus.

这种围绕特定话题——从妮琪·米娜的政治观点到西德尼·斯维尼的牛仔裤广告——制造出一片虚假兴趣泡沫的策略,近来尤其有效,并将文化战争的战火从机器人横行的社交网络战壕,转移到了更主流的渠道。《纽约时报》对这场社交媒体风波的一项调查发现,在斯维尼那则声名狼藉的American Eagle广告首秀后的几天里,X平台上提到她的次数相对较少,而且那些早期帖子中只有不到10%是直接批评的。直到有几篇将该广告比作纳粹优生学宣传的帖子最终病毒式传播开来,愤怒的循环才开始了,保守派意见领袖试图将这种本质上对广告宣传的边缘视角,描绘成自由派的共识。

“These episodes follow a common pattern: a small incident is framed as ‘proof’ of a broader culture war, then a mix of real users, coördinated accounts, and bots push the same talking points and narratives until it looks like a widespread response,” Emilio Ferrara, a computer-science professor at U.S.C., told me. Extreme voices with high follower counts, such as Chaya Raichik, the woman behind the right-wing X account Libs of TikTok, are usually at the center of the skirmish, and then bot networks swarm to boost the message. It’s like pouring gasoline onto a few embers, which then appears to be a bonfire. Lynnette Ng, a former bot-network researcher at Carnegie Mellon University, explained why the swarm is so effective: “Bots frequently and aggressively hit cognitive-bias triggers in their messages which push the brain to short-circuit people’s ability to reason about the information in front of them.” It doesn’t help that people struggle to decipher bots from humans in the first place during political conversations. The default heat setting for political discourse online is already so high that it tends to pressurize such conversations into a single, highly combustible layer. Bots that are designed to inflame those political disagreements are trained on those conversations and then injected back into the discourse, amplifying the feedback loop of people yelling at bots who are yelling at people, and so on.

“这些事件遵循一个共同的模式:一个小事件被框定为更广泛文化战争的‘证据’,然后真实用户、协调一致的账户和机器人混合在一起,推动相同的论调和叙事,直到它看起来像一种广泛的回应,”南加州大学计算机科学教授埃米利奥·费拉拉告诉我。拥有大量粉丝的极端声音,例如右翼X账户“抖音自由派”背后的女人查亚·雷奇克,通常是这类小冲突的中心,然后机器人网络蜂拥而至,放大这些信息。这就像往几块余烬上浇汽油,然后看起来就像一场篝火。卡内基梅隆大学前机器人网络研究员Lynnette Ng解释了这种蜂拥为何如此有效:“机器人在其信息中频繁且猛烈地触发认知偏差,这会迫使大脑短路,使人们丧失对面前信息进行推理的能力。”雪上加霜的是,在政治对话中,人们一开始就很难区分机器人和真人。网络政治话语的默认热度已经如此之高,以至于倾向于将此类对话压缩成一个单一、高度易燃的层面。那些旨在煽动政治分歧的机器人,正是在这些对话上训练出来的,然后又被重新注入到话语中,放大了人们对着机器人喊叫、机器人又对着人们喊叫的反馈循环,如此往复。

This is easy enough to understand; bots are like automated moths to digital flame. But the rationale propelling them is a little harder to decipher. Surely, some of the motive is financial, as engagement on social-media platforms has been monetized. On X, for example, an account is able to participate in X’s revenue-sharing program as long as it is “verified”—which really just means that the owner has paid a small fee for a premium account—and the page meets minimum metrics such as having five hundred verified followers and a certain number of recent “organic” impressions. (“Organic” here means that you didn’t pay for your posts to be promoted like an ad.) There’s no quality incentive here; as long as a post is attracting eyeballs and generating ad impressions, there is a potential for payout. A bot that is programmed to maximize engagement and to interact with accounts that have lots of followers can make money for its operator by appearing next to ads in the X timeline. A.I. has made that feedback loop spin only faster: bots now learn what sort of content drives the most engagement and adjust their outputs to generate likes, reposts, and comments.

这很容易理解;机器人就像自动扑向数字火焰的飞蛾。但驱动它们的理由则有点难以解读。当然,部分动机是财务上的,因为社交媒体平台上的参与度已经被货币化了。例如,在X平台上,只要一个账户是“已验证的”——这实际上只意味着所有者支付了一小笔费用获得了高级账户——并且该页面满足最低指标,如拥有500个已验证粉丝和一定数量的近期“自然”展示量,它就能参与X的收入分享计划。(这里的“自然”是指你没有像广告那样为帖子付费推广。)这里没有任何质量激励;只要一个帖子能吸引眼球并产生广告展示,就有获利的可能。一个被编程为最大化参与度并与拥有大量粉丝的账户互动的机器人,可以通过出现在X时间线上的广告旁边,为其操作者赚钱。人工智能只会让这个反馈循环转得更快:机器人现在能学习什么样的内容能驱动最多的参与度,并调整其输出来产生点赞、转发和评论。

Unfortunately, the posts that get the most engagement are invariably the ones that upset us the most. Rage-baiting, as this strategy is often called, is an effective behavior to program into a bot’s temperament, since people are more likely to engage with social-media posts that challenge their beliefs than those that confirm them. Maintaining a system powered by invective discourse also seems to be a practical business model for social-media platforms. A group of researchers found that removing toxic posts from a user’s feed reduced the amount of time they spent on a given platform. The total time that users spend mindlessly scrolling is the lifeblood of social-media outlets, meaning, as Ferrara explained, that they are dealing with a “conflicting system of incentives,” since bots are good for engagement metrics that can be attractive to advertisers but also mar user experience past a certain threshold. Keeping things just toxic enough so that users scroll without getting too upset at the state of the world is the sweet spot for platforms. It’s cynical, but it’s also very good business.

不幸的是,获得最多参与度的帖子,总是那些最让我们心烦意乱的帖子。这种策略常被称为“愤怒诱饵”,将其编入机器人的脾性是一种有效的行为,因为人们更有可能与挑战其信念的社交媒体帖子互动,而非那些证实其信念的帖子。维持一个由谩骂话语驱动的系统,似乎也是社交媒体平台一种实用的商业模式。一组研究人员发现,从用户的信息流中移除有毒帖子,会减少他们在特定平台上花费的时间。用户无意识滚动屏幕的总时长是社交媒体平台的命脉,这意味着,正如费拉拉所解释的,它们正面临一个“相互冲突的激励系统”,因为机器人有利于参与度指标,这对广告商有吸引力,但超过一定阈值也会损害用户体验。保持毒性恰到好处,让用户既能不断滚动,又不至于对世界状况过于不安,这正是平台的最佳平衡点。这很 cynical,但也是一门极好的生意。

The platform engineers who keep people scrolling are only one cog in the attention-capturing machine. The people who create and deploy bot networks are pulling another set of levers in their attempt to make money or influence public opinion, and conflict is very good at attracting eyeballs. Many bots on social media are trained to maximize engagement, and the number of likes, shares, or comments a post receives is a large component of how the algorithms on X, Instagram, and TikTok decide what to put in front of users next. Those two parties—the platform owners who tweak the algorithm’s currents and the bot operators who ride it—work in tandem to shape people’s experiences online and end up warping reality in the process. There’s a growing weariness about the bot-dominated internet, though. Perhaps it explains why so many people were upset when it was revealed that Geese, a band beloved by the exact kinds of people who consider their music taste to be unassailably authentic, had reportedly worked with a marketing company to create legions of fake fan accounts. This tactic is not a major deviation from decades of creative and manipulative music marketing, but coverage of the controversy was overwhelmingly negative. Critics accused the band’s label of waging a “PsyOp,” one in which bots were capable of building an alternate reality and tricking them into liking something, almost against their will.

让用户不断滚动的平台工程师,只是这台注意力攫取机器中的一个齿轮。那些创建和部署机器人网络的人,则在试图赚钱或影响公众舆论的过程中,操纵着另一套杠杆,而冲突非常擅长吸引眼球。社交媒体上的许多机器人都被训练来最大化参与度,而一个帖子获得的点赞、分享或评论数量,是X、Instagram和TikTok的算法决定下一步向用户展示什么内容的重要组成部分。这两方——调整算法流向的平台所有者,以及驾驭这股流向的机器人操作者——协同工作,塑造了人们的在线体验,并在此过程中最终扭曲了现实。不过,对于这个由机器人主导的互联网,人们越来越感到厌倦。也许这解释了为什么当人们发现,深受那些自认为音乐品味无可置疑地真实的人群喜爱的乐队Geese,据报道曾与一家营销公司合作创建了大量虚假粉丝账户时,会有如此多的人感到不安。这种策略与几十年来富有创意和操纵性的音乐营销并无太大偏差,但围绕此事的报道却是一边倒的负面。批评者指责该乐队的唱片公司发动了一场“心理战”,在这场心理战中,机器人能够构建一个另类现实,几乎违背人们的意愿,诱骗他们喜欢上某样东西。

Ng compared the mechanics behind the glut of bots inflaming culture-war topics to an automated propaganda war that is currently being won by the individuals and groups more willing to use available technologies to pursue their own ends. “They’re an interesting tool for automated advertising that can be used by people to do good and do harm. Instead of us focussing on bots that are doing harm, we should focus on how we can use the same technology to make them do good.” It’s a pragmatic solution, if a little depressing, to give over the rest of the internet to automated skirmishes against disinformation.

Ng将大量机器人煽动文化战争话题背后的机制,比作一场自动化的宣传战,而目前,那些更愿意利用现有技术来达到自己目的的个人和团体正在赢得这场战争。“它们是一种有趣的自动化广告工具,可以被人们用来做好事,也可以用来做坏事。我们与其关注那些做坏事的机器人,不如关注我们如何能利用同样的技术让它们做好事。”这是一个务实的解决方案,尽管有点令人沮丧,即把互联网的其余部分交给自动化的小冲突来对抗虚假信息。

Personally, I’d rather let the bots fight one another and log off forever. And yet the bot revolution is coming—or is perhaps already here—whether we like it or not. It goes far beyond political discourse, as bots now dominate how we experience life online: the customer-support chatbots that pop up when you want to rebook a flight, A.I.-powered summaries at the top of Google searches, automatic censors that flag and remove explicit content. But what happens when bots are all that’s left of digital life? Such a reality doesn’t seem terribly far away. Some in Silicon Valley would hand their entire lives over to “agents,” a dressed-up term for bots which has become one of the industry’s favorite words. Agents, though, are conceived of as independent and capable of reasoning, a spin along the lines of “bots with thoughts.”

就我个人而言,我宁愿让机器人互相争斗,然后永远下线。然而,无论我们喜不喜欢,机器人革命正在到来——或者也许已经来临。它远远超出了政治话语的范畴,因为机器人现在主导着我们体验在线生活的方式:当你想重新预订航班时弹出的客服聊天机器人、谷歌搜索顶部由人工智能驱动的摘要、标记并删除露骨内容的自动审查器。但是,当机器人成为数字生活所剩下的一切时,会发生什么?这样的现实似乎并不遥远。硅谷的一些人愿意将他们的整个生活交给“智能体”,这是机器人的一个美化说法,已成为该行业最流行的词汇之一。不过,智能体被构想为独立的、具备推理能力的,这是一种类似于“有思想的机器人”的说法。

In February, a security researcher at Meta named Summer Yue created an A.I. agent using the platform OpenClaw that she tasked with managing her Gmail account and suggesting which messages she should delete. Before she knew it, the bot started deleting all the e-mails in her inbox, like a digital locust. “I couldn’t stop it from my phone. I had to RUN to my Mac mini like I was defusing a bomb,” she wrote on X. That a security researcher for Meta was comfortable handing over the keys to her e-mail account to an autonomous bot that quickly went feral was funny, but after reading Yue’s story I found myself staring at my inbox. It was Sunday afternoon, and I had just got back from a weekend away. The number of unread e-mails in my inbox hovered around eighty thousand, and I found myself fantasizing about turning my whole life over to the bots and letting an agent nuke my overflowing inbox. It sounded liberating. Perhaps that’s what the A.I. apocalypse is really shaping up to be—not the elimination of humanity by an omniscient machine mind but an internet overrun by unthinking, error-prone automatons that make the web unusable and destroy it from the inside. After the bots take over, we can all get back to the real world. ♦

今年二月,Meta公司一位名叫Summer Yue的安全研究员,使用OpenClaw平台创建了一个AI智能体,她指派这个智能体管理她的Gmail账户,并建议她应该删除哪些邮件。她还没反应过来,这个机器人就开始删除她收件箱里的所有邮件,就像一场数字蝗灾。“我无法从手机上阻止它。我不得不跑向我的Mac mini,就像我在拆除一枚炸弹,”她在X上写道。一位Meta的安全研究员竟放心地将自己邮箱的钥匙交给一个迅速失控的自主机器人,这很滑稽,但在读完Yue的故事后,我发现自己盯着自己的收件箱。那是一个周日下午,我刚度过一个周末回来。收件箱里未读邮件的数量徘徊在八万封左右,我发现自己幻想着把我的整个生活都交给机器人,让一个智能体核平我爆满的收件箱。这听起来令人解脱。也许,人工智能的末日真正在形成的模样正是如此——不是全知机器心智消灭人类,而是一个被无思想、易出错的自动机器淹没的互联网,它们使网络无法使用,并从内部将其摧毁。等机器人接管之后,我们都可以回到现实世界了。 ♦

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