Books

How America Became Antifascist

美国如何成为反法西斯国家
Franklin D. Roosevelt was slow to confront the threat of Fascism. A new history explores how he—and the country—finally came around.
富兰克林·D·罗斯福迟迟不肯直面法西斯主义的威胁。一部新的历史著作探究了他——以及这个国家——最终是如何转变立场的。
A portrait of a person.
Photograph by Edward Steichen / Courtesy Collection Mudam Luxembourg – Musée d’Art Moderne Grand-Duc Jean, reproduced by Rémi Villaggi

In fiction, spoiler alerts exist to protect the reader experience, premised on the idea that knowing a story’s outcome will reduce momentum and suspense. In historical writing, it’s just the opposite. Works of history gain energy from the fact that readers know where the narrative is going, especially when it’s going nowhere good. Books on the origins of wars tend to rely on a tragic arc, with the reader aware of the shoals ahead while the books’ subjects blithely reassure one another that the coast looks clear, that diplomacy will win the day, that any conflict will be short and easy.

在小说中,剧透警告是为了保护读者的阅读体验,其前提是:知道故事的结局会削弱推进感和悬念。在历史写作中,情况恰恰相反。历史著作的能量恰恰来自读者知道叙事走向何方,尤其是当走向并不美好时。关于战争起源的书籍往往依赖一种悲剧性的弧线:读者知道前方有暗礁,而书中的人物却轻松地互相安慰,说海岸看起来风平浪静,外交会赢得胜利,任何冲突都会短暂而轻松。

Within this literature, no decade is more doom-laden than the nineteen-thirties, when misguided hope and willful blindness led the world’s democracies to grossly underestimate the threat of Fascism. In the standard story, the United States, Britain, and France stood by, wringing their hands and straining for appeasement while the Japanese stampeded through Asia and Nazi Storm Troopers ran roughshod over Europe. The result was the greatest cataclysm in modern history: seventy million dead, the genocide of European Jews, the bombing of once magnificent cities. The reader, aware of this outcome, is left with the literary equivalent of shouting at the screen: Don’t do it! Act now! Watch out—they’re coming for you!

在这类文献中,没有哪个年代比二十世纪三十年代更具宿命感。在那个年代,误入歧途的希望和刻意为之的盲目让世界各民主国家严重低估了法西斯主义的威胁。在标准叙事中,美国、英国和法国袖手旁观,绞着双手、竭力绥靖,而日本在亚洲横冲直撞,纳粹冲锋队在欧洲肆意践踏。结果是现代史上最大的浩劫:七千万人死亡,欧洲犹太人遭到种族灭绝,曾经辉煌的城市被炸成废墟。知道这一结局的读者,便会产生一种文学意义上的“对着屏幕大喊”的冲动:别这么做!现在就行动!小心——他们冲你来了!

The historian William I. Hitchcock’s excellent new book, “A Shadow Over the World: Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Rise of Fascism, and the Making of America’s World War II” (Simon & Schuster), leans into this sense of foreboding. In the course of nearly six hundred pages, Hitchcock describes how Fascism spread across the globe, beginning with Mussolini’s rise in the battered, destabilized Italy of the nineteen-twenties and ending in 1941, when Hitler occupied most of Continental Europe. A Pulitzer finalist and a professor at the University of Virginia, Hitchcock has written several books about the Second World War, each with an emphasis on the European theatre. This time, he wants to explain why U.S. policymakers, especially F.D.R., failed to act or even to fully comprehend what was happening until it was almost too late.

历史学家威廉·I·希区柯克(William I. Hitchcock)出色的新著《世界上的阴影:富兰克林·D·罗斯福、法西斯主义的崛起与美国二战的缔造》(西蒙与舒斯特出版社)充分利用了这种不祥的预感。在近六百页的篇幅中,希区柯克描述了法西斯主义如何蔓延全球,从二十年代墨索里尼在饱受创伤、动荡不安的意大利崛起开始,到1941年希特勒占领欧洲大陆大部分地区为止。希区柯克曾入围普利策奖,是弗吉尼亚大学的教授,写过好几本关于第二次世界大战的书,每本都侧重欧洲战场。这一次,他想解释为什么美国的决策者——尤其是罗斯福——未能采取行动,甚至未能充分理解正在发生的一切,直到几乎为时已晚。

Unlike most coming-of-war narratives, though, “A Shadow Over the World” offers a happy ending of sorts. Hitchcock lays out a harrowing chronology of self-interested decisions, missed opportunities, and moments of cowardice as U.S. government officials debated how to meet the Fascist threat. Yet his main question is not why they failed to counter it but how, in the end, they succeeded. “In these pages,” he writes by way of introduction, “we will see an imperfect nation and an imperfect leader strive to do good after a long stretch of doing nothing in the face of fascist persecution.” What’s amazing about the era, he suggests, is not the hope, cherished by so many Americans, that war might be avoided. It’s that the nation eventually rose up and dedicated the full force of its industrial, ideological, spiritual, and military might to banishing Fascism from the earth.

不过,与大多数战争来临叙事不同,《世界上的阴影》提供了一种近乎圆满的结局。希区柯克铺陈了一段令人痛心的编年史:在美国政府官员争论如何应对法西斯威胁的过程中,充斥着自私自利的决策、错失的良机和怯懦的时刻。然而,他的核心问题不是他们为何未能反击,而是他们最终如何取得了成功。“在这些篇章中,”他在引言中写道,“我们将看到一个不完美的国家和一个不完美的领袖,在面对法西斯迫害时长期无所作为之后,努力行善。”他暗示,那个时代令人惊叹的,不是许多美国人所珍视的“战争或许可以避免”的希望,而是这个国家最终奋起,将工业、意识形态、精神和军事的全部力量投入到将法西斯主义从地球上铲除的事业中。

To suggest that the United States in the mid-twentieth century was, at its heart, an antifascist nation is no small claim these days. In the decade-plus since Donald Trump descended his golden escalator, historians have been busy excavating what a Roosevelt aide described as the “latent Nazism” in American life. Recent books have explored Americans’ embrace of eugenics and racism, anti-egalitarianism and antisemitism, nativism and illiberal politics. They have also explored the literal Fascism that took root in the U.S. during the thirties, when avowedly pro-Nazi organizations held mass rallies at Madison Square Garden and Henry Ford cozied up to Hitler.

在当今时代,说二十世纪中期的美国本质上是一个反法西斯国家,绝非轻描淡写的论断。自唐纳德·特朗普走下金色扶梯以来的十多年里,历史学家们一直在忙着挖掘一位罗斯福助手所说的美国生活中“潜伏的纳粹主义”。近年的著作探讨了美国人对优生学和种族主义、反平等主义和反犹主义、本土主义和反自由政治的拥抱。它们还探讨了三十年代在美国扎根的字面意义上的法西斯主义,当时公开亲纳粹的组织在麦迪逊广场花园举行大规模集会,亨利·福特与希特勒交好。

This work has helped make our own backlash moment more comprehensible: despite the myth of liberal progress, the reactionary and quasi-Fascist strains of American society have long been there. But the scholarly trend has obscured something that once seemed obvious—during the defining crisis of the century, the U.S. fought Fascism with everything it had. Hitchcock declares this struggle an “inspiring story of America,” with all the necessary caveats. In 1941, the aviator Charles Lindbergh may still have been praising Hitler’s air power and railing against undue Jewish influence. The federal government, though, was securely in the hands of committed antifascists. Foremost among them was Roosevelt, who maintained that democracy and Fascism could not coexist.

这些研究帮助我们更好地理解当下的反弹时刻:尽管有自由主义进步的神话,美国社会中反动和准法西斯的脉络早已存在。但学术潮流遮蔽了一些曾经显而易见的事实——在二十世纪的决定性危机中,美国倾其所有与法西斯主义作战。希区柯克宣称这场斗争是一个“鼓舞人心的美国故事”,并附上了所有必要的限定。1941年,飞行员查尔斯·林德伯格可能仍在赞美希特勒的空中力量,抨击所谓犹太人的过度影响。然而,联邦政府牢牢掌握在坚定的反法西斯主义者手中。其中最重要的是罗斯福,他坚持认为民主与法西斯主义无法共存。

In Hitchcock’s telling, Roosevelt is both hero and antihero: the man who refused to heed warnings of a looming disaster—until, in the nick of time, he did. Born into a wealthy and storied political family in New York’s Hudson Valley, Roosevelt grew up expecting an easy life. For years, those expectations held firm. Though the region where he grew up leaned Republican, Roosevelt joined the Democratic Party and rose swiftly through state government. Just before the First World War, with a Democrat, Woodrow Wilson, in the White House, he was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy, the same post that his legendary cousin Theodore once held. In 1920, at the tender age of thirty-eight, he won a spot on the national ticket as the Party’s Vice-Presidential candidate. Although it turned out to be a Republican year, Roosevelt emerged as a rising star and a Democratic standard-bearer.

在希区柯克的叙述中,罗斯福既是英雄也是反英雄:一个拒绝听取灾难迫近警告的人——直到千钧一发之际,他终于听了。罗斯福出生于纽约哈德逊河谷一个富裕而显赫的政治世家,从小便期待轻松的人生。多年来,这些期待一直成立。尽管他成长的地区倾向共和党,罗斯福却加入了民主党,并迅速在州政府中崛起。第一次世界大战前夕,民主党人伍德罗·威尔逊入主白宫,罗斯福被任命为海军部助理部长——正是他那位传奇的堂兄西奥多曾经担任过的职位。1920年,年仅三十八岁的他赢得了民主党副总统候选人的全国提名。尽管那一年最终是共和党获胜,罗斯福却崭露头角,成为民主党的旗手。

Then, in 1921, the first great tragedy of his life struck. One day in August, he came down with a fever and numbness throughout his body; by the next morning, he could not move. The culprit turned out to be polio, a dreaded disease of the pre-vaccine twentieth century. Despite the best therapies, he never regained the ability to walk unaided. Like many biographers, Hitchcock sees this physical ordeal as a turn of events that deepened Roosevelt’s character. But “A Shadow Over the World” is not primarily a biography of Roosevelt. Instead, the book offers a collective account of the “colorful, angry, tumultuous years” of his Presidency, when “chaos, fear, and profound human insecurity ruled” the globe.

然后,在1921年,他人生中第一场重大悲剧降临了。八月的一天,他突发高烧,全身麻木;到第二天早上,他已经无法动弹。罪魁祸首是脊髓灰质炎——疫苗问世前二十世纪令人恐惧的疾病。尽管接受了最好的治疗,他再也无法独立行走。与许多传记作者一样,希区柯克认为这场身体上的磨难加深了罗斯福的品格。但《世界上的阴影》主要不是一部罗斯福传记。相反,这本书对他总统任期内那些“多彩、愤怒、动荡的岁月”进行了集体性的叙述,那时“混乱、恐惧和深刻的人类不安全感统治着”全球。

For Roosevelt’s generation, no historical experience carried more weight than the First World War—or, as it was commonly known until 1939, the Great War. As Hitchcock notes, it is impossible to understand the thirties without that earlier war as a reference point: a grand cautionary tale about what to do and what not to do in response to European conflict. By the time Roosevelt became President, in 1933, most Americans viewed the war as a huge mistake. Progressives mourned the death of reform amid patriotic jingoism. Conservatives shuddered to think how close the country had come to permanent entangling alliances. Americans across the political spectrum agreed that the bloodshed had been a colossal waste of money and human life. Meant to be “the war to end war” and to make the world “safe for democracy,” it had instead produced instability, economic catastrophe, and imperial rivalry.

对罗斯福那一代人来说,没有什么历史经验比第一次世界大战——或者按1939年前的通行说法,大战——更具分量。正如希区柯克所指出的,不理解那场更早的战争作为参照点,就不可能理解三十年代:它是一个宏大的警示故事,告诉人们面对欧洲冲突该做什么、不该做什么。到1933年罗斯福就任总统时,大多数美国人认为那场战争是一个巨大的错误。进步派哀叹改革在爱国主义的沙文主义狂热中夭折。保守派一想到国家差点陷入永久性的纠缠联盟就不寒而栗。美国各政治派别一致认为,那场流血是对金钱和生命的巨大浪费。它本应是“终结一切战争的战争”,本应让世界“为民主而安全”,结果却带来了动荡、经济灾难和帝国争霸。
A proNazi rally.
A pro-Nazi rally at Madison Square Garden, in May, 1934.
1934年5月,麦迪逊广场花园举行的一场支持纳粹的集会。
Photograph from Alamy

The war also gave new force to two powerful ideological movements, Soviet Communism and European Fascism, both of which seemed hellbent on destabilizing, then remaking, the global order. “A Shadow Over the World” is especially effective at describing the rise of Fascism in the twenties, first in Italy and then, more haltingly, in Weimar Germany. It was Benito Mussolini, not Adolf Hitler, who created the Fascist playbook: fomenting a national crisis through “political terrorism,” turning “angry young men” into thuggish enforcement agents, attacking the legitimacy of the existing government, and then demanding a new government in its place. In discussing such techniques, Hitchcock studiously avoids comparisons to the present, though one can’t help but wonder whether certain details were chosen for their current resonance. “I am in top form. Huge crowd,” Germany’s propaganda minister, Joseph Goebbels, wrote in his diary in 1933 after leading a book-burning rally.

那场战争还赋予了两股强大的意识形态运动以新的力量:苏联共产主义和欧洲法西斯主义,两者似乎都执意要颠覆、然后重塑全球秩序。《世界上的阴影》在描述二十年代法西斯主义的崛起方面尤为出色,先是在意大利,然后更为曲折地在魏玛德国。是贝尼托·墨索里尼,而非阿道夫·希特勒,创造了法西斯主义的剧本:通过“政治恐怖”煽动国家危机,将“愤怒的年轻人”变成暴力的执法打手,攻击现政府的合法性,然后要求以新政府取而代之。在讨论这些手法时,希区柯克刻意避免与当下进行比较,尽管读者不禁会想,某些细节是否因其当代共鸣而被特意挑选。“我状态极佳。人山人海。”德国宣传部长约瑟夫·戈培尔在1933年主持一场焚书集会后在日记中写道。

Such moments are chilling to read about, in part because we know where they will lead. At the time, however, the meaning of Fascism wasn’t so clear. Though we now tend to view antisemitism as the ideology’s molten core, many Americans, well into the thirties, associated Fascism mainly with anti-Communism, which had its own powerful constituency. “Their chief object is to fight socialism, communism, and anarchism,” the New York Times wrote in an early article about Italy’s Fascisti. The Hearst newspaper chain’s first profile of Hitler made no explicit mention of antisemitism, emphasizing instead his hatred of the Bolsheviks. Even in the mid-thirties, the Chicago Tribune quoted one Fascist supporter in Spain explaining that “what Spaniards mean by fascist is a government that keeps order. That is what they want—that, and to destroy the Marxists.” To many Americans, early Fascism sounded less like a foreign menace than like a familiar form of anti-Communist politics.

读到这样的时刻令人不寒而栗,部分原因是我们知道它们将引向何方。然而在当时,法西斯主义的含义并不那么清晰。尽管我们现在倾向于将反犹主义视为这一意识形态的熔融核心,但直到三十年代中后期,许多美国人仍将法西斯主义主要与反共联系在一起,而反共本身拥有强大的支持群体。“他们的主要目标是打击社会主义、共产主义和无政府主义,”《纽约时报》在一篇关于意大利法西斯党的早期文章中写道。赫斯特报业集团对希特勒的第一篇人物特写没有明确提及反犹主义,而是强调他对布尔什维克的仇恨。即使在三十年代中期,《芝加哥论坛报》还引用西班牙一位法西斯支持者的话解释说:“西班牙人所说的法西斯,是指维持秩序的政府。那就是他们想要的——那个,再加上消灭马克思主义者。”对许多美国人来说,早期的法西斯主义听起来不像外来威胁,倒像是一种熟悉的反共政治。

In any case, the nation’s approach toward Europe was not to meddle in its internal affairs but, rather, to avoid another terrible Continental war. Throughout the Western world, the twenties were a period of high hopes and big thinking about global peace; the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by more than sixty nations, including the United States, intended to outlaw war altogether.

无论如何,美国对欧洲的态度不是干涉其内部事务,而是避免另一场可怕的欧洲大陆战争。在整个西方世界,二十年代是一个对全球和平抱有高度期望和宏大构想的时期;1928年的《凯洛格—白里安公约》由包括美国在内的六十多个国家签署,意图彻底废除战争。

Once the Great Depression hit, there seemed to be even less reason to get involved in Europe’s mess. The statistics are familiar, but they bear repeating: between 1929 and 1932, the U.S. stock market lost roughly ninety per cent of its value, and unemployment reached twenty-four per cent. No wonder most Americans favored dealing with things at home rather than worrying about Europe. Some even called for a national dictator who could take the crisis in hand and get the economy functioning again. Instead, the country elected Franklin Roosevelt, who, in Hitchcock’s words, “offered them not dictatorship but democracy.”

大萧条来袭后,似乎更没有理由卷入欧洲的乱局。这些统计数字人们耳熟能详,但仍值得重复:1929年至1932年间,美国股市市值蒸发了约百分之九十,失业率达到百分之二十四。难怪大多数美国人倾向于先处理国内事务,而不是担心欧洲。有些人甚至呼吁设立一位国家独裁者来掌控危机、让经济重新运转。结果,这个国家选举了富兰克林·罗斯福,用希区柯克的话说,他“提供给他们的不是独裁,而是民主”。

As Hitchcock observes, Roosevelt’s personal motivations and deepest convictions are notoriously difficult to parse. As President, he often told people what they wanted to hear, not necessarily what he thought. He spent little time writing reflections or elaborating on his decision-making. Because he died in office, he left behind no retrospective summaries or grand narratives of his Presidency. His Secretary of War Henry Stimson likened conversing with Roosevelt to “chasing a vagrant beam of sunshine around a vacant room.” Historians can sympathize. Among the most persistent questions about Roosevelt is whether he possessed a coherent world view or just a topnotch set of political instincts.

正如希区柯克所观察到的,罗斯福的个人动机和最深层的信念出了名地难以解析。作为总统,他经常对人们说他们想听的话,而不一定是他真实的想法。他很少花时间写反思或阐述自己的决策过程。因为他在任内去世,没有留下任何回顾性的总结或关于其总统任期的宏大叙事。他的战争部长亨利·史汀生把与罗斯福交谈比作“在一间空房间里追逐一束飘忽不定的阳光”。历史学家们对此深有同感。关于罗斯福最持久的问题之一是:他究竟拥有一套连贯的世界观,还是仅仅拥有一流政治直觉。

Hitchcock believes that there was a there there—a few fundamental ideas and commitments that guided Roosevelt’s actions. One was the notion of interdependence, in both domestic politics and foreign affairs. “It is literally true that the ‘self-supporting’ man or woman has become as extinct as the man of the Stone Age,” Roosevelt declared, as the governor of New York. “Without the help of thousands of others, any one of us would die, naked and starved.” In Hitchcock’s account, Roosevelt eventually extended this analysis to the fight against Fascism.

希区柯克相信,罗斯福确实有实质内核——几个指导其行动的基本理念和承诺。其一是相互依存的观念,无论在国内政治还是外交事务中。“‘自食其力’的男人或女人已经像石器时代的人一样灭绝了,这句话字面上就是事实,”罗斯福在担任纽约州州长时宣称。“没有成千上万其他人的帮助,我们任何一个人都会赤身裸体地饿死。”在希区柯克的叙述中,罗斯福最终将这一分析延伸到了反法西斯斗争。

It is impossible to read “A Shadow Over the World” without wondering what happened to the thoughtful, generous style of political leadership that Roosevelt embodied. Educated as a man of the world, he spoke both French and German. He devoured approximately a dozen newspapers every day, divided between morning and evening rounds. To Hitchcock, the indelible feature of Roosevelt’s Presidency was his desire to protect democratic norms and processes amid crises, even as critics accused him of being a power-mad dictator or a Communist sympathizer. “Here in America we are waging a great and successful war,” Roosevelt told the nation in 1936. “It is a war for the survival of democracy. We are fighting to save a great and precious form of government for ourselves and for the world.” Hitchcock calls those words “the thesis of the rest of his presidency.”

读《世界上的阴影》,不可能不去想罗斯福所体现的那种深思熟虑、宽厚大度的政治领导风格究竟去了哪里。他受过世界公民式的教育,会说法语和德语。他每天吞读大约十几份报纸,分早晚两轮阅读。对希区柯克来说,罗斯福总统任期不可磨灭的特征,是他在危机中保护民主规范和程序的愿望,即便批评者指责他是权力狂独裁者或共产主义同情者。“在美国,我们正在打一场伟大而成功的战争,”罗斯福在1936年告诉全国。“这是一场为民主生存而进行的战争。我们正在为拯救一种伟大而珍贵的政府形式而战,为了我们自己,也为了世界。”希区柯克称这番话为“他余下总统任期的总纲”。

One question Hitchcock poses is why Roosevelt did not act sooner to confront the threat of Fascism or try to protect that “great and precious form of government” in places such as Spain, Austria, and France. Despite Hitchcock’s admiration for Roosevelt, “A Shadow Over the World” is largely an account of the President’s confusion and undue caution vis-à-vis European Fascism. The repetition can grow tiring, but that frustration is precisely the point. If Roosevelt really believed what he said, why did he wait so long to act on it?

希区柯克提出的一个问题是:罗斯福为什么没有更早采取行动对抗法西斯威胁,或者为什么没有在西班牙、奥地利和法国等地保护那种“伟大而珍贵的政府形式”?尽管希区柯克钦佩罗斯福,《世界上的阴影》在很大程度上是对总统在面对欧洲法西斯主义时的困惑和过度谨慎的记述。这种重复可能会让人读得疲惫,但这种挫败感恰恰是重点所在。如果罗斯福真的相信自己说的话,他为什么等了那么久才付诸行动?

One reason was the Neutrality Act, first passed in 1935 with Roosevelt’s reluctant support and then, in various iterations, renewed year after year, even in the wake of Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia, the Spanish Civil War, Kristallnacht_,_ and Hitler’s seizure of Austria and the Czech Sudetenland. The laws constrained the United States from selling weapons to any government actively engaged in war—an appealing idea, perhaps, but one with perverse effects. The U.S. could not sell arms to the valorous Republican government in Spain, but it was free to sell oil and grain and machinery to the Nazis (who were not, technically, at war for most of the thirties).

原因之一是《中立法案》。该法案于1935年首次通过,罗斯福勉强支持,之后以各种版本年复一年地续期,即使在意大利入侵埃塞俄比亚、西班牙内战、水晶之夜、希特勒吞并奥地利和捷克苏台德地区之后也是如此。这些法律禁止美国向任何正在交战的国家政府出售武器——这个想法或许很吸引人,却产生了荒谬的效果。美国不能向西班牙英勇的共和政府出售武器,却可以自由地向纳粹出售石油、粮食和机器(因为纳粹在三十年代大部分时间里严格来说并未处于战争状态)。

The laws reflected mainstream American opinion at the time: Europe’s problems were Europe’s problems. So did U.S. immigration policy, which was generally hostile to newcomers, especially Jewish ones. Despite impassioned lobbying and organizing efforts, Roosevelt kept his distance from the plight of European Jews—he was willing to express sympathy but not to open the gates. In the spring of 1939, when nearly a thousand Jewish refugees aboard the St. Louis, a German steamer, reached American waters, U.S. officials sent them back to meet their fate in Hitler’s Europe.

这些法律反映了当时美国的主流舆论:欧洲的问题是欧洲自己的问题。美国的移民政策也是如此,总体上对新来者充满敌意,尤其是对犹太移民。尽管有充满激情的游说和组织努力,罗斯福始终与欧洲犹太人的困境保持距离——他愿意表达同情,却不愿打开大门。1939年春,当近千名犹太难民乘坐德国轮船“圣路易斯号”抵达美国水域时,美国官员将他们遣返,让他们回到希特勒统治下的欧洲去面对自己的命运。

Even as President, Roosevelt did not single-handedly have the power to defy the Neutrality Acts or to upend the nation’s restrictive immigration laws. Still, Hitchcock wonders, couldn’t he have done more to show which side the U.S. was on? From his first moment in office, Roosevelt enjoyed overwhelming Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress. His repeated electoral victories were landslides of a sort that has become unthinkable in the twenty-first century; in 1936, he won more than sixty per cent of the popular vote and a whopping ninety-eight per cent of the Electoral College. Thanks to the New Deal, he presided over a vastly expanded administrative state that was responsive to executive direction. He also had a well-organized grassroots constituency. While Hitler was dismantling independent labor unions in Germany, Roosevelt was championing them in the U.S., which gave him a wide base of support for New Deal initiatives.

即便身为总统,罗斯福也没有单枪匹马地违抗《中立法案》或推翻国家限制性移民法的权力。但希区柯克仍然追问:他难道不能做得更多,来表明美国站在哪一边吗?从就任之初,罗斯福就在国会两院享有压倒性的民主党多数。他屡次选举胜利都是压倒性的,其程度在二十一世纪已不可想象;1936年,他赢得了超过百分之六十的普选票和高达百分之九十八的选举人票。得益于新政,他领导着一个大幅扩张、对行政指令反应灵敏的行政国家。他还拥有组织良好的草根支持群体。当希特勒在德国解散独立工会时,罗斯福在美国支持工会,这为他的新政举措赢得了广泛的支持基础。

In short, Roosevelt was a strong President who showed, time and again, that he could lead the country in unlikely directions. That political power, however, came with limits. He may have had a Democratic majority, but it was a fractious one, dominated by Southern Democrats committed to preserving Jim Crow. And, as Hitchcock writes, antisemitism “coursed through the bloodstream of American public life,” including the blue-blooded foreign-policy establishment. At the White House, Roosevelt’s inner circle urged him to stay focussed on the Depression and the New Deal, the defining issues of his Presidency. Within the diplomatic corps, advisers suggested that the real global threat was the Soviet Union and the “militant left,” not whatever was happening in Italy or Germany.

简而言之,罗斯福是一位强势总统,一次又一次地证明了他能带领国家走向出人意料的方向。然而,这种政治权力也有其限度。他或许拥有民主党多数,但这是一个分裂的多数,由致力于维护吉姆·克劳法的南方民主党人主导。而且,正如希区柯克所写,反犹主义“流淌在美国公共生活的血液中”,包括蓝血贵族主导的外交政策建制派。在白宫,罗斯福的核心圈子敦促他专注于大萧条和新政——他总统任期的决定性议题。在外交使团内部,顾问们认为真正的全球威胁是苏联和“激进左翼”,而不是意大利或德国正在发生的一切。

Some Americans saw things differently, and their prescient warnings form the backbone of Hitchcock’s body politic. First among them is the newspaper columnist Dorothy Thompson, who secured an interview with Hitler in 1931 and spent the rest of the decade sounding the alarm about what she described as the Nazis’ “peculiar mixture of Nordic myth, antisemitism, militaristic tradition, desperado nationalism and moronized socialism.” Thompson was widely celebrated in her day as the “First Lady of American Journalism.” (She was also the wife of the novelist Sinclair Lewis, whose book “It Can’t Happen Here” stoked worries about homegrown Fascism.) As Hitchcock puts it, she was “almost Roosevelt’s alter ego,” the Cassandra who saw what was coming when the President couldn’t, or wouldn’t.

有些美国人看法不同,他们富有先见之明的警告构成了希区柯克笔下政治体的骨干。其中首推报纸专栏作家多萝西·汤普森(Dorothy Thompson),她在1931年设法采访了希特勒,并在随后的十年里不断拉响警报,称纳粹是“北欧神话、反犹主义、军国主义传统、亡命徒民族主义和低能化社会主义的奇特混合物”。汤普森在她那个时代被广泛誉为“美国新闻界第一夫人”。(她也是小说家辛克莱·刘易斯的妻子,刘易斯的书《这里不会发生》引发了人们对本土法西斯主义的担忧。)正如希区柯克所说,她“几乎是罗斯福的另一个自我”,是那位在总统不能或不愿看到未来时预见一切的卡珊德拉。

Thompson had her share of allies. “A Shadow Over the World” brings to life the vibrant antifascist “network” around Roosevelt, filled with journalists and policymakers and civic leaders desperate to make the White House listen. Their ranks included luminaries such as Ernest Hemingway, the Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes (“the most outspoken antifascist in the cabinet”), and the rabbi Stephen Wise, all of whom deployed their public influence to spread the word about Nazi atrocities. Hitchcock also gives due credit to the many women at the forefront of that same effort, including the Labor Secretary Frances Perkins, the reporter Martha Gellhorn (who later married Hemingway), and the First Lady, Eleanor Roosevelt. On this issue, as on so many others, Eleanor was out ahead of her husband.

汤普森有不少盟友。《世界上的阴影》生动呈现了罗斯福身边充满活力的反法西斯“网络”,其中满是记者、政策制定者和公民领袖,他们拼命想让白宫听到自己的声音。他们的行列中包括欧内斯特·海明威、内政部长哈罗德·L·伊克斯(Harold L. Ickes,“内阁中最直言不讳的反法西斯主义者”)和拉比斯蒂芬·怀斯(Stephen Wise)等知名人物,他们都运用自己的公共影响力传播纳粹暴行的消息。希区柯克还充分肯定了站在同一努力前沿的众多女性,包括劳工部长弗朗西丝·珀金斯(Frances Perkins)、记者玛莎·盖尔霍恩(Martha Gellhorn,后来嫁给了海明威)以及第一夫人埃莉诺·罗斯福。在这个问题上,正如在许多其他问题上一样,埃莉诺走在了丈夫前面。

Hitchcock’s point in mapping this network is not just to provide a contrast to Roosevelt. He argues that the antifascist opinions and strategies developed in such circles provided a framework for national opinion and policy once events drew the U.S. into war. Given Hitchcock’s interest in this broader civic context, it is surprising that he does not pay more attention to the Popular Front, the uneasy coalition of Communists, socialists, liberals, and progressives that defined left-wing politics in the late thirties. Though Popular Front groups took on domestic issues such as labor and civil rights, antifascism was their raison d’être. Indeed, it was the Stalin-dominated Comintern that called for such a coalition in 1935 to oppose the urgent threat of global Fascism. Years later, during the Red Scare, American Communists joked that their greatest crime was to have been “prematurely antifascist” in an age when few Americans were prepared to face reality.

希区柯克描绘这一网络的意义,不仅仅是为了与罗斯福形成对比。他认为,在这些圈子里发展起来的反法西斯观点和策略,为事件将美国拖入战争后的全国舆论和政策提供了框架。鉴于希区柯克对更广泛公民背景的兴趣,令人惊讶的是他没有更多地关注人民阵线——那个由共产党人、社会主义者、自由派和进步派组成的不稳定联盟,它定义了三十年代后期的左翼政治。尽管人民阵线团体也关注劳工和民权等国内议题,反法西斯主义才是它们存在的理由。事实上,正是斯大林主导的共产国际在1935年呼吁建立这样一个联盟,以对抗全球法西斯主义的紧迫威胁。多年后,在红色恐慌期间,美国共产党人开玩笑说,他们最大的罪行是在很少有美国人准备好面对现实的时代“过早地反法西斯”。

Although the antifascist left may have been vindicated by history, the widespread association of antifascism with Communism helps explain why Americans, including Roosevelt, came so late to the cause. During the thirties, anti-Communism was at least as powerful as antifascism in the U.S., and many Americans expressed skepticism about any political movement associated with Moscow. In 1938, when the Texas congressman Martin Dies, Jr., became chairman of a House committee tasked with investigating “un-American activities,” his putative aim was to go after Communists and Fascists equally. The Communist Party did itself no favors the following year when, in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, it performed an about-face on Fascism. The pact was a disaster for the Popular Front, but the severing of the ideational link between Communism and antifascism probably helped the antifascist cause at home. After 1939, it became possible—and necessary—to envision an antifascist politics that could be defined as truly American.

尽管反法西斯左翼最终被历史证明是正确的,但反法西斯主义与共产主义之间的广泛关联,有助于解释为什么包括罗斯福在内的美国人如此之晚才加入这一事业。在三十年代,反共在美国至少与反法西斯一样强大,许多美国人对任何与莫斯科有关的政治运动都持怀疑态度。1938年,得克萨斯州众议员小马丁·戴斯(Martin Dies, Jr.)成为众议院一个负责调查“非美活动”的委员会主席时,他表面上的目标是同等打击共产党人和法西斯分子。次年,共产党在纳粹—苏联互不侵犯条约签订后对法西斯主义来了个一百八十度大转弯,这对自己毫无益处。该条约对人民阵线是一场灾难,但共产主义与反法西斯主义之间观念联系的切断,可能反而帮助了国内的反法西斯事业。1939年之后,构想一种可以被定义为真正美国式的反法西斯政治,变得既可能又必要。

According to Hitchcock, Roosevelt always “instinctively hated fascism.” But not until 1939 did he start to embrace the idea that a literal war against actually existing Fascist powers would be both desirable and inevitable. The title “A Shadow Over the World” comes from a speech Roosevelt delivered that September, just weeks after Hitler invaded Poland, launching the Second World War. “I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass,” he told Congress. “I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candor, that darker periods may lie ahead.”

据希区柯克所述,罗斯福始终“本能地憎恨法西斯主义”。但直到1939年,他才开始接受这样一种观念:一场针对实际存在的法西斯政权的字面意义上的战争,既是可取的,也是不可避免的。《世界上的阴影》这个书名来自罗斯福那年九月发表的一篇演讲,就在希特勒入侵波兰、发动第二次世界大战几周之后。“我希望能提供一种希望,即笼罩世界的阴影可能迅速消散,”他对国会说。“我不能。事实迫使我坦率地说,更黑暗的时期可能还在前面。”

At last, he sounded more like Dorothy Thompson, unflinching and resolute. Even so, it would take more than two years for the U.S. to enter the war. Hitchcock thinks that putting the right ideas in place was a necessary first step; without Roosevelt’s early articulation of aims, it would have been impossible to mobilize American society on the epic scale required for total war. Over the past half century, Americans have grown accustomed to regional conflicts fought by specialized professional troops, in which the support of Congress or the American public seems more or less irrelevant. The Second World War demanded mass buy-in; every factory, every worker, every young man, every housewife had to play a role. Hitchcock maintains that persuasion had to come first—that, for a democracy to fight, its citizens must know what they are fighting for. “The Second World War was at its heart a war of ideas,” he concludes.

终于,他听起来更像多萝西·汤普森了——毫不退缩,坚定不移。即便如此,美国参战还要再等两年多。希区柯克认为,把正确的理念确立起来是必要的第一步;没有罗斯福早期对目标的阐述,就不可能以全面战争所需的史诗级规模动员美国社会。在过去半个世纪里,美国人已经习惯了由专业化职业军队进行的地区冲突,在这些冲突中,国会或美国公众的支持似乎或多或少无关紧要。第二次世界大战需要全民投入;每一座工厂、每一个工人、每一个年轻人、每一个家庭主妇都必须发挥作用。希区柯克坚持认为,说服必须先行——一个民主国家要打仗,其公民必须知道自己在为什么而战。“第二次世界大战本质上是一场思想之战,”他总结道。

But ideas go only so far. If the Second World War was an ideological war, it was also an economic and bureaucratic one, fought for control of the world’s raw materials and industrial capacity. When it came to the practicalities of mobilization, administrative competence proved at least as important as high-flown rhetoric. So did the capability to manufacture vast quantities of airplanes, tanks, and bullets. Hitchcock believes that Roosevelt’s New Deal vision blended seamlessly with his war aims; both emphasized democracy, collective action, and global interdependence. New Deal experiments also helped build the bureaucratic infrastructure that made the war effort possible.

但思想的作用是有限的。如果说第二次世界大战是一场意识形态战争,它同时也是一场经济和官僚战争,争夺的是世界原材料和工业产能的控制权。在动员的实际操作层面,行政能力至少与高调 rhetoric 同样重要。制造大量飞机、坦克和子弹的能力也是如此。希区柯克认为,罗斯福的新政愿景与他的战争目标无缝融合;两者都强调民主、集体行动和全球相互依存。新政的实验还帮助建立了使战争努力成为可能的官僚基础设施。

In the end, it was neither ideas nor organization—neither Thompson nor Roosevelt—that persuaded the U.S. to enter the war. The Japanese did that, when they attacked Pearl Harbor, in December, 1941. As a historian of the European theatre, Hitchcock devotes only a single chapter to Japan’s imperial expansion in Asia during the thirties. He also ends his book before Pearl Harbor, arguing that the essential features of the American war effort, including the national commitment to fighting Fascism, were in place by then. For Hitchcock, the turning points came earlier, in 1940 and 1941, as Hitler blitzed his way through Continental Europe. Moved more by geopolitical reality than by idealism, Roosevelt began to insist that the U.S. would have to aid Britain—and fight Fascism—or face the extinction of democracy.

最终,说服美国参战的既不是思想也不是组织——既不是汤普森也不是罗斯福。是日本人做到了这一点,他们在1941年12月袭击了珍珠港。作为欧洲战场的历史学家,希区柯克只用了单独一章来论述三十年代日本在亚洲的帝国扩张。他也在珍珠港事件之前结束了这本书,认为美国战争努力的基本特征——包括对抗击法西斯主义的全国性承诺——到那时已经就位。对希区柯克来说,转折点出现在更早的1940年和1941年,当时希特勒闪电般地横扫欧洲大陆。罗斯福更多地被地缘政治现实而非理想主义所驱动,开始坚持认为美国必须援助英国——必须与法西斯主义作战——否则将面临民主的灭绝。

By the fall of 1941, much of the country had come to agree with him, though influential groups, such as the isolationist America First Committee, mounted fierce opposition. Hitchcock highlights key moments of escalating national commitment: Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech, on January 6, 1941, with its rousing statement of war aims; the creation of the lend-lease policy that March, with its promise of virtually unlimited arms for Great Britain; and the release of the Atlantic Charter, in August, 1941, jointly issued by Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, which envisioned a postwar order characterized by free trade, democratic rights, economic security, and territorial stability. The implication is that the U.S. would have entered the war and fought the good fight even without Pearl Harbor. But it’s worth remembering that the U.S. did not declare war on Germany until December 11th, four days after the Japanese attack. Even then, Hitler was the first mover. Only after Germany declared war on the U.S. did the U.S. respond in kind.

到1941年秋,全国大部分地区已经同意他的看法,尽管孤立主义的“美国优先委员会”等有影响力的团体发起了激烈反对。希区柯克突出了全国承诺逐步升级的关键时刻:1941年1月6日罗斯福的“四大自由”演讲,其中对战争目标作出了振奋人心的阐述;同年3月租借政策的出台,承诺向英国提供几乎无限的武器;以及1941年8月罗斯福与温斯顿·丘吉尔联合发布的《大西洋宪章》,构想了一个以自由贸易、民主权利、经济安全和领土稳定为特征的战后秩序。其隐含的意思是,即使没有珍珠港事件,美国也会参战并打好这场正义之战。但值得记住的是,美国直到12月11日——日本袭击四天之后——才对德国宣战。即便在那时,也是希特勒先动手的。直到德国对美国宣战,美国才以同样的方式回应。

After the war ended, of course, anti-Communism became the guiding principle in U.S. foreign policy, bringing Washington into friendly relations with Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, and military dictatorships elsewhere. But antifascism remained a vital part of Americans’ self-conception, as if entering the war and winning it had always been America’s destiny. Hitchcock’s book restores a sense of contingency to that story, even as it tries to draw lessons from the nineteen-thirties. One might conclude from America’s halting embrace of antifascism during that decade that we should listen to the Dorothy Thompsons of the world, who warn that the unthinkable—global war, societal collapse, genocide—really can happen. The difficulty is knowing which Dorothy Thompsons to listen to. False certainty is common enough in political life, and history is crowded with confident warnings that proved wrong. Roosevelt is arguably the more useful example, precisely because of his hesitation, pragmatism, and self-interest. What made him a great President, in Hitchcock’s view, was his willingness to watch and listen, and to change his mind as events unfolded.

当然,战争结束后,反共成为美国外交政策的指导原则,使华盛顿与佛朗哥的西班牙、萨拉查的葡萄牙以及其他地方的军事独裁政权建立了友好关系。但反法西斯主义仍然是美国人自我认知的重要组成部分,仿佛参战并赢得胜利从来就是美国的宿命。希区柯克的书为这个故事恢复了偶然性的感觉,尽管它也试图从三十年代汲取教训。人们或许会从美国在那十年中对反法西斯主义的迟疑拥抱中得出结论:我们应该倾听世界上的多萝西·汤普森们,她们警告说,不可想象的事情——全球战争、社会崩溃、种族灭绝——真的可能发生。困难在于知道该听哪些多萝西·汤普森。虚假的确定性在政治生活中相当常见,历史上充斥着被证明是错误的自信警告。罗斯福或许是更有用的榜样,恰恰因为他的犹豫、务实和自利。在希区柯克看来,使他成为伟大总统的,是他愿意观察和倾听,并随着事态发展改变自己的想法。

“A Shadow Over the World” describes Roosevelt’s “evolution from an anti-war pacifist, a nationalist, and an American exceptionalist to a man who embraced a stunningly ambitious global task: the safeguarding of democracy in a world that had fallen under the shadow of fascism.” But Roosevelt did not abandon American exceptionalism, even as he made his case for global war. Instead, he sought to transform what it meant—not the land grabs of Manifest Destiny or the imagined security of isolationism but a commitment to defending democratic ideals and basic human welfare in the face of global tyranny and immiseration.

《世界上的阴影》描述了罗斯福“从一个反战的和平主义者、民族主义者和美国例外论者,演变为一个拥抱了惊人宏大的全球任务的人:在一个陷入法西斯阴影的世界中捍卫民主。”但罗斯福在为全球战争辩护的同时,并没有放弃美国例外论。相反,他试图改变它的含义——不再是“昭昭天命”的领土扩张,也不是孤立主义所想象的虚幻安全,而是在面对全球暴政和贫困化时,致力于捍卫民主理想和基本人类福祉。

Roosevelt’s blind spots and foot-dragging are worth remembering as a counterpoint to the self-congratulatory Greatest Generation myth. But, as Hitchcock notes, the remarkable thing is that he changed his mind at all, and that the nation followed. For the rest of the twentieth century, America’s role in combatting Fascism helped define its national identity. At a moment when that self-conception seems to be waning, “A Shadow Over the World” makes a vigorous case for antifascism as a central inheritance of the modern American political tradition. ♦

罗斯福的盲点和拖延值得铭记,作为对自我庆贺的“最伟大一代”神话的反衬。但正如希区柯克所指出的,了不起的是他最终改变了想法,而且国家跟随了他。在二十世纪的剩余时间里,美国在抗击法西斯主义中的角色帮助定义了它的国家认同。在一个这种自我认知似乎正在衰落的时刻,《世界上的阴影》有力地论证了反法西斯主义是现代美国政治传统的核心遗产。♦

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