A Reporter at Large

He Helped Stop Iran from Getting the Bomb

他曾阻止伊朗获得核弹
A former C.I.A. officer says that he recruited scientists as part of the United States’ effort to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.
一名前中情局官员透露,他曾招募科学家参与美国破坏伊朗核计划的行动。
Person sitting
Photographs by Thomas Prior for The New Yorker

Not long after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Kevin Chalker set out to become a spy. He was a thirty-year-old graduate student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, in Washington, D.C., and he and his wife, Young, had a newborn son. She thought that this idea was terrible. Having grown up in a left-leaning Jewish family in Chicago, she pictured killings and coups. She also worried that Chalker would turn out like his father—a gruff and taciturn man who had once worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. He had ended up as a construction worker in Fort Worth, Texas, where he kept trying to interest his daughter-in-law in Jesus and guns. The last time the family got together, he’d offered to teach her how to use a knife to kill someone.

2001年9月11日恐怖袭击发生后不久,凯文·查克(Kevin Chalker)就立志要成为一名间谍。当时他是华盛顿特区约翰斯·霍普金斯大学高级国际研究学院的三十岁研究生,与妻子杨(Young)刚迎来新生儿子。妻子认为这个念头糟糕透顶——她在芝加哥一个倾向左翼的犹太家庭长大,脑海中浮现的是暗杀与政变。她还担心查克会变得像他父亲那样:那位曾效力于中央情报局的男子性情粗粝、沉默寡言,最终在得克萨斯州沃斯堡当建筑工人,总试图让儿媳对耶稣和枪支产生兴趣。上次家庭聚会时,这位父亲甚至提出要教她如何用刀杀人。

Chalker reminded her that his father had been an enlisted marine who joined a C.I.A. paramilitary force operating in Southeast Asia during the early years of the Vietnam War, a time when “the agency was doing wacky stuff all over the world.” Chalker promised her that he would do only “traditional espionage—no big deal,” adding, “Everything’s going to be cool.”

查克提醒她,自己的父亲曾是一名海军陆战队士兵,越战初期加入了中情局在东南亚的一支准军事部队——那时“中情局正在全球各地搞些疯狂勾当”。查克向她保证,自己只会从事“传统间谍活动——没什么大不了的”,并补充道:“一切都会很顺利。”

He queued up a few days later at the C.I.A. table at his school’s national-security job fair. Chalker had a more martial bearing than most graduate students. He had been a nationally ranked judo fighter and a Golden Gloves boxer in high school and college, and he had spent two years at the United States Air Force Academy, in Colorado Springs. (He dropped out because of an eye injury sustained in a bar fight, and eventually graduated from Texas Christian University.) He also had an aptitude for languages. He could read and speak basic Mandarin and fluent Japanese—he had lived and worked in Japan for several years after college. He had even picked up a little Farsi from an Iranian American girlfriend in college. A C.I.A. analyst at the job fair put Chalker on the phone with a native Japanese speaker at headquarters, to test his proficiency, and soon he was on the way to a Marriott in northern Virginia for the first of half a dozen interviews. In the fall of 2003, he entered the first class of C.I.A. trainees who had applied after 9/11. The training culminated in months at the Farm, the legendary C.I.A. base at Camp Peary, in Virginia. The agency assigned each new trainee a randomly generated alias for internal use. Chalker became Fred E. Snappleton.

几天后,他在学校国家安全招聘会上排到了中情局的展台前。查克比大多数研究生更有军人气质。他在高中和大学期间曾是全国排名前列的柔道选手和金手套拳击手,还在科罗拉多斯普林斯的美国空军学院待过两年(因酒吧斗殴导致眼伤退学,最终毕业于得克萨斯基督教大学)。他还有语言天赋,能读写基础汉语,日语流利——大学毕业后曾在日本工作生活数年。大学时甚至从一位伊朗裔美国女友那里学了点波斯语。招聘会上的中情局分析员让查克与总部日语母语者通话测试水平后,他很快就被安排前往弗吉尼亚北部万豪酒店参加首轮面试——这仅是六轮面试的开始。2003年秋,他成为9·11事件后首批中情局学员。训练在弗吉尼亚皮里营传奇的中情局基地“农场”达到高潮,新学员会被随机分配内部使用的化名。查克成了弗雷德·E·斯纳普尔顿。

I first heard of Chalker in 2018. After a six-year career at the agency, he had set up a security-consulting company, and one of its few publicly known clients was the emirate of Qatar. That spring, the investor Elliott Broidy—a mega-donor to President Donald Trump—filed a lawsuit calling Chalker a former C.I.A. “cyber-operative” and claiming that Qatar had paid him to orchestrate cyberattacks against Broidy and several others. The hacking and leaking of a vast trove of Broidy’s private e-mails revealed that he had tried to turn the Trump White House against Qatar as part of his successful effort to win hundreds of millions of dollars in business with the United Arab Emirates, Qatar’s chief regional rival, for a private intelligence company he owned. I wrote articles for the Times about the contents of Broidy’s leaked e-mails, and I also covered his evolving legal claim against Chalker. I had no reason to doubt that Chalker had played a role in the hack.

我第一次听说查克是在2018年。他在中情局工作六年后,成立了一家安全咨询公司,其少数公开客户之一便是卡塔尔酋长国。那年春天,特朗普总统的重要金主、投资人埃利奥特·布罗迪提起诉讼,称查克是中情局前“网络特工”,并指控卡塔尔雇佣他对布罗迪及数名人士策划网络攻击。布罗迪大量私人邮件遭黑客入侵并泄露,揭露他曾试图推动特朗普政府与卡塔尔对立——这正是他为自己拥有的私人情报公司赢得数亿美元阿联酋业务的关键策略,而阿联酋正是卡塔尔在地区的主要竞争对手。我曾为《纽约时报》撰写关于布罗迪泄露邮件内容的报道,也持续关注他对查克不断变更的法律指控。当时我毫不怀疑查克确实参与了这起黑客事件。

So I was surprised when, in early 2024, Chalker sent me an e-mail introducing himself. He had read an article I wrote for this magazine about an innocent American caught up in spy-vs.-spy battles among Persian Gulf monarchies, and he wanted to talk. We arranged to meet at his office, high in the World Trade Center. Now fifty-four, Chalker is nearly six feet tall and barrel-chested, with short brown hair and a thick, graying red beard. His suite in the World Trade Center is cavernous, with a view that sweeps from the Brooklyn Bridge to the Statue of Liberty. A collection of historic encryption machines is displayed in vitrines in the main room, and in his corner office he keeps half-empty bottles of obscure liquors from around the world. The whole place could have accommodated dozens of people. But, aside from a receptionist, he appeared to be alone.

所以在2024年初,当乔克主动发邮件自我介绍时,我颇感意外。他读了我为《纽约客》撰写的一篇文章,内容是关于一位无辜美国人卷入波斯湾君主国间谍战的遭遇,希望与我聊聊。我们约在他位于世贸中心高层的办公室见面。现年五十四岁的乔克身高近六英尺,胸膛宽阔,留着棕色短发和浓密泛红的灰白胡须。他在世贸中心的办公室极为宽敞,视野从布鲁克林大桥一直延伸到自由女神像。主厅的玻璃柜里陈列着历代加密设备,角落办公室则摆着半瓶来自世界各地的冷门烈酒。整个空间足以容纳数十人办公,但除了前台接待,这里似乎只有他独自一人。

Chalker told me that his consulting firm, Global Risk Advisors, had once employed nearly two hundred people, almost all of them former military and intelligence officers. Before Broidy’s lawsuit, the company had earned about a hundred million dollars a year. By 2018, he had also founded a second company, Qrypt, which develops cutting-edge quantum encryption, and had hired dozens of computer programmers. But Broidy’s suit received tremendous publicity, driving away all of Global Risk’s clients, even the Qataris, and Chalker was forced to lay off its entire staff. Qrypt had been negotiating its first large contract, with the Pentagon, until a counterintelligence official called about Broidy’s allegations. Chalker virtually shut down that company, too, although he kept its name on the empty suite in the World Trade Center. Since then, Chalker said, he had “not earned a single penny.” He lost a lectureship at Yale after the Yale Daily News wrote about Broidy’s lawsuit. Banks refused to do business with him. His insurance company had even cancelled his homeowner’s policy, because he was deemed too great a risk.

查克告诉我,他的咨询公司“全球风险顾问”曾雇佣近两百名员工,几乎全是前军事和情报官员。在布罗迪提起诉讼前,这家公司年收入约一亿美元。到2018年,他还创立了第二家公司Qrypt,专门开发尖端量子加密技术,并聘请了数十名程序员。但布罗迪的诉讼引发了巨大关注,吓跑了全球风险顾问的所有客户,连卡塔尔客户也不例外,查克被迫遣散了全部员工。Qrypt当时正与五角大楼洽谈首份大合同,直到一位反情报官员来电询问布罗迪的指控。查克几乎关停了这家公司,只保留了世贸中心空置办公室的挂牌。查克说,自那以后他“没赚到一分钱”。《耶鲁每日新闻》报道布罗迪诉讼后,他失去了耶鲁大学的教职。银行拒绝与他往来。保险公司甚至以风险过高为由,取消了他的房屋保险。

News reports, citing anonymous sources and Broidy’s suit, alleged that Chalker had hacked various other eminent figures, including the Emirati Ambassador to Washington; that he had spied on Switzerland’s top prosecutor and two Republican senators; and that he had deployed such spy tricks as covert surveillance and honey traps—sexual lures—in order to help Qatar secure the rights to host the soccer World Cup in 2022. Chalker, who denied all of these allegations, told me that the stress of Broidy’s lawsuit made him vomit so frequently that he eventually required esophagus surgery.

据新闻报道援引匿名消息来源及布罗伊迪的诉讼称,查克曾入侵多位其他显要人物的系统,包括阿联酋驻华盛顿大使;他曾监视瑞士最高检察官及两名共和党参议员;为帮助卡塔尔赢得2022年足球世界杯主办权,他还动用了秘密监控与美人计等间谍手段。查克否认了所有指控,他告诉我,布罗伊迪的诉讼带来的压力让他频繁呕吐,最终不得不接受食道手术。
Immigration officer at Ellis Island renames Frankenstein.
“Frankenstein’s Monster? From now on, it’s just Frankenstein. Welcome to America.”
“科学怪人的怪物?从现在起,就叫科学怪人。欢迎来到美国。”
Cartoon by Benjamin Schwartz
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Recently, however, he and Broidy had settled the suit. Chalker told me that the terms were confidential but that he wanted to repair his reputation. He had always been an American patriot, he insisted, and to prove it he was willing to talk publicly, for the first time, about his years of clandestine work for the C.I.A.—which, he said, had “prevented Iran from getting a nuke.”

然而,最近他与布罗伊迪达成了和解。乔克告诉我,和解条款是保密的,但他希望挽回自己的声誉。他坚称自己始终是一位美国爱国者,为了证明这一点,他愿意首次公开谈论自己多年来为中央情报局(C.I.A.)所做的秘密工作——他说,这些工作“阻止了伊朗获得核武器”。

Chalker told me that, just as he had promised his wife, he had never personally engaged in combat or killing. Yet, during many conversations in the past two years, he also told me that he had risked his life for the agency, and that he indirectly carried responsibility for some killings. He acknowledged that luck—“right place, right time”—had played a big role in the success of his various covert operations. But he also insisted that he had helped obtain pivotal information that laid the groundwork for more than a decade of American efforts to disrupt the Iranian nuclear-weapons program, from the Stuxnet cyberattacks, which occurred around 2010, to the Obama Administration’s nuclear deal, in 2015, to the U.S. air strikes on Iranian atomic-energy facilities in the summer of 2025.

查克告诉我,正如他向妻子承诺的那样,他从未亲身参与过战斗或杀戮。然而,在过去两年的多次交谈中,他也告诉我,他曾为这个机构冒过生命危险,并且间接地为一些杀戮负有责任。他承认运气——“天时地利”——在他各项秘密行动的成功中扮演了重要角色。但他也坚称,自己曾帮助获取关键情报,为美国十多年来破坏伊朗核武器计划的行动奠定了基础——从2010年前后的“震网”网络攻击,到2015年奥巴马政府的核协议,再到2025年夏季美国对伊朗原子能设施的空中打击。

Chalker’s strategy for clearing his reputation—which had been the foundation of his lucrative business—was unexpected, to say the least. It is nearly unheard of for ex-spies to divulge their past activities. But Chalker spoke in detail, aware that I would vet his narrative. As we talked, I sensed a certain resentment. The C.I.A., despite all the crucial and dangerous work he claimed to have done, had offered him no help as the lawsuit ruined his life. I wondered how much of his story I could trust.

查克(Chalker)为洗刷自己名誉所采取的策略——这本是他利润丰厚之事业的基石——至少可以说,出人意料。前间谍主动透露过往行动,几乎是闻所未闻之事。但查克却讲得颇为详尽,他清楚我会核实他的叙述。交谈中,我察觉到一丝怨愤。尽管他声称自己曾为中央情报局(C.I.A.)完成过诸多关键而危险的任务,但当那场官司毁掉他的生活时,局里却未施以援手。我不禁怀疑,他的故事究竟有几分可信。

Chalker told me that his application to the C.I.A. included an hours-long multiple-choice test. Instead of posing questions about geography or world affairs, the test asked him to tackle hypothetical situations, from the frustrating to the dangerous. Chalker concluded that the test was primarily assessing his psychology. “They don’t want Boy Scouts,” he told me. “They want people just crazy enough to do all the crazy things the agency asks.”

查克告诉我,他申请中情局时参加了一场长达数小时的多项选择题测试。题目没有涉及地理或国际事务,而是要求他处理各种假设情境——从令人沮丧的到危机四伏的。查克认为,这场测试主要是在评估他的心理状态。“他们不要童子军,”他对我说,“他们要的是刚好够疯狂、能完成局里所有疯狂任务的人。”

He began as a clandestine-services trainee on the East Africa desk at C.I.A. headquarters, in Langley, Virginia. Part of the desk’s work at the time entailed paying favored Somali warlords to capture or kill suspected Al Qaeda terrorists. Chalker told me, “We would say, ‘Fifty thousand dollars alive or twenty-five thousand dead’—because we preferred to have them alive so we could debrief them.” He told me that one of his assignments was shipping dry ice to Mogadishu; the C.I.A. used it to transport human-tissue samples for DNA testing, to confirm the identity of a corpse before paying a bounty.

他最初在弗吉尼亚州兰利的中央情报局总部担任东非事务处的秘密行动受训员。当时该部门的部分工作包括向受青睐的索马里军阀支付酬金,以抓捕或击毙疑似基地组织恐怖分子。查克告诉我:“我们会说'活捉五万,击毙两万五'——因为我们更希望活捉他们以便审讯。”他还告诉我,他的任务之一就是向摩加迪沙运送干冰;中情局用干冰运输人体组织样本进行DNA检测,以便在支付赏金前确认尸体身份。
Safe door
A keypad-secured door leading to a safe room in Chalker’s house. The decal features a common saying in intelligence circles.
一扇通往查克家中安全屋的密码门。门贴上是情报圈里的一句常用语。

It isn’t clear how many high-level targets, if any, were killed while Chalker worked on the East Africa desk. But the broader pattern of C.I.A. payments to certain warlords was later exposed by a diplomat critical of the practice; the payments, intended to bolster warlords and clans who could counter Islamist extremism, helped set off a backlash in Somalia that culminated in an Islamist takeover in 2006. (The U.S. responded by backing an Ethiopian invasion.) Matt Bryden, an expert on the Horn of Africa, interviewed Mogadishu warlords who were on the C.I.A. payroll at the time, and he told me that the payments had triggered “a whole chain of counterproductive consequences, as far as the U.S. was concerned.”

尚不清楚乔克在东非处任职期间有多少高层目标被击毙(如果有的话)。但中情局向某些军阀付款的更大模式后来被一位批评这种做法外交官揭露;这些款项旨在支持能够对抗伊斯兰极端主义的军阀和部族,却引发了索马里的强烈反弹,最终导致2006年伊斯兰主义者夺取政权。(美国的回应是支持埃塞俄比亚入侵。)非洲之角问题专家马特·布赖登采访了当时接受中情局报酬的摩加迪沙军阀,他告诉我,这些付款引发了“就美国而言,一连串适得其反的后果”。

Transportation in and out of Mogadishu was another problem for the agency. Armed groups had menaced C.I.A. teams driving to and from neighboring Djibouti. Planes arriving in Mogadishu risked getting hit by gunfire as they descended. The desk chief asked Chalker for ideas. Chalker told me that, by reading cable traffic and studying airplane tail numbers, he discovered that inbound charter flights delivering khat—a legal narcotic leaf that many Somalis chew for a buzz—always landed without trouble. When Chalker told me this story, he imitated the desk chief’s throaty response: “Are you telling me that we are going to use U.S.-taxpayer dollars to hire a bunch of fucking drug dealers to fly in and out of fucking Mog?” Then: “That is the best fucking idea I ever heard.” (The desk chief didn’t respond to phone messages, but a former senior official told me that the C.I.A.’s inspector general questioned, but ultimately consented to, the reliance on khat-shipment flights. I am withholding certain names out of consideration for the agency’s policies around protecting the identities of its officers; elsewhere in this article, I have withheld details in order to protect individuals whose coöperation with the agency may put them in danger.)

进出摩加迪沙的交通是令中情局头疼的另一大难题。武装团伙曾多次袭击往返邻国吉布提的中情局车队。飞抵摩加迪沙的飞机在降落时随时可能遭遇枪击。部门主管向查克征求对策。查克告诉我,通过研读电报往来记录并核对飞机尾翼编号,他发现那些运送恰特草(一种合法的麻醉性叶片,许多索马里人通过咀嚼它来获得快感)的包机总能平安降落。当查克讲述这段往事时,他模仿着部门主管那沙哑的嗓音:“你是说我们要用美国纳税人的钱,雇一帮该死的毒贩子进出该死的摩加迪沙?”紧接着又说:“这他妈是我听过最棒的主意。”(该部门主管未回复电话留言,但一位前高级官员告诉我,中情局监察长曾质疑过依赖恰特草运输航班的方案,但最终予以批准。出于对中情局保护人员身份政策的尊重,本文隐去了部分姓名;同时为避免为协助中情局工作的人员招致危险,文中亦省略了若干细节。)

After Chalker completed his assignment, he spent months learning defensive driving, the use of weapons, surveillance detection, nighttime land navigation, techniques to assess the credibility of a potential asset, and other tradecraft. Roleplay exercises at the Farm simulated traps or manipulations that officers might face. About a quarter of the class failed to complete the course, and Chalker told me that many others quit the agency within their first year of “being a spook in the real world.” His class of more than a hundred and twenty trainees eventually slimmed down to fewer than fifty. At thirty-three, Chalker was older than most of his classmates, with more experience professionally and abroad, and he was tapped to spend a day with James Pavitt, then the agency’s director of operations. (Other former officials confirmed that Pavitt, who died in 2022, sometimes invited trainees to join him for a day, though they stepped out during sensitive meetings.)

完成培训任务后,查克花了数月时间学习防御性驾驶、武器使用、监视识别、夜间陆地导航、评估潜在线人可信度的技巧及其他谍报技术。农场里的角色扮演练习模拟了特工可能遭遇的陷阱或操控手段。大约四分之一的学员未能完成课程,查克告诉我,还有更多人在“成为现实世界间谍”的第一年内离开了中情局。他们那期超过一百二十名学员的班级,最终缩减到不足五十人。三十三岁的查克比大多数同学年长,拥有更丰富的专业经验和海外经历,因此被选中与当时的中情局行动处处长詹姆斯·帕维特共度一天。(其他前官员证实,已于2022年去世的帕维特确实偶尔会邀请学员陪同工作一日,不过在敏感会议期间学员们会回避。)

At the Farm graduation ceremony, envelopes labelled with the first name and last initial of each new officer were placed on a large table. Chalker told me that it was like “finding your seat at a wedding.” Inside were the officers’ first assignments. Many were bound for Iraq, which the U.S. had recently invaded. Chalker assumed that, based on his language skills, he would work in East Asia. Instead, the slip inside the envelope for “Kevin C.” said “CP/IRANNUC”—counterproliferation, working against Iran’s nuclear-weapons program.

在农场毕业典礼上,一张大桌上摆放着写有新晋特工姓名首字母的信封。查克告诉我,这就像“在婚礼上找座位”。信封里装着特工们的首次任务派遣。许多人被派往美国刚入侵的伊拉克。查克原以为凭借自己的语言能力,会被派往东亚工作。然而,写着“凯文·C”的信封里,纸条上却写着“CP/IRANNUC”——防扩散部门,针对伊朗核武器项目展开工作。

Chalker was shocked. A classmate with a doctorate in physics had been assigned to enter a two-year Japanese-language program, whereas Chalker, fluent in Japanese, had received a D in physics at the Air Force Academy and had never set foot in the Middle East. After a bus dropped the graduates off at Langley, he started to complain. The officer handling Chalker’s assignment told him to “go sit in that fucking cubicle and don’t speak until spoken to.” Chalker told me that the officer happened to be Valerie Plame, whose cover had recently been blown by the George W. Bush Administration, in a retaliatory leak that came after her husband publicly questioned the rationale behind the Iraq War. (When I called Plame, she told me that she did not remember Chalker or use such profanities, but she said that she had been parked in a personnel job at headquarters at the time and would indeed have rejected complaints about a trainee’s assignment.)

查克大为震惊。一位拥有物理学博士学位的同学被派去参加为期两年的日语培训,而查克本人日语流利,在空军学院物理课只拿了D,还从未踏足过中东。当大巴将毕业生们送到兰利总部后,查克开始抱怨。负责分配工作的官员命令他“滚去那个该死的隔间里坐着,没叫你开口就别说话”。查克告诉我,这位官员正是瓦莱丽·普莱姆——她的特工身份不久前刚被小布什政府报复性泄露,起因是其丈夫公开质疑伊拉克战争的理由。(当我致电普莱姆时,她表示不记得查克其人,也否认说过粗话,但承认当时确实在总部人事部门任职,按惯例确实会驳回学员对工作分配的投诉。)

Before 9/11, Iran’s nuclear ambitions had been a relatively low priority for American spies. The C.I.A. knew that, in the late eighties, Iran had bought instructions for making an atomic bomb from the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan at a meeting in Dubai. But Khan had sold outdated blueprints, and the agency believed that this had handicapped the Iranians, who had never engineered the necessary centrifuges. Then the invasion of Iraq—although it turned up no evidence of a live threat from weapons of mass destruction—raised new concerns about how close Saddam Hussein had come in the nineties to obtaining a nuclear weapon. President Bush, alarmed, directed the National Security Council to prevent Iran from acquiring one.

9·11事件之前,伊朗的核野心对美国情报机构而言并非首要任务。中情局掌握的情报显示,上世纪八十年代末,伊朗曾在迪拜会晤巴基斯坦科学家阿卜杜勒·卡迪尔·汗,购得了原子弹制造指南。但汗出售的图纸早已过时,中情局认为这阻碍了伊朗的核计划——伊朗人始终未能造出必需的高速离心机。随后爆发的伊拉克战争虽未发现大规模杀伤性武器的现实威胁,却引发了新的担忧:萨达姆·侯赛因在九十年代究竟离获得核武器有多近?警觉的布什总统随即指示国家安全委员会:必须阻止伊朗获得核武器。

A debate over tactics unfolded within the Bush Administration. Chalker told me that, as he understood it, the Pentagon had suggested running commando operations to kill key Iranian scientists, as Israel subsequently did. But the C.I.A. proposed recruiting those scientists to defect, as U.S. spies had once courted Soviet physicists. Chalker paraphrased the agency’s pitch: “We can debrief them and learn so much more—and, if they say no, then you can kill them.” (A more senior agency official confirmed the broad strokes of his account.) The White House liked the agency’s idea, and Bush authorized the C.I.A. to conduct clandestine operations to stop Iran from building a bomb.

布什政府内部就行动策略展开了一场辩论。查克告诉我,据他了解,五角大楼曾建议效仿以色列后来的做法,通过突击队行动刺杀伊朗关键科学家。但中情局提议招募这些科学家叛逃,就像美国间谍当年策反苏联物理学家那样。查克转述了中情局的说辞:“我们可以通过审讯他们获取更多情报——如果他们拒绝,你们再动手也不迟。”(一位更资深的中情局官员证实了其说法的基本脉络。)白宫采纳了中情局的方案,布什授权中情局开展秘密行动以阻止伊朗制造核弹。

The C.I.A. program that Chalker described to me became publicly known in 2007, when the Los Angeles Times reported on the existence of an agency project called Brain Drain. But the details of the “invitations” to Iranian scientists have not previously been reported. (The C.I.A., which jealously guards its sources and methods, declined to comment on Chalker’s account.)

查克向我描述的这项中情局计划在2007年公之于众,当时《洛杉矶时报》报道了该机构一个名为“人才流失”项目的存在。但关于向伊朗科学家发出“邀请”的具体细节此前从未被披露。(中情局对其消息来源和行动方式讳莫如深,拒绝对查克的叙述置评。)
Knight kneeling before king.
“My liege, I pledge my sword, my life, and my car for airport pickups and drop-offs, even if it’s, like, super early.”
“陛下,我以我的剑、我的生命,以及我的车起誓,随时接送您往返机场,哪怕是那种超级大清早。”
Cartoon by Lars Kenseth
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When Chalker joined the Iran desk, roughly two hundred C.I.A. officers there were working on counterproliferation. But nearly all of them were analysts. Aside from the group’s chief and his deputy, only three others—including Chalker—were trained for field operations. (I reviewed internal documents that independently confirmed these numbers.) Chalker told me that there was an additional challenge: both of the more experienced operators were undergoing treatment for alcoholism, a common problem in their profession. Just weeks after he graduated from the Farm, Chalker became both the desk’s newest case officer and the most senior one available. Chalker recalled that the group’s chief had told him, dryly, “Snappleton, looks like you have a chance to excel.” Chalker suspected that his premature promotion was “a really, really bad idea.”

查克加入伊朗组时,该组约有二百名中情局官员从事反扩散工作。但其中几乎全是分析人员。除了组长和副组长,只有另外三人——包括查克——接受过实地行动训练。(我查阅的内部文件独立证实了这些数字。)查克告诉我还有个额外难题:两位较有经验的外勤人员都在接受酗酒治疗——这在他们这行很常见。从农场结业仅数周,查克就成了伊朗组最新晋的外勤特工,同时也是能出勤的最高级别特工。查克回忆组长曾面无表情地对他说:“斯纳普顿,看来你有机会大展拳脚了。”查克怀疑这种拔苗助升“实在是个糟透的主意”。

Chalker learned that the C.I.A. didn’t have a ready roster of Iranian scientists who might be persuaded to defect. In fact, the agency had few relevant assets inside Iran. About a decade earlier, however, a U.S. spy working in the region had obtained transformational insights from an Iranian nuclear physicist. This scientist, who was given the code name Bernadine, had even passed on detailed knowledge of the meeting in Dubai where the Iranians had bought nuclear secrets from A. Q. Khan. But Bernadine had since become erratic. After refusing any payments for nearly a decade, he had suddenly demanded hundreds of thousands of dollars. And the information he provided increasingly confused C.I.A. physicists; some of it didn’t even make scientific sense. Bernadine appeared to be useless—or, worse, a potential double agent. Chalker was asked to come up with a plan to recruit other scientists, and began by reading old cable traffic about how the agency had handled Soviet defectors in the John le Carré days.

查克了解到,中情局并没有一份现成的伊朗科学家名单,可以尝试说服他们叛逃。事实上,该机构在伊朗境内几乎没有相关资产。不过,大约十年前,一名在该地区工作的美国间谍曾从一位伊朗核物理学家那里获得了颠覆性的情报。这位代号为“伯纳丁”的科学家,甚至提供了伊朗人在迪拜从A·Q·汗手中购买核秘密的会议详情。但伯纳丁后来变得反复无常。在近十年拒绝任何报酬后,他突然索要数十万美元。而他提供的情报越来越让中情局的物理学家困惑;有些甚至不符合科学常识。伯纳丁似乎已毫无价值——或者更糟,可能是个双面间谍。查克被要求制定招募其他科学家的计划,他首先研读了旧时电报往来,了解在约翰·勒卡雷笔下的冷战时期,中情局是如何处理苏联叛逃者的。

Then, just a few months after Chalker set to work, Bernadine called. Like other covert assets, he had been given a phone number at C.I.A. headquarters to call if he wanted to talk or needed to be pulled out of Iran, along with a secret code and a passphrase to authenticate himself. Bernadine was now viewed with such suspicion that Chalker’s bosses suspected a setup. The unit’s chief told Chalker to arrange a meeting with Bernadine outside Iran but to consider the situation potentially hostile: if the Iranians had compromised Bernadine, their commandos might barge in to capture or kill Chalker. The night before Chalker left to meet Bernadine, in a European city, he thought that these might be his final hours with his family. His wife was pregnant with their second child. After dinner, their two-year-old offered him some of his ice cream, because “sharing is caring.”

就在查克开始工作几个月后,伯纳丁打来了电话。和其他秘密线人一样,他得到了中情局总部的一个电话号码,以便在需要谈话或需要撤离伊朗时联系,同时还配备了一个秘密代码和一句暗语来验证身份。伯纳丁如今备受怀疑,查克的上司怀疑这是个圈套。该部门主管指示查克在伊朗境外与伯纳丁会面,但要将此视为潜在敌对情况:如果伊朗人已经策反了伯纳丁,他们的突击队可能会闯入抓捕或杀害查克。在查克动身前往欧洲某城市与伯纳丁会面的前一晚,他想着这可能是与家人共度的最后时光。妻子正怀着他们的第二个孩子。晚餐后,两岁的儿子把自己的冰淇淋分给他一些,因为“分享就是关爱”。

The global war on terror was near its peak. “Everything was fast back then,” Chalker recalls. The agency sent him to the meeting alone and unarmed. According to Chalker, this was standard: if a case officer needed a weapon, “pretty much everything has already gone wrong.” When he reached the European city, he identified Bernadine on a prearranged street corner—he was the older man standing alone with quavering hands. They exchanged code words. (Chalker: “It’s always something like ‘I am looking for an Italian restaurant that serves lasagna.’ ‘I don’t eat Italian food but I love apple pie.’ ”) An operative would normally plan to walk alone to a hotel room to avoid being seen with an asset. But in this case the danger was that Bernadine might be conspiring to kidnap or murder Chalker, so he wanted bystanders to see them together. He escorted Bernadine through a nearby hotel lobby to a room he had reserved.

全球反恐战争正值高潮。“那时一切都很快,”查克回忆道。中情局派他独自前往会面,且未配武器。据查克所述,这是标准程序:若案件官员需要武器,“那基本上意味着事态已经失控”。抵达那座欧洲城市后,他在预先约定的街角认出了伯纳丁——那个双手微颤、独自站立的老者就是目标。他们交换了暗语。(查克说:“通常是类似'我在找供应千层面的意大利餐厅''我不吃意大利菜但喜欢苹果派'这样的对话。”)特工通常会独自前往酒店房间,避免被人看见与线人同行。但这次情况特殊——危险在于伯纳丁可能正密谋绑架或杀害查克,因此他反而需要让旁人看见两人在一起。他陪同伯纳丁穿过附近酒店大堂,走进了预定的房间。

As soon as the door closed, Chalker began hammering Bernadine with hostile questions. He recited details from the recent reports filed by Bernadine’s C.I.A. handler, and demanded that Bernadine explain his suspicious behavior. Bernadine looked baffled—nobody from the C.I.A. had ever treated him so disrespectfully. He said that he had never demanded any payments or taken any C.I.A. money. He insisted that he began working with the agency to protect his children from a dangerous nuclear-arms race, not to get rich. He also denied relaying the technical information that had so confused C.I.A. physicists, calling it obvious nonsense.

门一关上,查克便开始用一连串充满敌意的问题向伯纳丁发难。他复述了伯纳丁的中情局联络人近期报告中的细节,要求伯纳丁解释自己的可疑行为。伯纳丁一脸困惑——中情局从未有人如此不尊重他。他说自己从未索要过任何报酬,也没拿过中情局一分钱。他坚称自己与中情局合作是为了保护子女免受危险的核军备竞赛威胁,而非为了发财。他还否认传递过那些令中情局物理学家困惑不已的技术信息,称其显然是胡言乱语。

Chalker, unsure what to make of these denials, placed a notebook in front of Bernadine, who spent hours filling it with pages of new details and diagrams related to Iran’s nuclear program. While Bernadine returned to Iran, Chalker took the next flight out of the country.

查克不确定该如何看待这些否认,他在伯纳丁面前放了一本笔记本。伯纳丁花了几个小时,写满了与伊朗核计划相关的新细节和图表。伯纳丁返回伊朗后,查克随即搭乘下一班飞机离开了该国。

A team of C.I.A. officers detained Chalker at Dulles Airport. The agency was worried that he, too, might have flipped, and made him take a polygraph test. But physicists at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in Tennessee, said that the new scientific details from Bernadine checked out. Chalker also judged him to be honest. This raised an obvious question: If Bernadine hadn’t provided the bogus information or requested the payments, had his previous handler at the agency engaged in deception? Chalker later wrote a report accusing the handler of fabricating intelligence and embezzling from the C.I.A. Chalker said he had been told that the agency eventually recovered some two million dollars in stolen funds, and that the handler served time in prison.

中情局的一队特工在杜勒斯机场拦下了查克。局里担心他也可能叛变,让他接受了测谎。但田纳西州橡树岭国家实验室的物理学家说,伯纳丁提供的新科学细节经得起检验。查克也判断他是诚实的。这就引出了一个明显的问题:如果伯纳丁没有提供虚假信息或索要报酬,那么他之前在中情局的接头人是否参与了欺骗?查克后来写了一份报告,指控那名接头人捏造情报并从中情局贪污。查克说,他被告知中情局最终追回了约两百万美元的被盗资金,那名接头人也因此入狱服刑。

In the months after the meeting in Europe, Chalker arranged to sneak Bernadine’s wife and several close family members out of Iran. He then set out to meet again with Bernadine, this time in a Middle Eastern city, with the plan of escorting him to the United States. Using encrypted communications, Chalker directed a C.I.A. case officer in the city to set up a safe house for a rendezvous with Bernadine.

在欧洲会面后的几个月里,查克设法将伯纳丁的妻子和几位近亲秘密带离伊朗。随后他动身前往中东某座城市,准备与伯纳丁再次会合,计划护送其前往美国。通过加密通讯,查克指示中情局驻该城市的案件官员设立安全屋,作为与伯纳丁的会面地点。

When Chalker explained the plan to me, he taught me a lot of agency jargon. To pick up a key to the safe house, he set up a “brush-pass” in the city’s souk, in a busy alley where he and the local case officer might make contact unobserved. This followed a protocol known as Screening, Cover, and Flow. To spot the case officer, he asked her to describe her appearance, and he assigned her to carry both a “far recognition signal” (her “far” was a copy of the Financial Times, which is printed on distinctive pink paper) and a “near recognition signal” (her “near” was a scarf tied around the forward strap of a purse slung over her left shoulder). If she suspected surveillance, she was to remove the scarf to abort the handoff. He also gave the case officer a specific S.D.R., or “surveillance-detection route,” so that he could watch her arriving from an elevated spot and feel confident that nobody was tailing her.

查克向我解释行动计划时,教会了我不少情报术语。为取得安全屋钥匙,他在老城集市一条繁忙的巷子里安排了“擦身交接”,以便与当地联络官在不引人注目的情况下接触。这遵循着名为“筛查·掩护·流动”的行动规程。为辨认联络官,他让对方描述外貌特征,并指定她携带“远距识别信号”(她的“远信号”是那份用独特粉红色纸张印刷的《金融时报》)与“近距识别信号”(她的“近信号”是系在左肩挎包前侧背带上的丝巾)。若她察觉被监视,便要解下丝巾中止交接。他还为联络官规划了特定的“反监视行进路线”,以便从高处观察她抵达时的状况,确保无人尾随。

She showed up on time. Yet she carried a different newspaper, and her scarf was tied to the wrong part of her purse strap, in the back. Was this a signal or just sloppiness? Chalker panicked. He took the key, but he sent a message to Bernadine to stay in Iran, then hurried to the airport.

她准时出现了。但她拿的报纸不一样,围巾系在手提包背带的位置也不对——系在了后面。这是暗号还是粗心?查克慌了。他拿了钥匙,却给伯纳丁发了条消息让她留在伊朗,然后匆匆赶往机场。

Three security officers met him at Dulles. This time, a team of gray-haired C.I.A. veterans grilled him about each step of his plan. Chalker wondered what he’d done wrong. Had the Iranians grabbed Bernadine? He interrupted his interrogation: “I get it. I am fired. Just tell me why, and let me go home!”

三名安保人员在杜勒斯机场接机。这一次,审讯他的是中情局一群头发花白的老手,他们盘问着他计划的每一个步骤。查克(Chalker)暗自思忖自己究竟做错了什么。难道是伊朗人抓住了伯纳丁(Bernadine)?他打断了审问:“我明白了。我被解雇了。但请告诉我原因,然后让我回家!”

In fact, the questioning of Chalker was part of a postmortem examination of a misstep by the case officer who had handed him the key. She was married to a U.S. official working in the country, and she had rented the safe house using an alias, along with a fake passport. The country’s intelligence officers had already been monitoring her and, upon reviewing the rental agreement, concluded that she was a spy. (Not a very good one—she’d botched the newspaper and scarf signals.) According to Chalker, the country’s intelligence agency had shared the location of the safe house with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—who likely would have abducted Chalker had he shown up. It’s not clear how the C.I.A. learned of the tipoff to the I.R.G.C., but it was presumably through intercepted communications.

事实上,对查尔克的盘问是对那名交给他钥匙的案官失误的善后审查的一部分。她嫁给了一名在该国工作的美国官员,并用化名和假护照租下了那间安全屋。该国情报人员早已在监视她,在审查租赁协议后断定她是间谍(而且不太高明——她把报纸和围巾的信号搞砸了)。据查尔克称,该国情报机构已将安全屋的位置告知伊斯兰革命卫队——如果他当时出现,很可能已被对方绑架。目前尚不清楚中情局如何得知向伊斯兰革命卫队通风报信之事,但很可能是通过截获通讯。

Working with a different undercover officer, this time in a European city, Chalker successfully extracted Bernadine to America. A C.I.A. cable with the subject heading “Exceptional Performance Award for Fred E. Snappleton” commended Chalker for “exemplary ops sense in guiding the asset and his family during this sensitive time,” and awarded him a twenty-five-hundred-dollar bonus.

在另一名卧底探员的配合下,查克这次在一座欧洲城市成功将伯纳丁转移至美国。中情局一份题为“弗雷德·E·斯纳普顿杰出表现奖”的电文赞扬查克“在此敏感时期引导线人及其家属时展现出卓越的行动意识”,并授予他两千五百美元奖金。

To find other potential defectors, Chalker asked Bernadine to name everyone he knew involved in the Iranian nuclear program. After eight months, according to one internal count that I reviewed, Chalker’s debriefings of Bernadine had produced hundreds of intelligence reports, as well as leads for several other operations, which in turn generated more successful defections.

为了寻找其他潜在的叛逃者,查克要求伯纳丁列出他所知的每一位参与伊朗核计划的人员。根据我查阅的一份内部统计,经过八个月的问询,查克从伯纳丁处获取的情报已形成数百份报告,并为其他几项行动提供了线索,而这些线索又促成了更多成功的叛逃。

One pivotal source emerged under sordid circumstances. In 2006, Chalker was based in the C.I.A.’s New York station. He sometimes coördinated with the Department of Homeland Security to look out for targets passing through J.F.K., and he developed contacts inside the department’s agencies. One day, Chalker’s counterparts in D.H.S. called with a tip: the local police in a town in the Hudson Valley had received a complaint about an Iranian-born scientist allegedly soliciting prostitutes. F.B.I. special agents told Chalker that he could join them as they questioned the man, and they all headed upstate.

一个关键线索的出现,背景却颇为不堪。2006年,乔克驻扎在中情局纽约站。他时常与国土安全部协作,留意途经肯尼迪机场的可疑人员,并在该部下属机构中发展了一些线人。某日,国土安全部的联络人传来消息:哈德逊河谷某小镇警方接到举报,称一名伊朗裔科学家涉嫌嫖娼。联邦调查局探员告知乔克可以参与问讯,一行人随即驱车北上。
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“我没想到这还是一家连锁店。”
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The scientist, Masud Naraghi, was about seventy years old. He had studied nuclear physics at the University of Michigan in the early sixties, finished a doctorate at Case Western Reserve University, then returned to Iran and worked for its atomic-energy agency. A short-lived marriage to an American woman had given him a green card, and he had quietly returned on his own to the United States in the early nineties, bringing with him a considerable amount of cash. He’d used the money to found an engineering firm, Torr International, just outside Newburgh, New York.

科学家马苏德·纳拉吉(Masud Naraghi)年约七十。六十年代初,他曾在密歇根大学攻读核物理,后在凯斯西储大学取得博士学位,接着返回伊朗,任职于该国原子能机构。他与一位美国女性的短暂婚姻让他获得了绿卡,九十年代初,他独自悄然回到美国,随身携带了相当可观的现金。他用这笔钱在纽约州纽堡市郊创立了一家工程公司——托尔国际(Torr International)。

Before Chalker and the F.B.I. agents sat down with Naraghi at his Torr office, Chalker checked with C.I.A. headquarters. He learned that other case officers had debriefed Naraghi years earlier and concluded that he did not know anything useful to the C.I.A. about Iran’s nuclear program. But, as Chalker listened to Naraghi answering the F.B.I.’s questions, he felt that the Iranian seemed “too smart to be playing so dumb.” Impulsively, Chalker threw out Bernadine’s real name and asked if Naraghi knew him. The scientist “turned sheet white,” Chalker said. He recalled thinking, with delight, Oh, you motherfucker.

在乔克与联邦调查局探员们前往纳拉吉位于托尔的办公室会面之前,乔克先向中央情报局总部核实了情况。他得知多年前已有其他情报官员对纳拉吉进行过问询,并认定此人对伊朗核计划并无中情局所需的有价值情报。然而,当乔克听着纳拉吉回答联邦调查局的提问时,他感觉这位伊朗人“聪明得不像在装傻”。乔克突然脱口说出伯纳丁的真名,询问纳拉吉是否认识此人。这位科学家“脸色瞬间惨白”,乔克回忆道。他当时欣喜地想:好家伙,可算逮到你了。

Naraghi, whom the C.I.A. code-named Shelve, turned out to have been the founding father of the country’s covert nuclear program—the J. Robert Oppenheimer of Iran. But he was no loyalist. Chalker concluded that Naraghi had embezzled from the Iranian government to build up the nest egg he used to found Torr. It took Chalker two years of empathetic listening and confident reassurance to convince Naraghi to coöperate fully. But in time Naraghi shared new insights about how Iran had overcome the weaknesses in A. Q. Khan’s blueprints and about the scale and scope of the country’s nuclear ambitions. An internal C.I.A. document recommending Chalker for another award said that Naraghi had provided a “new intelligence-reporting stream on the foundations of Iran’s desire to become a nuclear power.”

中情局代号为“书架”的纳拉吉,后来被证实是伊朗秘密核计划的开创者——堪称伊朗的罗伯特·奥本海默。但他并非忠诚的爱国者。查克发现,纳拉吉曾挪用伊朗政府的资金,为自己积累起创立托尔公司的原始资本。查克花了两年时间,通过共情倾听和坚定安抚,终于说服纳拉吉全面配合。纳拉吉最终透露了伊朗如何克服A·Q·汗设计图纸中的缺陷,并揭示了该国核计划的规模与野心。中情局内部一份为查克申请嘉奖的文件指出,纳拉吉提供了“关于伊朗谋求核力量之根基的全新情报来源”。

As they talked, Naraghi decided that he wanted to write a memoir about his career and defection. The agency envisaged the book as a public invitation for other Iranian nuclear scientists to defect as well, and Chalker worked government contacts at Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation to line up a publisher at its HarperCollins division. But News Corporation executives somehow directed Chalker to Daniel Halpern, the bushy-haired and left-leaning editor of the company’s literary imprint Ecco Press. When I called Halpern, he readily admitted that he was “quite suspicious of the C.I.A.,” and said that he vividly remembered Chalker’s visit to his office. Chalker and another officer had been “right out of central casting—everybody on the floor could tell they weren’t your usual authors,” and the whole project felt very “cloak and dagger.” Halpern told me he ultimately decided that Naraghi was unwilling to reveal enough for a commercially viable book. Still, a member of the Naraghi family told me that Masud, who died in 2020, left behind a completed manuscript. The family declined to share it with me and is now seeking to sell it to a new publisher.

谈话间,纳拉吉决定写一本回忆录,讲述自己的职业生涯和叛逃经历。中情局希望这本书能公开号召更多伊朗核科学家叛逃,于是查克通过政府关系联系了鲁珀特·默多克新闻集团旗下的哈珀柯林斯出版社。但新闻集团高管不知为何将查克引荐给了丹尼尔·哈尔彭——这位头发蓬乱、立场偏左的编辑,负责集团旗下文学品牌埃科出版社。当我致电哈尔彭时,他坦承自己“对中情局相当怀疑”,并清晰记得查克到访办公室的情形。查克和另一名探员“简直像从特工电影里走出来的——整层楼的人都看得出他们不是普通作者”,整个项目充满“谍影重重的氛围”。哈尔彭告诉我,他最终认定纳拉吉不愿透露足够多内容来支撑一本有商业价值的书。不过,纳拉吉家族成员透露,2020年去世的马苏德留下了一份完整手稿。家属拒绝向我提供这份手稿,目前正寻求将其出售给新的出版商。

To recruit an asset, most undercover C.I.A. case officers follow a method referred to during training as SADRH, for Spot, Assess, Develop, Recruit, and Handle. The painstaking process might take years. Chalker’s job had a different rhythm. He specialized in the “cold pitch”—recruiting a stranger in minutes. Perhaps a relative living in the West agrees to lure a scientist outside Iran, or an eminent physicist invites an Iranian to speak at a conference abroad. (The C.I.A. often set up conferences for that purpose.) Chalker, posing as a curious junior researcher, might arrange to bump into the scientist in a hallway and ask a question about his long-ago dissertation. Could they get coffee?

招募线人时,大多数中情局卧底特工都遵循训练中称为SADRH的方法——即识别、评估、发展、招募与掌控。这套繁琐流程可能耗时数年。而查克的工作节奏截然不同。他专精于“冷接触”——在几分钟内将陌生人发展为线人。或许是某位旅居西方的亲属同意引诱伊朗科学家出境,或是知名物理学家邀请伊朗学者赴海外会议演讲(中情局常为此类目的组织学术会议)。查克会伪装成求知若渴的初级研究员,刻意在走廊“偶遇”目标学者,就其多年前的学位论文提出疑问。能否一起喝杯咖啡?

Chalker said that, at least for him, the curious-scientist ruse never worked. He told me that every actual scientist he approached immediately guessed that he was a spy, from either the U.S. or Israel. “Every time I walk up and say, ‘Salaam habibi, how are you?,’ they just think, Oh, this is it, and they assume I am there to kill them.” Most of the time, he said, the terrified scientist was “compliant” enough to at least sit down in a café. Chalker typically had about ten minutes to explain, as gently as possible, that he was from the C.I.A., that he had the power to secure the scientist and his family a comfortable new life in the U.S.—and that, if the offer was rejected, the scientist, regrettably, would be assassinated. (Chalker tried to emphasize the happier potential outcome.)

查克说,至少对他而言,那种伪装成好奇科学家的把戏从未奏效。他告诉我,他接触过的每一位真正的科学家都立刻猜出他是间谍——不是美国的就是以色列的。“每次我走上前说'萨拉姆,亲爱的,你好吗?',他们只会想:哦,来了,然后认定我是来杀他们的。”他说,大多数时候,惊恐万分的科学家至少会“顺从地”在咖啡馆坐下。查克通常有十分钟时间,尽可能温和地解释自己来自中情局,有能力为这位科学家及其家人在美国安排舒适的新生活——而如果拒绝提议,很遗憾,这位科学家将被暗杀。(查克试图强调更乐观的那种可能性。)

Killing a civilian scientist would violate international law. The American government has denied ever doing it, and I found no evidence that the U.S. has carried out any such murders. A former senior agency official familiar with the Brain Drain project told me all that mattered was that Iranian scientists had believed they would be killed, regardless of whether the U.S. actually made good on the threat. And Israel had been conducting a campaign to assassinate Iranian scientists, which made the prospect of lethal reprisal highly plausible. Other former officials with knowledge of the project told me that the C.I.A. sometimes shared intelligence with Mossad which enabled its operatives to locate and kill a scientist. Such information exchanges were kept vague enough to preserve deniability if a more legalistic U.S. Administration later took office.

杀害平民科学家将违反国际法。美国政府始终否认曾采取此类行动,我也没有发现任何证据表明美国实施过此类谋杀。一位熟悉“人才流失”项目的前情报机构高级官员告诉我,关键在于伊朗科学家们相信美国会杀害他们,无论美国是否真的实施了威胁。而以色列一直在开展刺杀伊朗科学家的行动,这使得致命报复的可能性显得尤为真实。其他了解该项目的美国前官员告诉我,中央情报局有时会与摩萨德共享情报,使其特工能够定位并杀害科学家。这类信息交流被刻意模糊处理,以便未来若出现更注重法律程序的美国政府上台,美方仍能保持可推诿的余地。

According to Ronen Bergman’s “Rise and Kill First” (2018), a history of Israel’s targeted killings, Michael Hayden, Bush’s last C.I.A. director, told then President-elect Barack Obama that the Israeli assassination program “has no American relationship whatsoever,” and that the agency would, of course, never recommend such a thing. But, Hayden continued, his “broad intelligence judgement” was that the Israeli killings were very useful, because “the death of those human beings had a great impact” on deterring Iran from developing a bomb.

据罗南·伯格曼在《先发制人》(2018年)——一部关于以色列定点清除行动历史的著作——中所述,布什任内最后一任中情局局长迈克尔·海登曾告诉当时已当选总统的巴拉克·奥巴马:以色列的暗杀计划“与美国毫无关联”,中情局当然也绝不会建议采取此类行动。但海登接着表示,根据他的“宏观情报判断”,以色列的刺杀行动极为有效,因为“这些人的死亡对威慑伊朗发展核弹产生了巨大影响”。

The Iranian news media has blamed the deaths of at least eighteen scientists in the past two decades on Israeli and American spies; Israeli officials have done little to hide Mossad’s role in the assassinations, many of which were carried out with the assistance of internal Iranian opposition groups. In 2007, Ardeshir Hosseinpour, a physicist in his mid-forties, was killed in Isfahan, either by radiation or by poisonous gas. In 2010, a bomb planted on a parked motorcycle in Tehran killed Massoud Ali Mohammadi, who was fifty. Later that year, a bomb affixed to the car of Majid Shahriari, another scientist in his mid-forties, killed him and injured his wife. In 2011, gunmen on motorcycles shot and killed Darioush Rezaeinejad, aged thirty-five, as he and his wife were picking up their daughter from school; his wife was also wounded. In 2012, yet another bomb affixed to a car killed the thirty-two-year-old Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, along with his driver. And so on.

伊朗媒体将过去二十年里至少十八名科学家的死亡归咎于以色列和美国间谍;以色列官员几乎毫不掩饰摩萨德在这些暗杀行动中的作用,其中许多暗杀是在伊朗国内反对派组织的协助下完成的。2007年,四十多岁的物理学家阿尔德希尔·侯赛因普尔在伊斯法罕遇害,死因或是辐射中毒,或是毒气。2010年,德黑兰一辆停放摩托车上的炸弹炸死了五十岁的马苏德·阿里·穆罕默迪。同年晚些时候,另一名四十多岁的科学家马吉德·沙里亚里汽车上的炸弹炸死了他,并炸伤了他的妻子。2011年,三十五岁的达里乌什·礼萨伊内贾德和妻子接女儿放学时,被骑摩托车的枪手射杀;他的妻子也受了伤。2012年,又一起汽车炸弹事件炸死了三十二岁的穆斯塔法·艾哈迈迪·罗尚和他的司机。如此等等。

Chalker told me that he didn’t know the exact fates of the scientists who refused his offers. This wasn’t surprising, given that intelligence agencies compartmentalize information about sensitive operations. Citing stories from friends in the U.S. Special Forces, Chalker said he believed that, on at least a few occasions, U.S. commandos—such as Delta Force operatives, Navy SEALs, or members of the C.I.A.’s paramilitary Ground Branch—have carried out targeted killings of Iranian military officers. (Chalker said that the operators even had a term of art for such killings: X-boxing.) He could not name any Iranian scientists assassinated by Americans. But he is confident that those who rebuffed him were, in fact, killed—one way or another.

查克告诉我,他并不清楚那些拒绝他提议的科学家们的具体命运。考虑到情报机构对敏感行动的信息实行严格分隔,这并不令人意外。查克援引他在美国特种部队的朋友讲述的故事说,他相信至少在某些情况下,美国突击队——比如三角洲部队、海豹突击队或中情局准军事地面分支的成员——曾执行过针对伊朗军官的定点清除行动。(查克说,执行这类任务的操作员甚至有个专业术语:X-boxing。)他无法说出任何被美国人暗杀的伊朗科学家姓名。但他确信,那些拒绝他的人最终都以某种方式被清除了。

Israel’s assassination campaign sometimes complicated Chalker’s attempts to recruit defectors. He told me that an Iranian scientist who had agreed to coöperate with him—code-named Hustle—once casually mentioned that he was considering an invitation from a colleague outside Iran to attend a conference abroad. Surmising that Mossad must be trying to draw Hustle out of Iran in order to kill him, Chalker wrote out an urgent cable for the C.I.A. to send to the Israelis, taking the exceptional step of disclosing himself and his operation. He summarized the cable to me: “You do not have dibs. . . . And do not, I repeat, do not kill the white guy, about five-eleven, with brown hair and a red beard, who may be with him.” Hustle eventually defected to the U.S., via a city in Asia. According to an internal C.I.A. report, Hustle participated in “an intense, week-long debrief session” with specialists from the C.I.A. and the Department of Energy, and provided “detailed re-engineering” schematics of “Iran’s most advanced and sensitive nuclear technology,” along with “the locations of clandestine facilities within the missile development node of Iran’s weaponization program.” Chalker and a C.I.A. lawyer persuaded a university administrator to ask a member of its physics faculty to assess Hustle’s qualifications to enroll in graduate school; Hustle went on to complete a degree in the U.S. and started a successful new career. (I independently confirmed those aspects of his résumé.)

以色列的刺杀行动有时会干扰查克招募变节者的努力。他告诉我,一位代号“哈斯尔”的伊朗科学家曾同意与他合作,某次闲聊时提到正考虑接受国外同事的邀请出席海外会议。查克推测摩萨德很可能试图将哈斯尔引出伊朗实施刺杀,便紧急起草电报让中情局转告以色列人,破例透露了自己的身份和行动。他向我复述了电报要点:“你们没有优先权……切勿——重复一遍——切勿杀害那个可能与他同行的白种男子,身高约一米八,棕发红须。”哈斯尔最终经由某亚洲城市叛逃至美国。根据中情局内部报告,他接受了中情局与能源部专家“为期一周的密集问询”,提供了“伊朗最先进、最敏感核技术”的“详细逆向工程”示意图,以及“伊朗武器化计划导弹研发节点内秘密设施的位置”。查克与中情局律师说服某大学行政人员,请物理系教员评估哈斯尔攻读研究生的资格;哈斯尔随后在美国完成学位,开启了成功的新事业。(我独立核实了其履历中的这些信息。)

Chalker told me that two of the scientists he’d approached outside Iran— “complete dicks” who were “very confrontational”—had brusquely rebuffed him; he was certain that they had immediately reported him to Iranian intelligence, and in both instances he raced to an airport. He was also sure that both men were eventually killed, though he felt little remorse about it. Each scientist had made a choice to side firmly with Iran in a covert war with the U.S., at a time when Iranian-backed militias were actively killing American soldiers in Iraq. (The Pentagon has said that more than six hundred Americans died at the hands of such Iranian proxies.)

查克告诉我,他在伊朗境外接触过的两位科学家——“十足的混蛋”,“极具对抗性”——都粗暴地拒绝了他;他确信这两人立即向伊朗情报部门举报了他,而这两次他都火速赶往机场。他也确信这两人最终都被杀害了,尽管他对此几乎毫无愧疚。在伊朗支持的民兵组织于伊拉克境内积极杀害美军士兵的时期,这两位科学家都选择了在美伊暗战中坚定地站在伊朗一边。(五角大楼称,超过六百名美国人死于此类伊朗代理人之手。)

Another scientist was tantalized enough by Chalker’s offer to help him defect that he talked for more than two hours. But the scientist worried that the C.I.A. could not fulfill its promise to protect his wife and his children from the Iranian authorities. Chalker told me that he had insisted, “No, I can do this! I’ve done this so many times before—you don’t understand! And, you know, you are gonna die if you don’t let me do this.” The scientist still refused, telling Chalker, “If I say yes, they might die, and, if I say no, only I will.”

另一位科学家被查克的提议所吸引——查克承诺帮助他叛逃——两人交谈了两个多小时。但这位科学家担心中情局无法兑现承诺,保护他的妻儿免受伊朗当局的迫害。查克告诉我,他当时坚持说:“不,我能做到!我以前做过很多次——你不明白!而且你要知道,如果不让我帮你,你会死的。”那位科学家仍然拒绝了,他对查克说:“如果我答应,他们可能会死;如果我拒绝,只有我会死。”

Chalker told me that he “felt really bad about that one.” The scientist in question felt no loyalty to the Iranian government and, indeed, would have been happy to help defeat its nuclear program. He was sacrificing himself to protect his family. “My only job was to make them feel secure and safe, to get them to agree to let me take them out,” Chalker told me. “I just couldn’t convince him.”

查克告诉我,他“对那件事感到非常难过”。这位科学家对伊朗政府并无忠诚可言,事实上,他本会乐意帮助挫败其核计划。他牺牲自己是为了保护家人。“我唯一的任务就是让他们感到安全、安心,说服他们同意让我带他们离开,”查克告诉我,“但我就是没能说服他。”

Another Iranian scientist, whose code name was Ejection, had started out even more skeptical. At their initial meeting, Ejection clung to the conviction that Chalker was a Mossad operative trying to lure him to his death. To establish his C.I.A. bona fides, Chalker told me, he began “peeling the onion.” First, he named other Iranian scientists—including close former colleagues of Ejection’s—whom he had helped to defect with their families. Then Chalker pulled from a hidden compartment in his jacket a photograph of himself, in the U.S., standing next to one of those colleagues. When that didn’t work, Chalker produced a note from another such colleague, handwritten in Farsi, urging Ejection to trust Chalker’s offer. Finally, Chalker repeated a detail of Ejection’s medical history that only his good friends would have known.

另一位代号为“弹射”的伊朗科学家起初更加多疑。初次会面时,弹射坚信查克是摩萨德特工,企图诱杀他。查克告诉我,为证明自己的中情局身份,他开始“层层剥开洋葱”:先列举了其他曾协助携家眷叛逃的伊朗科学家——包括弹射的几位前亲密同事;接着从夹克暗袋抽出一张在美国与其中某位同事的合影;见对方仍不信任,又出示了另一位同事亲笔书写的波斯语字条,力劝弹射接受查克的提议;最后,查克说出了弹射医疗史中一个只有挚友才知晓的细节。
Person talking to someone and walking their Godzillalike pet on a leash.
“It’s so hard to find a pet that likes living in the city.”
“想找一只喜欢住在城里的宠物,真是太难了。”
Cartoon by Christopher Weyant
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But Iranian authorities had told Ejection that the Israelis had killed all of the former colleagues Chalker claimed to have recruited. He remained convinced that everything Chalker said was part of a Mossad plot: the Israelis could have staged the photograph using a mask or a wax dummy; they could have tortured a colleague into writing something in Farsi, then digitally manipulated the letters to form a fake message; they could have hacked Ejection’s medical records. Giving up, Chalker left Ejection a phone number to call if he changed his mind before he was killed.

但伊朗当局告诉伊杰克申,以色列人已经杀死了乔克声称招募的所有前同事。他仍然坚信乔克所说的一切都是摩萨德阴谋的一部分:以色列人可能用面具或蜡像伪造了照片;他们可能折磨了一位同事,迫使其写下波斯语文字,然后通过数字技术篡改字母,伪造出信息;他们可能入侵了伊杰克申的医疗记录。乔克最终放弃,给伊杰克申留下一个电话号码,告诉他若在被处决前改变主意可以拨打。

Not long afterward, in Iran, Ejection unexpectedly ran into the daughter-in-law of one of those former colleagues. Defying Chalker’s warnings, she had flown into the country to visit her extended family. (Another member of that family confirmed to me that they had returned to Iran for such visits.) In Chalker’s telling, Ejection offered the woman condolences about her father-in-law’s assassination by Mossad. She said not to worry—he was alive and living in the U.S., under the protection of a burly C.I.A. officer with short brown hair and a red beard. Ejection, convinced at last, called the number Chalker had left him.

不久之后,在伊朗,伊杰克申意外遇见了其中一位前同事的儿媳。她不顾乔克的警告,飞回伊朗探望她的大家庭。(该家庭的另一位成员向我证实,他们确实曾返回伊朗进行此类探访。)据乔克讲述,伊杰克申向这位女士对其公公遭摩萨德暗杀表示哀悼。她却说不用担心——他还活着,住在美国,由一位棕色短发、红色胡须的魁梧中情局官员保护着。伊杰克申终于信服,拨通了乔克留给他的号码。

More than two years after their abortive encounter, Chalker sat down again with Ejection, in another hotel room in a European city, and congratulated him on the new life awaiting him in the U.S. Chalker was joined by a C.I.A. translator and by a physicist from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, who debriefed Ejection for three days. Ejection turned out to have access to Natanz, in central Iran, where a secret facility had been equipped with underground buildings capable of housing thousands of centrifuges for enriching uranium. He knew much more than expected. By the second day, a cable from headquarters informed Chalker that the plan had changed. Instead of flying Ejection to America to start that new life, Chalker was told to persuade him to return to Iran to find out even more.

在那次失败的会面两年多后,查克与“弹射”再次会面——这次是在欧洲某城市的另一间酒店客房。查克祝贺他即将在美国开始新生活。陪同查克前来的还有中情局译员和橡树岭国家实验室的物理学家,他们对“弹射”进行了为期三天的问询。原来“弹射”能进入伊朗中部的纳坦兹——那里建有秘密设施,地下厂房足以容纳数千台铀浓缩离心机。他知道的远比预期要多。第二天,总部来电告知查克计划有变:不再安排“弹射”飞往美国开始新生活,而是要说服他返回伊朗获取更多情报。

Improvising, Chalker seized on a professional insecurity that he knew haunted Ejection. Chalker told me that his pitch went like this: Ejection was a star scientist with a prodigious intellect, but he had never been promoted to the level he felt his work merited. Surely the Iranian system had been unfair to him. Chalker recalls telling Ejection, “People have never treated you with the respect you deserve, but this is your chance. You can prove to everyone that you are smarter and better than they are.”

查克急中生智,抓住了一个他深知困扰着“弹射”的职业不安全感。查克告诉我,他的说辞是这样的:弹射是一位才华横溢的明星科学家,却从未获得与工作成就相匹配的晋升。伊朗的体制显然对他不公。查克回忆自己当时对弹射说:“人们从未给予你应得的尊重,但这次机会来了。你可以向所有人证明,你比他们更聪明、更出色。”

For Ejection, returning to Iran meant risking his life. He said that he would go back only if the C.I.A. paid him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Chalker, as it happened, had brought along a duffelbag containing three million dollars. But he knew the byways of Iranian culture, and worried that Ejection would stop trusting him if he coughed up the money without haggling. Chalker talked him down to about ten thousand dollars, in part by explaining that carrying more cash would make him too conspicuous at the airport. Sometimes, Chalker told me, a case officer’s job is “to convince someone that something is a really good idea—even though it is actually the worst idea ever.”

对于“弹射”来说,返回伊朗意味着赌上性命。他表示除非中情局支付数十万美元,否则绝不回去。巧的是,查克当时恰好带着一个装有300万美元的行李袋。但他深谙伊朗文化的迂回之道,担心若不经讨价还价就掏出巨款,反而会失去“弹射”的信任。查克最终将金额压到一万美元左右,部分理由是携带过多现金会让他在机场过于显眼。查克告诉我,有时案件官员的工作就是“说服某人相信某个主意绝妙无比——即便这实际上是史上最糟的主意”。

Ejection agreed to return to Iran for a short period. Chalker, who handed him off to another case officer, never learned where he ended up, or whether he survived. Another cable to Fred E. Snappleton commended Chalker for giving the agency invaluable “eyes and ears on the ground” inside Natanz.

伊杰克逊同意返回伊朗短期逗留。将他移交给另一名案件官员的查克,此后便不知其最终下落,亦不知他是否幸存。另一份发给弗雷德·E·斯纳普尔顿的电报赞扬查克为机构提供了纳坦兹内部“实地耳目”的宝贵情报。

According to Chalker, another scientist, code-named Sealion, provided new intelligence about a Syrian weapons program. An asset code-named Omitted added more details during a meeting in a Middle Eastern city, and then returned to Syria; not long afterward, Israel bombed a facility where Omitted was believed to be working, and Chalker told me that he was unsure if Omitted was killed. Former C.I.A. officials told me that intelligence reports from Chalker’s assets were presented to the highest levels of the U.S. government, including to Presidents Bush and Obama.

据查克称,另一位代号“海狮”的科学家提供了关于叙利亚武器计划的新情报。代号“省略”的线人在中东某城市会面时补充了更多细节,随后返回叙利亚;不久后以色列轰炸了据信“省略”所在的工作设施,查克告诉我他无法确定“省略”是否遇难。前中情局官员向我透露,查克手下线人提供的情报报告曾呈报给美国政府最高层,包括布什和奥巴马两位总统。

Espionage is never a solo performance. The resources of a state are what make spying effective: collaboration with friendly foreign services; the collection of intercepted communications; interpretation and assessment by legions of trained analysts; the unknowing collaborations of many case officers, each siloed off from the others. The revelations from Chalker’s defectors were one strand of a long cord, and he also had the advantage of fortuitous timing. The American invasion of Iraq had elevated Iranian scientists’ fears about the potential consequences of pursuing a weapon of mass destruction. In 2005, the election of the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a bellicose hard-liner, spooked some of the country’s scientists, making them willing to undermine the nuclear project.

间谍活动从来不是独角戏。国家资源才是让谍报工作奏效的关键:与友好国家情报机构的协作;截获通讯的收集;大批训练有素的分析师进行的解读与评估;以及众多互不知情的案件官员在各自隔离状态下形成的非自觉协作。查克手下叛逃者透露的情报,不过是漫长线索中的一缕,而他还得益于时机凑巧。美国入侵伊拉克加剧了伊朗科学家对研发大规模杀伤性武器可能招致后果的恐惧。2005年,好战的强硬派马哈茂德·艾哈迈迪-内贾德当选伊朗总统,更令该国部分科学家惊惶不安,促使他们甘愿暗中破坏核计划。

Nevertheless, Chalker’s former colleagues told me that he had demonstrated an indisputable knack for the cold pitch. In my many hours of interviews with him, he appeared relentlessly attentive, and he somehow managed to come off as guilelessly earnest even as he recounted a career of ruthless deception. Then, there is his fighter’s frame. It may have been a dead giveaway at a conference of physicists, but one American colleague told me that looking so much like a spy from central casting had helped Chalker persuade potential defectors that he could actually deliver on a promise of protection.

然而,查克的前同事告诉我,他在“冷推销”方面确实展现出无可争议的天赋。在我与他进行的多次访谈中,他始终表现得全神贯注,更令人称奇的是,即便在讲述自己充满无情欺骗的职业生涯时,他仍能散发出一种近乎天真的诚恳。此外,他那副格斗家般的身板也颇具说服力——虽然在物理学家会议上可能显得格格不入,但一位美国同事告诉我,查克这副活脱脱从间谍片里走出来的形象,反而让潜在投诚者相信,他确实有能力兑现提供庇护的承诺。

The most salient reason for his success, though, was surely his existential offer: defect or die. One of Chalker’s colleagues told me that, against the backdrop of so many Israeli assassinations, Chalker’s interactions with Iranian scientists could almost be considered humanitarian—he had been “throwing them a lifeline.” Of the many scientists he approached, three-quarters ultimately agreed to coöperate.

然而,他成功最显著的原因,无疑是他提出的生存抉择:要么叛逃,要么死亡。查克的一位同事告诉我,在以色列频繁实施暗杀的背景下,查克与伊朗科学家的接触几乎可被视为人道主义行为——他是在“向他们抛出一条救生索”。在他接触过的众多科学家中,最终有四分之三同意合作。

To corroborate his recollections, I obtained partially redacted excerpts of employee reviews by Chalker’s C.I.A. supervisors. As at many workplaces, agency assessments can be hyperbolic, reflecting the effusiveness of a supportive boss trying to promote the accomplishments of his team and win his employee a raise. But even a skeptical reading confirmed that Chalker had done his job. Some reviewers praised his understanding of the “acquisition cycle” for recruiting an asset, and the “balance between empathy and prescriptive direction” that he brought to his work. One veteran supervisor noted that Chalker’s work “produced Intel of tremendously high impact” that was “regularly briefed to senior policy makers and directly influenced U.S. Policy.” Another supervisor said that the “only criticism” of Chalker within the agency was that he could sometimes fall behind on administrative tasks. Yet another credited Chalker with either debriefing or recruiting Iranian scientists across successive generations of the nuclear program’s history; the reviewer called this a “unique Counterproliferation milestone.”

为核实其回忆,我获取了查克的中情局上司对其工作评估的部分删节摘录。与许多职场一样,机构评估难免夸大其词——那些支持下属的上司总想极力彰显团队成就,为下属争取加薪。但即便以怀疑眼光审视这些评语,也能确认查克确实恪尽职守。有评审人称赞他深谙发展线人的“招募周期”,并在工作中把握住“同理心与指令性引导之间的平衡”。一位资深主管指出,查克的工作“产生了极具影响力的情报”,“定期向高层决策者汇报并直接影响美国政策”。另一位主管表示,局内对查克“唯一的批评”是他偶尔会延误行政事务。还有评审人将查克在不同时期对伊朗核科学家的策反或问讯工作称为“防扩散领域的独特里程碑”。

Cumulatively, Chalker’s defectors contributed to what several former senior officials told me had been a dramatic leap forward in the U.S. government’s understanding of Iran’s nuclear ambitions in those years. The consequences were manifold. Around 2010, U.S. and Israeli spies used that intelligence to help carry out the Stuxnet cyberattack, which reportedly destroyed a thousand centrifuges used to enrich uranium. In 2015, the Obama Administration also relied on the intelligence as it negotiated a diplomatic agreement to constrain Iran’s nuclear-weapons program. Gary Samore, a former senior official in the Obama Administration who worked on the deal, told me that negotiators had felt confident the agreement would restrict all of Iran’s uranium enrichment because, in the previous decade, the C.I.A. had achieved such a comprehensive understanding of the program, with “tremendous penetration” into its facilities, sometimes including details “down to the blueprints.” Although Samore personally never knew which information had come from any “specific defector,” he told me that the “picture was very complete.”

几位前高级官员告诉我,查尔克策反的这些线人,共同促成了美国政府当年对伊朗核野心的理解实现了一次巨大飞跃。其影响是多方面的。2010年左右,美国和以色列的情报人员利用这些情报协助实施了“震网”(Stuxnet)网络攻击,据报道摧毁了上千台用于浓缩铀的离心机。2015年,奥巴马政府同样依据这些情报,通过外交谈判达成了限制伊朗核武器计划的协议。曾参与该协议谈判的奥巴马政府前高级官员加里·萨莫尔告诉我,谈判代表们当时确信协议将限制伊朗所有的铀浓缩活动,因为此前十年间,中情局已对该计划有了全面深入的掌握,对其设施实现了“惊人的渗透”,有时甚至“细致到蓝图级别”。虽然萨莫尔本人从未知晓哪些情报来自“特定叛逃者”,但他表示“整体图景非常完整”。

Drawing at least in part on information from Chalker’s defectors, the Pentagon constructed life-size underground facsimiles of Iranian nuclear facilities where the scientists had worked, attempting to duplicate even the thickness of the walls. The Air Force relied on the facsimiles to plan the bombing raids carried out in the past two years against nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, and U.S. Special Forces have used a facsimile for training. In the current war, President Trump is reportedly considering ordering a commando operation against one of the Iranian facilities to capture enriched uranium.

五角大楼至少部分依据查克手下叛逃者提供的情报,建造了与伊朗核设施等大的地下仿真模型,试图连墙壁厚度都精确复现。过去两年间,空军正是依靠这些模型策划了对纳坦兹、福尔多及伊斯法罕核设施的轰炸行动,美国特种部队也将其用于训练。据称,特朗普总统正考虑在当前战事中下令对某处伊朗核设施实施突击行动,以夺取浓缩铀。

Chalker’s wife, though, never forgot his promise that spy work would be “no big deal.” In 2009, the agency reassigned him from New York to Rome. He and his family were to move into an apartment building that was home to a Syrian diplomat who was believed to have knowledge of his country’s chemical- and biological-weapons programs. The agency hoped that Chalker and his wife would befriend the diplomat’s entire family. But, just before the move, Young learned that her father had cancer, and she insisted on a change of plans. She told Chalker that he was always away, that he never saw his sons, and that he did not make enough money. Chalker said that she’d given him an ultimatum: “You can leave if you want, but I am staying here, and I am keeping the kids.” In November, 2010, Chalker, who was approaching forty, formally resigned from the agency. He began coaching Little League and had more time to practice martial arts with his boys. Looking back, Young told me that she thought Chalker had tried to be a decent husband and father—“if you catch me on a good day.”

然而,查克的妻子始终记得他当初的承诺——间谍工作“没什么大不了的”。2009年,中情局将他从纽约调往罗马。按计划,他们全家将搬进一栋公寓楼,那里住着一位叙利亚外交官,据信此人掌握着该国化学与生物武器项目的情报。中情局希望查克夫妇能与这位外交官的全家建立友谊。但就在搬迁前夕,杨得知父亲罹患癌症,坚持要改变计划。她告诉查克,他总是不在家,从没好好陪伴儿子,挣的钱也不够多。查克说妻子当时给他下了最后通牒:“你想走可以走,但我要留在这里,孩子们也跟我留下。”2010年11月,年近四十的查克正式从中情局辞职。他开始执教少年棒球联盟,也有了更多时间陪儿子们练习武术。回首往事,杨告诉我,她觉得查克曾努力想做个称职的丈夫和父亲——“如果你在我心情好的时候问的话”。

On December 27, 2017, Robin Rosenzweig, the wife of Elliott Broidy and a legal adviser to his investment firm, received what appeared to be a security alert from Google, asking for her Gmail password. It was a phishing attempt, and when she fell for it hackers took over her account and gained access to Broidy’s. Within months, they had leaked tranches of his private messages to multiple journalists, including me. In addition to revealing his efforts to profit by turning the White House against Qatar, the disclosures forced him to plead guilty to conspiring to act as an unregistered foreign agent for the Chinese government and a Malaysian financier, for which he agreed to forfeit $6.6 million to the U.S. He might have faced a further penalty, or even jail time, but before he was sentenced—or made to forfeit the money—he received a pardon from President Trump. (Years earlier, in 2009, Broidy had also pleaded guilty to bribing New York State pension-fund managers, and agreed to pay the state eighteen million dollars.)

2017年12月27日,埃利奥特·布罗迪的妻子、其投资公司法律顾问罗宾·罗森茨维格收到一封看似来自谷歌的安全警报邮件,要求提供她的Gmail密码。这是一次钓鱼攻击,当她上钩后,黑客便接管了她的账户,并由此侵入了布罗迪的邮箱。数月之内,他们向包括我在内的多名记者分批泄露了布罗迪的私人邮件。这些披露不仅揭露了他试图通过挑动白宫反对卡塔尔来牟利的行径,还迫使他承认了为中国政府和一位马来西亚金融家充当未注册外国代理人的共谋罪名,为此他同意向美国缴纳660万美元罚金。他本可能面临更严厉的处罚甚至监禁,但在量刑前——或者说在被迫缴纳罚金前——他获得了特朗普总统的特赦。(更早的2009年,布罗迪还曾承认贿赂纽约州养老基金管理人,并同意向该州支付1800万美元。)

Broidy’s criminal convictions notwithstanding, his allegations against Chalker appeared plausible. Global Risk Advisors had been a shadowy operation. A list of specialties on its website had included “intelligence-based advisory services” that might employ techniques “developed from years of expertise within the US government.” For a time, Global Risk had advertised “penetration testing”—hacking clients in order to assess their cyber defenses. Moreover, Qatar was virtually its only publicly known client. Global Risk registered an office in Doha in the fall of 2017, shortly before the Broidy hack, during an escalating feud between the U.A.E. and Qatar (which had involved credible allegations of hacking by both sides). And Global Risk looked highly profitable, despite the absence of other known clients. Chalker and Young lived with their sons in a large apartment in Manhattan, and they also owned sprawling ranches in Texas and North Carolina. Many former U.S. national-security and intelligence officials have cashed in by selling consulting services to Persian Gulf monarchies whose agendas often differ from U.S. policy goals.

尽管布罗迪身负刑事案底,他对乔克的指控却显得言之凿凿。全球风险顾问公司本就是家行事诡秘的机构,其官网列出的专业服务包括“基于情报的咨询服务”,并暗示可能运用“源自美国政府多年经验积累的技术手段”。该公司曾一度公开宣传“渗透测试”业务——即通过入侵客户系统来评估其网络防御能力。更值得注意的是,卡塔尔几乎是该公司唯一公开披露的客户。2017年秋,就在布罗迪遭黑客攻击前夕,全球风险顾问公司在多哈设立了办事处,当时阿联酋与卡塔尔之间的争端正持续升级(双方都曾被可信指控实施过黑客攻击)。尽管没有其他已知客户,这家公司却显得利润惊人:乔克与杨带着儿子们住在曼哈顿的豪华公寓,同时在得克萨斯和北卡罗来纳拥有广袤的牧场。许多美国前国家安全与情报官员都通过向波斯湾君主国提供咨询服务赚得盆满钵满——这些国家的议程往往与美国政策目标背道而驰。

By 2022, lawyers for Broidy had revised his lawsuit against Chalker to charge that Qatar had paid Chalker “tens of millions of dollars” for “denigration campaigns” against the country’s critics. The complaint cited new information from five unnamed former Global Risk employees. Broidy’s lawyers also alleged that Chalker had orchestrated the hacking of the Emirati Ambassador to Washington and had used spy tactics against critics who opposed Qatar’s role as host of the World Cup in 2022. One detail in the suit was verifiable and seemed to bolster its assertions: Global Risk had set up various shell companies in Gibraltar, and in 2017 and 2018 at least forty million dollars had passed in and out of these accounts. The revised lawsuit, citing the five former employees, claimed that these were payments from Qatar. In 2022, an article in the Associated Press, which quoted anonymous former employees who sounded similar to those cited in the lawsuit, reported that the F.B.I. was investigating Chalker for potential violations of laws against providing foreign governments with information about the covert tactics of American spies. The F.B.I. declined to comment to the A.P.; a lawyer for Chalker denied all of the allegations, and said that he knew of no federal investigation. (Through a spokesman, Broidy declined to comment on any of this.)

到2022年,布罗迪的律师修改了对乔克的诉讼,指控卡塔尔向乔克支付了“数千万美元”,用于针对该国批评者的“诋毁行动”。诉状引用了五名未具名前环球风险公司员工提供的新信息。布罗迪的律师还指控乔克策划了针对阿联酋驻华盛顿大使的黑客攻击,并对反对卡塔尔主办2022年世界杯的批评者使用了间谍手段。诉讼中有一个可验证的细节似乎支持了这些指控:环球风险公司在直布罗陀设立了多家空壳公司,2017年至2018年间至少有四千万美元在这些账户中流转。修改后的诉讼援引五名前员工的说法,声称这些资金来自卡塔尔。2022年,美联社一篇报道引用了匿名前员工的陈述——其口吻与诉讼中引用的证人类似——称联邦调查局正在调查乔克是否涉嫌违反禁止向外国政府提供美国间谍秘密行动信息的法律。联邦调查局拒绝向美联社置评;乔克的律师否认了所有指控,并表示不知悉任何联邦调查。(布罗迪通过发言人拒绝对此发表评论。)

Vetting Chalker’s account of his C.I.A. career had led me to conclude that he had been a reliable narrator. When it came to his business career, however, I found a few inconsistencies. For example, he insisted to me that his company’s work for Qatar had begun after the country won the right to host a World Cup, in December of 2010. He said that his work had consisted only of making security preparations for the event, including helping to set up a state-of-the-art cyber-operations center and training Qatar’s internal security and intelligence services. Chalker also told me that he’d taken a leave before formally resigning from the C.I.A., and that he had used the time to figure out how to make money. When pressed, he admitted that, during this period, he and a former C.I.A. officer had set up a short-lived business partnership and pitched the Qataris on hiring them as security consultants; he said that he may have provided unpaid services or advice in that context. After further reporting, I concluded that this was likely a cropping of the full picture. Two advisers to Qatar told me that Global Risk had also conducted background checks and written reports on people linked to campaigns criticizing Qatar; corporate-intelligence firms often provide such open-source research. (Chalker later acknowledged that research to me.) I also reviewed credible documents that appeared to show that, in 2010, while Qatar was still competing to host the World Cup, Chalker’s business partnership had at least sought payment from Qatar, and had hired the private intelligence firm Diligence to snoop around, either for Qatar or at the behest of individual Qatari clients. (In 2020, a London-based consultant close to the Emiratis accused Diligence of bugging him, breaking into his mailbox, and trailing him; Diligence acknowledged conducting surveillance it said was legal and “justified.”)

在核实查克(Chalker)对其中情局生涯的叙述后,我认定他是一位可靠的讲述者。然而,当涉及他的商业生涯时,我发现了几处矛盾。例如,他坚称自己公司为卡塔尔的工作始于2010年12月该国赢得世界杯主办权之后。他表示自己的工作仅限于为赛事做安保准备,包括协助建立最先进的网络行动中心,以及培训卡塔尔的国内安全与情报部门。查克还告诉我,他在正式从中情局辞职前曾休假,并利用这段时间思考如何赚钱。在追问下,他承认在此期间曾与一名前中情局官员建立短暂商业合作关系,并向卡塔尔方面推销雇佣他们担任安全顾问的方案;他表示自己可能在此过程中提供了无偿服务或建议。经过进一步调查,我认为这很可能只是完整图景的一角。两位卡塔尔顾问告诉我,环球风险公司(Global Risk)还曾对批评卡塔尔的相关运动人士进行背景调查并撰写报告;企业情报公司常提供此类开源研究(查克后来向我承认了这项研究)。我还查阅了可信文件,这些文件似乎显示,2010年卡塔尔仍在申办世界杯期间,查克的商业合伙关系至少已试图向卡塔尔收取报酬,并雇佣了私人情报公司勤达(Diligence)进行侦查活动——无论其服务对象是卡塔尔政府还是个别卡塔尔客户(2020年,一位与阿联酋关系密切的伦敦顾问指控勤达公司对其窃听、侵入邮箱及跟踪;勤达承认进行了监视,但称其行为合法且“正当”)。

In the course of my reporting, I met several enemies Chalker had made over the years, sometimes in disputes over money. When I pressed him about the anonymous former employees, he admitted that he had been a hot-tempered and secretive boss, and that Global Risk’s work culture—dominated by former spies and commandos—had been characterized by what he called “toxic masculinity.” Turnover was high, and he readily named a few employees who had left on bad terms and might have seen a chance to profit by coöperating with Broidy. After all, Broidy’s private intelligence company, Circinus, hires the same kinds of former spies and commandos that Chalker’s once did. In that sense, Broidy and Chalker—one working for the U.A.E., the other for Qatar—were two of a kind.

在采访过程中,我见到了几位查克多年树敌的对象,有些是因金钱纠纷结怨。当我追问那些匿名前员工的情况时,他承认自己曾是脾气暴躁、行事隐秘的老板,而“全球风险”公司由前间谍和特种兵主导的工作文化,充斥着被他称为“有毒阳刚气”的氛围。公司人员流动率很高,他随口就能报出几位不欢而散的前雇员姓名——这些人或许认为与布罗迪合作有利可图。毕竟布罗迪的私人情报公司“天箭座”雇佣的,正是查克昔日倚重的那类前间谍与特种兵。从这个意义上说,布罗迪与查克——一个为阿联酋效力,另一个为卡塔尔服务——实属一丘之貉。

As Broidy’s lawsuit dragged on, the allegations it kicked up grew increasingly far-fetched. The A.P. reported obtaining business proposals that Chalker had supposedly submitted to Qatar; Fox News, the Free Press, and two Swiss news outlets eventually posted some of this material online. One putative proposal, titled “Project Endgame,” evidently used “Endgame” as a code name for the Emirati Ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba. Printed on Global Risk letterhead, dated March of 2017, and signed only with the initial “K,” it appeared to outline a plan for hacking Otaiba’s e-mails, which leaked later that spring. But the proposal was full of cartoonishly goofy faux spy talk. (“Imminent Threat: Qatar’s enemies are already plotting against you. The time to act is now!”) And it looked less like an authentic pitch to officials in Doha than like a document calculated to embarrass Qatar in the West. (“An attack on Hamas is an attack on Qatar. An attack on the Muslim Brotherhood is an attack on Qatar.”) Echoing right-wing conspiracy theories, the proposal also offhandedly listed the Times as among “Qatar’s media assets.” John Sipher, a prominent former C.I.A. officer who reviewed some of the supposed proposals as a potential expert witness for Chalker, told me that the documents were “loopy” and “horseshit,” and that they could not have been written by anyone with actual U.S.-government experience. (The Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, and the BBC never reported on the documents or their allegations.)

随着布罗伊迪的诉讼拖延日久,由此引发的指控也愈发荒诞不经。美联社报道称获得了查克据称提交给卡塔尔的商业提案;福克斯新闻、《自由新闻报》及两家瑞士新闻机构最终将部分材料发布在网上。其中一份名为“终局计划”的提案,显然将“终局”作为阿联酋驻华盛顿大使优素福·奥泰巴的代号。这份文件印有环球风险公司的信头,日期标注为2017年3月,仅以字母“K”签署,看似勾勒了入侵奥泰巴电子邮件的计划——当年春天晚些时候这些邮件确实遭到泄露。但提案充斥着漫画般滑稽的伪间谍话术(“迫在眉睫的威胁:卡塔尔的敌人已在密谋对付你。行动刻不容缓!”),与其说是向多哈官员提交的真实方案,不如说是精心设计来让卡塔尔在西方世界难堪的文件(“攻击哈马斯就是攻击卡塔尔。攻击穆斯林兄弟会就是攻击卡塔尔”)。提案还附和右翼阴谋论,随口将《纽约时报》列为“卡塔尔的媒体资产”。前中情局高级官员约翰·赛弗曾以查克潜在专家证人的身份审阅过部分所谓提案,他告诉我这些文件“荒诞不经”且“纯属胡扯”,绝不可能是任何真正具有美国政府工作经验之人所撰(《纽约时报》《华盛顿邮报》《华尔街日报》及英国广播公司均未报道过这些文件及其指控)。

Chalker himself had never been a cyberoperative; in any case, it would hardly require the expertise of a former C.I.A. officer to carry out the run-of-the-mill phishing attacks that snared both the Ambassador and Broidy. Nor, I learned, did Chalker stop working for the agency after resigning. Several former officials told me that Chalker had become a contractor for the agency and for the Pentagon. Global Risk had provided the C.I.A. with covert financial and logistical services for operations around the world. People familiar with Global Risk’s operations told me that the Gibraltar shell companies had been used to move C.I.A. money, and that much of Chalker’s revenue had come from covert work for the U.S. government. Chalker had stayed in contact with the deputy chief of the C.I.A.’s station in Doha while working for Qatar, and had obtained State Department licenses to provide the training and services that Global Risk sold to the country. Pawel Chudzicki, whose law firm handled the licenses for Global Risk, told me that the State Department had conducted an inquiry in response to the Associated Press article and identified no violations of the law. Indeed, given how much money Chalker was making off the C.I.A. and the military, I found it hard to imagine that he would jeopardize his cash flow by hacking Broidy, a prominent Republican fund-raiser close to Trump—much less by spying on senior American lawmakers.

查克本人从未当过网络特工;无论如何,要实施那些诱捕大使和布罗迪的普通钓鱼攻击,根本不需要前中情局官员的专业知识。我还了解到,查克辞职后并未停止为这家机构工作。几位前官员告诉我,查克已成为中情局和五角大楼的承包商。全球风险公司为中情局在世界各地的行动提供秘密财务和后勤服务。熟悉全球风险公司运营的人士告诉我,直布罗陀的空壳公司曾被用来转移中情局的资金,而查克的大部分收入都来自为美国政府所做的秘密工作。在为卡塔尔工作期间,查克一直与中情局驻多哈站的副站长保持联系,并获得了国务院的许可,为全球风险公司向该国出售的培训和服务提供支持。帕维尔·丘兹基的律师事务所为全球风险公司处理许可证事宜,他告诉我,国务院已针对美联社的报道展开调查,并未发现任何违法行为。事实上,考虑到查克从中情局和军方赚了那么多钱,我很难想象他会冒险去黑掉布罗迪——这位与特朗普关系密切的知名共和党筹款人——更不用说去监视美国高级议员了。

Former U.S. officials told me that, in early 2023, Chalker’s lawyers—citing, among other things, the potential exposure of the Gibraltar shell companies—formally asked the C.I.A. to invoke national-security concerns and quash Broidy’s lawsuit. But the agency’s lawyers, following standard policy, responded that they would intercede only when the possibility of Chalker’s testifying was truly imminent. Feeling that the agency had abandoned him, Chalker groused to friends that, as recently as September 11, 2021, the C.I.A.’s New York station had borrowed his World Trade Center office to hold a memorial event with two hundred guests. Three months later, he complained, the station had disinvited him from its annual holiday party because of the stigma surrounding the lawsuit.

前美国官员告诉我,2023年初,查克的律师——除其他理由外,特别提及直布罗陀空壳公司可能被曝光——正式要求中情局以国家安全为由撤销布罗迪的诉讼。但该机构律师遵循标准政策回应称,只有在查克出庭作证的可能性真正迫在眉睫时才会介入。感到被机构抛弃的查克向朋友抱怨说,就在2021年9月11日,中情局纽约站还借用过他在世贸中心的办公室举办过两百人规模的纪念活动。他愤愤不平地指出,仅仅三个月后,该站就因诉讼带来的污名将他从年度节日派对宾客名单中剔除。

The unnamed former Global Risk employees remained the linchpin of Broidy’s lawsuit. By 2024, Broidy’s lawyers were requesting an extraordinary protective order that would have blocked them from publicly revealing their names, appearing in open court, or facing questions from Chalker’s lawyers, as though they were testifying against a Mafia don. An anonymous declaration from one of the former employees referred vaguely to Chalker’s unspecified “capabilities” and claimed that the employee feared for the safety of “myself and/or my family” if Chalker ever learned who he was. (None of the unnamed former employees cited in the lawsuit agreed to speak with me on the record.) Meanwhile, an article in the Jerusalem Post speculated, without evidence, that Qatar might have paid Chalker to train Hamas fighters. Chalker told me, incredulously, “I was an Iran guy for the agency, my wife is Jewish, and I am training Hamas?”

这些未具名的前全球风险公司雇员始终是布罗伊迪诉讼案的关键。到2024年,布罗伊迪的律师竟要求法院下达一项非常规保护令,试图阻止这些雇员公开姓名、在公开法庭露面或接受乔克律师的质询——仿佛他们是在指证黑手党教父。其中一名前雇员在匿名声明中含糊地提及乔克“不为人知的能力”,并声称若乔克得知其身份,“我和/或我的家人”将面临安全威胁。(诉讼中提及的所有匿名前雇员均拒绝接受我的正式采访。)与此同时,《耶路撒冷邮报》一篇报道毫无根据地推测卡塔尔可能曾雇佣乔克训练哈马斯武装人员。乔克难以置信地对我说:“我为中情局效力时是伊朗问题专家,我妻子是犹太人,我怎么可能去训练哈马斯?”

Finally, on April 2, 2024, a magistrate judge gave Broidy’s lawyers a one-month deadline to justify the supposed safety concerns of the former Global Risk employees—veterans of the Special Forces or the C.I.A. who presumably knew how to look out for themselves. Six days later, Broidy settled. Four people familiar with the terms told me that no money changed hands. Chalker faced no criminal charges. Senior national-security officials do not appear to have taken the allegations seriously, either: while the lawsuit was unfolding, Qrypt, Chalker’s other company, signed technology-licensing agreements with both the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.

最终在2024年4月2日,地方法官给布罗迪的律师一个月期限,要求其说明前全球风险公司员工——那些特种部队或中情局出身、按理说懂得自我保护的老兵——所谓的安全顾虑究竟有何依据。六天后,布罗迪选择了和解。四位了解内情的人士告诉我,和解协议中并未涉及金钱赔偿。查克没有面临任何刑事指控。国家安全部门的高级官员似乎也未曾认真看待这些指控:就在诉讼进行期间,查克名下的另一家公司Qrypt先后与橡树岭国家实验室和洛斯阿拉莫斯国家实验室签署了技术授权协议。

Regardless of the merits of Broidy’s lawsuit against Chalker, it effectively doubled as an attack on Qatar, by portraying the country as involved in seedy digital espionage. The resulting negative publicity increased the perceived risks for U.S. consultants, lobbyists, and former officials who might have considered working for Qatar, scaring them off or causing them to raise their prices. All of this surely pleased Qatar’s rivals, the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia. (The e-mail leaks revealed that Broidy had sought lucrative contracts with both countries.)

无论布罗迪(Broidy)对查克(Chalker)提起的诉讼本身是否站得住脚,它实际上都构成了对卡塔尔的攻击——通过将卡塔尔描绘成参与肮脏数字间谍活动的国家。由此引发的负面舆论,增加了美国顾问、说客及前官员为卡塔尔工作的风险认知,吓退了潜在合作者,或迫使他们抬高要价。这一切无疑令卡塔尔的竞争对手——阿联酋和沙特阿拉伯——感到满意。(邮件泄露事件显示,布罗迪曾向两国寻求利润丰厚的合同。)

Still, Chalker is no innocent. Marko Milanovic, a professor at the University of Reading, in Britain, and an expert on international law, told me that the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists in peacetime, whether by Israel or by the United States, was “just murder—just killing someone you don’t like.” Imagine, he said, if Russian or Iranian spies killed American computer scientists merely because they were working on artificial intelligence that had a military application. Of course, a former spy complicit in such killings was not a legitimate target, either. But Milanovic said, of Chalker’s recent difficulties, “Am I going to cry you a river? No.”

不过,查克也绝非无辜。英国雷丁大学教授、国际法专家马尔科·米拉诺维奇(Marko Milanovic)告诉我,在和平时期杀害伊朗核科学家——无论是以色列还是美国所为——都“纯粹是谋杀,纯粹是杀害你不喜欢的人”。他说,想象一下,如果俄罗斯或伊朗间谍杀害美国计算机科学家,仅仅因为他们正在研究具有军事用途的人工智能。当然,曾参与此类杀戮的前间谍也不是合法目标。但谈及查克最近的困境,米拉诺维奇表示:“我会为你流泪吗?不会。”

I asked Chalker about this perspective, and, to my surprise, he said that he could see parallels between his activities as a spy and Broidy’s lawsuit against him. “It was a highly successful nation-state denial-and-disruption campaign,” he said. “Just look at what it cost me—physical and mental health, lost friendships, lost business.” He concluded, “I have to admit, they did a bang-up job.” ♦

我向查克(Chalker)问及这一看法,出乎意料的是,他表示自己能够从间谍活动与布罗伊迪(Broidy)对他的诉讼之间找到相似之处。“这是一次极为成功的国家层面的否认与干扰行动,”他说,“看看它让我付出了什么代价——身心健康受损、友谊破裂、生意流失。”他总结道:“我得承认,他们干得真漂亮。” ♦

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