The Lede

Do U.S. Presidents Have the Power to Declare War?

美国总统是否拥有宣战权?
On paper, declaring war is reserved for Congress. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution turned a constitutional requirement into a legislative habit of looking away.
从法律条文上看,宣战权专属国会。而《东京湾决议》将这一宪法要求转化为立法机构惯常的视而不见。
LBJ signing a document in the White House East Room.
Photograph from Alamy

Whether a nation has just cause to begin a war and whether it conducts that war justly are matters of international law. Whether a U.S. President has the power to declare war is a matter of American constitutional law. That question can be answered doctrinally, politically, or historically. Whichever way, everything hinges on the year 1964.

一个国家是否有正当理由发动战争,以及该国是否以正义方式开展战争,属于国际法范畴。而美国总统是否拥有宣战权,则属于美国宪法范畴。这个问题可以从法理、政治或历史角度进行解答。无论从何种角度切入,一切答案都系于1964年这个关键年份。

On August 2nd of that year, North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the U.S.S. Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin. Following a much-disputed report of a second attack, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered a bombing raid and asked Congress to pass a joint resolution of support. Johnson had been angling for such a resolution since the last weeks of 1963 and had begun discussing it in earnest the following February. “Being sprung from the loins of the Congress,” Johnson’s adviser Jack Valenti later said, “he was very, very disgruntled and discontented with the fact that we were messing around in Southeast Asia without congressional approval.” As a senator, Johnson had particularly objected to Harry Truman having sent troops to Korea without seeking support from Congress. If any President tried to get away with that while Johnson was Senate Majority Leader, Valenti said, “Lyndon Johnson would have torn his balls off.”

当年8月2日,北越鱼雷艇在东京湾袭击了美国“马多克斯”号驱逐舰。在一份备受争议的第二次袭击报告之后,林登·B·约翰逊总统下令进行轰炸袭击,并要求国会通过一项支持联合决议。自1963年最后几周以来,约翰逊一直在谋求这样一项决议,并于次年2月开始认真讨论。约翰逊的顾问杰克·瓦伦蒂后来表示:“约翰逊出身国会,对我们未经国会批准就在东南亚胡作非为感到非常非常不满。”作为参议员,约翰逊尤其反对哈里·杜鲁门未经国会支持就向朝鲜派兵。瓦伦蒂说,如果任何总统在约翰逊担任参议院多数党领袖期间试图蒙混过关,“林登·约翰逊会让他吃不了兜着走。”

Pressed by Johnson to prop up the Administration’s actions in Vietnam, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, set to work wrangling his colleagues immediately following the attack on the Maddox. On the Senate floor, he offered reassurance that the measure was exceedingly narrow, but it was also clear that at least some members of the Senate understood the breadth of the resolution.

在约翰逊总统施压下,为支持政府在越南的行动,参议院外交关系委员会主席、阿肯色州参议员J·威廉·富布赖特在“马多克斯”号遇袭后立即着手游说同僚。他在参议院发言时安抚众人,称该决议范围极为有限,但显然至少部分参议员已意识到决议所蕴含的广泛授权。

MR. BREWSTER: My question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.

布鲁斯特先生:我的问题是,决议中是否有任何内容授权、建议或批准美国大规模军队在越南或中国登陆。

MR. BREWSTER: My question is whether there is anything in the resolution which would authorize or recommend or approve the landing of large American armies in Vietnam or in China.

布鲁斯特先生:我的问题是,决议中是否有任何内容授权、建议或批准美国大规模军队在越南或中国登陆。

MR. FULBRIGHT: There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the senator that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander-in-Chief feels is necessary.

富布赖特先生:据我所见,决议案中并未包含此意。我同意参议员的观点,这绝非我们所欲为之事。然而,决议案的措辞并未对此加以限制。它授权总司令可采取其认为必要的一切行动。

MR. FULBRIGHT: There is nothing in the resolution, as I read it, that contemplates it. I agree with the senator that that is the last thing we would want to do. However, the language of the resolution would not prevent it. It would authorize whatever the Commander-in-Chief feels is necessary.

富布赖特先生:据我所解读,该决议中并无任何条款涉及此点。我同意参议员的观点,这绝非我们所欲为之事。然而,决议的措辞并未对此加以禁止。它授权总司令可采取其认为必要的任何行动。

On August 7th, Congress issued a joint resolution declaring its support for “the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent any further aggression.” Johnson was delighted, remarking that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, “like grandma’s nightshirt . . . covered everything.”

8月7日,国会发表联合决议,宣布支持“总统作为总司令,采取一切必要措施击退对美国军队的任何武装攻击,并防止进一步侵略的决心”。约翰逊对此欣喜不已,称东京湾决议“就像奶奶的睡衣……无所不包”。

Fulbright came to regret both the vote and the war whose conduct it authorized. In 1967, he presided over hearings investigating American military operations in Vietnam. As the historian Bruce Schulman reported in his book “Lyndon Johnson and American Liberalism,” Johnson, furious at what he considered a betrayal, said, “You know when you’re milking a cow and you have all that foamy white milk in the bucket and you’re just about through, when all of a sudden the cow switches her tail through a pile of manure and slaps it into that foamy white milk. That’s Bill Fulbright.” In 1971, weary of the war in Vietnam, Congress repealed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. Two years later, determined to prevent “another Vietnam,” Congress jointly passed the War Powers Resolution; that measure aimed to claw back for the legislature its exclusive constitutional power to declare war, narrowing the circumstances under which a President could do so to “a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.” This week, Congress is expected to vote on another War Powers Resolution, which would say about the same thing and would be about as effective, which is to say, not at all. “The Constitution says we’re not supposed to be at war without a vote of Congress,” the Democratic senator Tim Kaine told NPR. This resolution is not expected to pass, and if it did pass, it would be ignored.

富布赖特后来对那次投票以及由此授权的战争都感到后悔。1967年,他主持了调查美国在越南军事行动的听证会。据历史学家布鲁斯·舒尔曼在《林登·约翰逊与美国自由主义》一书中记载,约翰逊认为这是一种背叛,他愤怒地说:“你挤牛奶的时候,桶里全是泡沫状的白色牛奶,你快要挤完了,突然奶牛把尾巴甩进一堆粪便里,然后拍进那泡沫状的白色牛奶里。这就是比尔·富布赖特。”1971年,国会厌倦了越南战争,废除了《东京湾决议》。两年后,为了阻止“另一个越南”,国会联合通过了《战争权力决议案》;该法案旨在为立法机构夺回其宣布战争的专属宪法权力,将总统可以这样做的情形缩小为“美国、其领土或属地或其武装部队遭到袭击所造成的国家紧急状态”。本周,国会预计将对另一项《战争权力决议案》进行投票,该决议案将表达大致相同的内容,效果也大致相同,也就是说,根本没有效果。“宪法规定,没有国会投票,我们就不应该参战,”民主党参议员蒂姆·凯恩告诉美国国家公共电台。这项决议预计不会通过,即使通过,也会被无视。

In 1964, the House voted unanimously in favor of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and only two senators voted against: Ernest Gruening, a Democrat and former governor of Alaska, and Wayne L. Morse, a Democrat from Oregon and a former dean of the Oregon Law School. (They often voted together, in dissent. “Morse and Gruening may be right, but they have been written off,” another senator remarked.) Gruening, who trained as a doctor, spent his early career as a foreign-policy journalist, and was an editor at The Nation. His position regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam dates to his opposition to the U.S. occupation of Haiti. A so-called peace progressive of the Wilsonian era, the anti-imperialist, pro-democracy Gruening had objected to American involvement in foreign wars since the nineteen-twenties. Elected to the Senate in 1958, he had consistently warned against U.S. entry into the war in Vietnam, questioning American intelligence (“the repeated optimistic statements of our officials . . . have been promptly refuted by events”) and calling it, in March of 1964, an “impossible war.” During the debate over the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, Gruening accused his colleagues of having propped up “corrupt and unpopular dictatorships which owe their temporary sojourn in power to massive American support,” leaving him convinced that the “allegation that we are supporting freedom in South Vietnam has a hollow sound.”

1964年,众议院一致投票赞成《东京湾决议案》,只有两名参议员投了反对票:民主党人、阿拉斯加州前州长欧内斯特·格鲁宁,以及来自俄勒冈州的民主党人、俄勒冈大学法学院前院长韦恩·L·莫尔斯。(他们经常一起投反对票。另一位参议员评论道:“莫尔斯和格鲁宁也许是对的,但他们已经被排除在外了。”)格鲁宁曾接受过医生培训,早期职业生涯是外交政策记者,还担任过《国家》杂志的编辑。他对美国介入越南的立场可以追溯到他对美国占领海地的反对。作为威尔逊时代所谓的和平进步主义者,这位反帝国主义、支持民主的格鲁宁自20世纪20年代以来就一直反对美国卷入对外战争。他于1958年当选参议员,一直警告美国不要卷入越南战争,质疑美国的情报(“我们官员反复发表的乐观声明……很快就被事实驳倒了”),并在1964年3月称其为“一场不可能打赢的战争”。在关于《东京湾决议案》的辩论中,格鲁宁指责他的同事们支持“腐败且不受欢迎的独裁政权,这些政权之所以能暂时掌权,全靠美国的大力支持”,这让他确信“所谓我们在支持南越自由的说法听起来空洞无力”。

Morse’s dissent is the more interesting case. Morse, a progressive Republican from Wisconsin and an avid Cold Warrior, had been elected to the Senate from Oregon but left the Republican Party in part because of its failure to denounce Joseph McCarthy and, in 1955, became a Democrat. In 1957, he objected, unsuccessfully, to a resolution that Dwight Eisenhower presented to Congress, seeking pre-authorization for military action in the Middle East, calling it “constitutionally dangerous.” After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in 1962, Morse described the C.I.A. as “an unchecked executive power that ought to be brought to an end,” and warned of the executive’s increasing recourse to unauthorized military action, predicting that “we are in a situation in which we shall probably never again see Congress pass a declaration of war prior to the beginning of a war.” History proved him right.

莫尔斯的异议则更为耐人寻味。这位来自威斯康星州的进步派共和党人、狂热的冷战斗士,虽从俄勒冈州当选参议员,却因共和党未能谴责约瑟夫·麦卡锡而退党,并于1955年转投民主党阵营。1957年,德怀特·艾森豪威尔向国会提交决议案,要求预先授权在中东采取军事行动时,莫尔斯曾以“违宪危险”为由提出反对却未获成功。1962年猪湾事件惨败后,莫尔斯将中央情报局斥为“亟须终结的失控行政权力”,并警告行政部门正日益频繁地采取未经授权的军事行动,预言“我们将面临国会再难在战争爆发前通过宣战决议的局面”。历史证明了他的远见。

Morse so frequently opposed unauthorized military action, and so often spoke at the end of the day, before an empty chamber, that he earned the nickname the Five O’Clock Shadow. In 1963, the week before John F. Kennedy was assassinated, he told Morse, “Wayne, I want you to know you’re absolutely right in your criticism of my Vietnam policy.” In the spring, when Johnson sought a military appropriation, Morse accused him of “trying by indirection to obtain congressional approval of our illegal, unilateral military action in South Vietnam without coming forward with a request for a declaration of war.”

莫尔斯频频反对未经授权的军事行动,且常在会议尾声、面对空荡荡的议席发言,因此得名“五点钟的幽灵”。1963年,约翰·肯尼迪遇刺前一周曾对他说:“韦恩,我想让你知道,你对我的越南政策的批评完全正确。”次年春天,当约翰逊寻求军事拨款时,莫尔斯谴责他“试图以迂回手段获得国会对我们在南越非法单边军事行动的批准,却不敢正式请求宣战”。

In August, Morse objected to the Tonkin Gulf Resolution on constitutional grounds, calling the resolution a “predated declaration of war” and an “evasion of congressional responsibility,” and a de-facto amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He warned his colleagues that “the American people will quickly lose their liberty if you do not stop feeding the trend toward Government by executive supremacy.” In 1965, when Johnson ordered the bombing of North Vietnam and sent fifty thousand troops to South Vietnam—“This is really war,” the President said that summer—Morse became a leading speaker at rallies in the growing antiwar movement.

八月,莫尔斯以宪法为由反对《东京湾决议》,称该决议是“提前宣战”和“逃避国会责任”,是对美国宪法的实际修正。他警告同僚们:“如果不阻止行政至上政府的趋势,美国人民将迅速失去自由。”1965年,当约翰逊下令轰炸北越并向南越派遣五万军队时——总统在那个夏天说“这确实是战争”——莫尔斯成为日益壮大的反战运动中集会的主要发言人。

Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to “declare war.” When, at the Constitutional Convention, in Philadelphia, in 1787, Pierce Butler of South Carolina raised the possibility that the President should wield this power, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts responded that he “never expected to hear in a republic, a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.” The general view of the delegates was reflected by Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 75: “The history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a President of the United States.”

美国宪法第一条第八款赋予国会“宣战”权。1787年费城制宪会议上,当南卡罗来纳州的皮尔斯·巴特勒提出总统或许也应掌握此项权力时,马萨诸塞州的埃尔布里奇·格里回应道:“在共和政体中,我从未想过会听到授权行政机构单独宣战的动议。”亚历山大·汉密尔顿在《联邦党人文集》第七十五篇中的论述,反映了代表们的普遍观点:“人类行为的历史并不支持那种对人类美德过于崇高的评价——这种评价会使一个国家将如此微妙重大的利益(即涉及本国与世界其他地区交往的利益)交由单独一位行政长官全权处置,并认为此举明智,即便这位长官如美国总统般经由特定程序产生且处于特定情境之中。”

Abraham Lincoln, while serving in Congress, summarized the Convention’s thinking this way:

亚伯拉罕·林肯在国会任职期间,曾如此概括制宪会议的核心理念:

Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.

君主们总是将人民卷入战争,使其陷入贫困,且往往——即便并非总是如此——以人民福祉为借口。我们的制宪会议深知,此乃王权压迫中最甚者;故决议制定宪法,使任何个人皆无权将此种压迫加诸吾辈。

Kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This, our Convention understood to be the most oppressive of all Kingly oppressions; and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us.

君主们总是将人民卷入战争,使其陷入贫困,即便并非总是如此,他们也常以人民福祉为借口。我们的制宪会议深知,这是所有君主压迫中最具压迫性的一种;因此他们决心制定宪法,确保无人能独揽大权,将此种压迫加诸我们身上。

If a President were to be granted this kingly power, Lincoln warned, there would be no turning back:

林肯警告道,若总统被赋予此等君王之权,便再无回头之路:

Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose—and you allow him to make war at pleasure.

若授权总统在认定有必要抵御入侵时即可进犯邻国,实则是纵容其随时以“必要”之名发动战争——这等于是将开战之权柄交由其个人意志随意驱使。

Allow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion, and you allow him to do so, whenever he may choose to say he deems it necessary for such purpose—and you allow him to make war at pleasure.

若授权总统于其认定有必要抵御入侵时,即可进犯邻国,实则是纵容其随时能以“确有必要”为由发动战争——这等于是将开战之权柄,全然交由其个人意志所左右。

That later Presidents did indeed engage in military action without consulting Congress, creeping on to a power reserved for the legislature, is a fact of the past century and a half of American history but especially since the rise of the national-security state during the Cold War. Does the fact of that frequent practice alter the Constitution? This question has been a subject of heated legal dispute since the late nineteen-sixties.

在过去的150年里,尤其是自冷战时期国家安全体制兴起以来,美国总统确实屡屡未经国会授权便采取军事行动,逐步蚕食了宪法赋予立法机构的宣战权。然而,这种反复出现的实践是否改变了宪法本身?自上世纪六十年代末以来,这一问题始终是激烈法律论争的焦点。

Reviewing the state of the debate in 1971, the Yale legal scholar Alexander M. Bickel addressed the contention that the provision of the Constitution that grants only Congress the power to declare war had been informally amended by the executive’s regular exercise of this authority. After all, as Louis Brandeis had written, the Constitution “is capable of growth.” Bickel was unpersuaded by this argument. Growth there might be, but you can’t extend the length of a Presidential term, or abolish the Electoral College, by “growth,” and neither can you grant the executive the power to declare war by force of habit. To be clear, Bickel opposed the U.S. war in Vietnam. “I formed the opinion some years ago that the war has been a moral and political disaster,” he wrote, “and I believe further that we might have avoided it, or might at least avoid its repetition, if our institutional arrangements were such as to foreclose presidential wars.” But his argument, here, was merely the constitutional one: “No one should ever reasonably have assumed that the United States could go to war by presidential say-so.”

耶鲁大学法学学者亚历山大·比克尔在1971年梳理这场辩论的现状时,提到了这样一种论点:宪法中规定只有国会有权宣战的条款,已经因行政部门经常行使这一权力而被非正式地修正了。毕竟,正如路易斯·布兰代斯所言,宪法“能够成长”。比克尔没有被这一论点说服。成长或许存在,但你不能通过“成长”来延长总统任期,或废除选举人团制度,同样也不能通过习惯的力量授予行政部门宣战的权力。需要明确的是,比克尔反对美国在越南的战争。“几年前我就认为这场战争是一场道德和政治灾难,”他写道,“而且我进一步相信,如果我们的制度安排能够杜绝总统战争,我们本可以避免这场战争,或者至少避免重蹈覆辙。”但他在这里的论点仅仅是宪法层面的:“任何人都不应合理地认为,美国可以仅凭总统的一句话就开战。”

Ink and blood have been spilled on this question abundantly since Vietnam, especially with regard to U.S. military action in the Middle East, in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and, this week, in Iran. The debate, as a legal scholar once explained, tends to fall into two camps. One camp sticks strictly to the claim that Congress alone has the power to declare war. The other camp argues that the President has the power, as Commander-in-Chief, to engage in military action to defend Americans in case of emergency. Both of those statements can be true and yet this can scarcely be said to be a stalemate, or even a proper separation of powers. Congress, having repeatedly failed to exercise its war power, no longer really can. And, as to what constitutes an emergency, the President gets to decide, allowing him, as Lincoln put it, to make war at pleasure. ♦

自越战以来,围绕这一问题的笔墨与鲜血已流得太多,尤其是涉及美国在中东、伊拉克、阿富汗以及本周在伊朗的军事行动。正如一位法学学者曾阐释的那样,相关争论往往分为两大阵营。一方严格坚持唯有国会拥有宣战权;另一方则认为,作为三军统帅,总统有权在紧急情况下采取军事行动保卫美国人民。这两种主张皆可成立,但这很难被称为僵局,甚至算不上恰当的分权制衡。国会屡次未能行使其战争权力,实际上已逐渐丧失这一能力。至于何为紧急情况,则由总统定夺——正如林肯所言,这使他得以“随心所欲地开战”。♦

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