Q. & A.

Do Federal Officials Really Have “Absolute Immunity”?

联邦官员真的享有“绝对豁免权”吗?
After killings by ICE and Border Patrol in Minneapolis, a legal expert discusses how agents might be held to account by local authorities.
明尼阿波利斯发生移民海关执法局与边境巡逻队枪击事件后,一位法律专家探讨了地方当局如何追究涉事人员的责任。
People wearing winter clothing gather with posters flowers and candles in front of them at a memorial.
Photograph by Philip Cheung for The New Yorker

On Saturday, agents with U.S. Border Patrol killed a man named Alex Jeffrey Pretti, the second person who has been shot dead by federal personnel in Minneapolis since President Donald Trump launched an immigration-enforcement operation in the city earlier this month. After the first killing, of a woman named Renee Good, who was shot behind the wheel of her car by an ICE agent, federal officials made clear that they had little interest in conducting an impartial investigation into the circumstances of her death. During a press conference, Vice-President J. D. Vance said that federal officials have “absolute immunity” in performing their duties. In the aftermath of Pretti’s death, which has prompted even some Republican officeholders to call for an investigation, state officials have accused the federal government of blocking access to the scene of the shooting. Multiple members of the Trump Administration have called Pretti a “domestic terrorist” and falsely described what occurred when he was gunned down, which was captured on video. On Saturday night, a federal judge ordered the government not to destroy or alter evidence after a lawsuit was filed by Minnesota authorities.

上周六,美国边境巡逻队特工开枪打死了一名男子,名叫亚历克斯·杰弗里·普雷蒂(Alex Jeffrey Pretti)。这是自本月早些时候唐纳德·特朗普总统在该市启动移民执法行动以来,联邦人员在明尼阿波利斯开枪打死的第二人。此前,一名名叫蕾妮·古德(Renee Good)的女子在车内被移民与海关执法局(ICE)特工开枪打死。联邦官员明确表示,他们对公正调查其死亡情况毫无兴趣。副总统J·D·万斯(J. D. Vance)在新闻发布会上称,联邦官员在执行公务时享有“绝对豁免权”。普雷蒂之死甚至促使一些共和党籍官员呼吁展开调查,而州政府官员则指责联邦政府封锁了枪击现场。特朗普政府多名成员称普雷蒂为“国内恐怖分子”,并歪曲描述了他被枪杀时的实情——整个过程已被视频记录。上周六晚,在明尼苏达州当局提起诉讼后,一名联邦法官下令政府不得销毁或篡改证据。

To talk about what state officials can and cannot do to investigate and prosecute crimes allegedly committed by federal officials, I spoke by phone with Steve Vladeck, a law professor at Georgetown who writes a newsletter on legal issues called “One First.” During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed why the law on these questions is so unsettled, how the Trump Administration could try to sabotage potential state actions, and how the Supreme Court might view future cases that feature a clash between executive power and states’ rights.

为了讨论州官员在调查和起诉联邦官员涉嫌犯罪时能做什么、不能做什么,我通过电话采访了乔治城大学法学教授史蒂夫·弗拉德克(Steve Vladeck),他撰写一份名为“One First”的法律议题通讯。在我们的对话中(为篇幅和清晰度已作编辑),我们讨论了为什么相关法律如此不确定、特朗普政府可能如何试图破坏州层面的潜在行动,以及最高法院可能如何看待未来涉及行政权与州权冲突的案件。

Tell me if this is helpful—there are two different ways it can be difficult for states to investigate or prosecute federal officials. One of them has to do with the law itself as defined by the courts, and the second has to do with the Trump Administration trying to throw up every roadblock it can. Those seem like different things.

让我来澄清一下——各州在调查或起诉联邦官员时可能面临两种不同的困难。其一涉及法院界定的法律本身,其二则关乎特朗普政府试图设置的重重障碍。这两者似乎是不同层面的问题。

I think that’s very helpful. There’s both the question of whether the law would allow a prosecution and whether as a matter of pure logistics, the prosecution is viable. We haven’t usually had to worry about the second one, but we certainly have to worry about it right now.

我认为这很有帮助。这里涉及两个问题:法律是否允许起诉,以及从纯粹的实际操作层面看,起诉是否可行。我们通常不必担心后者,但眼下确实必须考虑这一点。

So then let’s start with the first one, which relates to why it could be complicated for state officials to charge federal officers with crimes in a state such as Minnesota. What is the primary legal roadblock?

那么我们先从第一个问题开始,这个问题涉及为何在明尼苏达这样的州,州级官员以刑事罪名起诉联邦官员会如此复杂。主要的法律障碍是什么?

The primary legal roadblock is the doctrine that’s become known as supremacy-clause immunity. This is a not-very-well-developed idea dating back to an 1890 Supreme Court decision, which basically says that federal officers are immune from the consequences of state law for actions they’re performing in the legitimate exercise of their federal duties. And the idea, which I think is actually relatively uncontroversial, is that federal officers who are lawfully acting within their federal duties are necessarily acting in a way that has to override contrary state laws. It’s analogous in that respect to the doctrine that’s generally known as preëmption—that valid federal laws will always displace valid state laws.

主要的法律障碍是一项被称为“至上条款豁免权”的原则。这个理论可追溯至1890年最高法院的一项裁决,其发展并不完善,核心要义是:联邦官员在合法履行联邦职责时采取的行动,可以免于承担违反州法所产生的后果。我认为这个理念实际上争议不大——依法履行联邦职责的官员,其行为必然需要凌驾于相抵触的州法律之上。在这方面,它与通常被称为“优先适用”的原则类似,即有效的联邦法律始终优先于有效的州法律。

So the idea here, in the best case, is that if federal officials are trying to enforce desegregation at a school in the South in the nineteen-fifties, for instance, then state and local officials cannot mess with them?

那么,最理想的情况是,比如在二十世纪五十年代,如果联邦官员试图在南方某所学校推行废除种族隔离政策,州和地方官员就不能从中作梗?

That’s exactly right. You can’t prosecute federal officers for trespassing, for example, for enforcing a court order on a public school in the civil-rights era.

确实如此。例如,在民权运动时期,联邦官员为执行法院命令进入公立学校,你不能以非法侵入罪起诉他们。

Was the thinking behind the decision so high-minded, though, back in 1890?

然而,回到1890年,这项决策背后的考量真的如此高尚吗?

Actually, it was. So, the 1890 decision is this remarkably colorful case about the attempted assassination of Justice Stephen Field, and the question was whether his bodyguard, who was a deputy U.S. marshal, could be prosecuted by California for the murder of the Justice’s would-be assassin. And that was a context where I don’t think it’s especially surprising that the Supreme Court was of the view that the federal officer was immune from prosecution under state law for protecting one of their colleagues.

事实上,确实如此。1890年的判决是一起极具戏剧性的案件,涉及对斯蒂芬·菲尔德大法官的未遂刺杀。争议焦点在于,这位大法官的保镖——一位美国联邦副法警——是否应因击毙行刺者而受到加利福尼亚州的起诉。在这种特殊情境下,最高法院认为联邦官员为保护同僚免受州法律起诉具有豁免权,这一立场并不令人意外。

What other decisions have come up about these questions since 1890?

自1890年以来,关于这些议题还出现了哪些其他裁决?

The biggest problem is that there really haven’t been that many cases, and virtually none that have gone back to the Supreme Court. Most of the development of the doctrine has actually been in lower courts. And one of the things I think is unhelpful is that, even when lower courts held in at least some of these cases that prosecutions could go forward, they were often dropped by the prosecutors before they produced a verdict. So we actually have a very, very tiny number of examples of successful state prosecutions of federal officers in American history. Of course, one might also say we don’t have that many examples in American history of what’s been happening in Minneapolis over the past three weeks.

最大的问题在于,这类案件确实不多,几乎从未上诉至最高法院。相关法律原则的发展实际上主要发生在下级法院。我认为其中一个不利因素是,即便下级法院在至少部分案件中裁定起诉可以继续,检察官往往在判决前就撤销了诉讼。因此在美国历史上,州政府成功起诉联邦官员的案例确实寥寥无几。当然,或许也可以说,像过去三周明尼阿波利斯发生的事件,在美国历史上同样罕见。

Has the Supreme Court ruled that Congress needs to provide authorization for states to go after federal officials? Am I understanding that correctly?

最高法院是否裁定,国会需要授权各州才能对联邦官员采取行动?我的理解正确吗?

The Supreme Court has never said that. There are other contexts in which the Supreme Court has said that Congress needs to specifically authorize, for example, [civil] damages suits before federal officers can be sued for violating the Constitution. But we’ve never quite had that ruling in the context of criminal prosecutions. And that’s because these cases have been so few and far between.

最高法院从未这样说过。在其他语境下,最高法院确实曾表示国会需要明确授权——比如在联邦官员因违宪而被起诉的民事赔偿案件中。但在刑事起诉的语境下,我们从未有过这样的裁决。这是因为这类案件实在寥寥无几。

The real development in case law has been trying to figure out exactly where the line is between the officer who was immunized because he was acting in good faith and the officer who went too far and should have known that he was going too far. There is a 2006 ruling in the federal appeals court in Denver, which was written by Michael McConnell, a very highly regarded and pretty right-of-center federal appeals judge. And McConnell says you can prosecute federal officers if it wasn’t necessary and reasonable for the officer, in the carrying out of their federal duties, to do what they did.

判例法领域的真正进展,在于试图厘清那条界限究竟何在——一边是出于善意行事而享有豁免权的官员,另一边则是越界行事且本应知晓自己越界的官员。2006年丹佛联邦上诉法院曾有一项裁决,由备受尊崇且立场偏右的联邦上诉法院法官迈克尔·麦康奈尔(Michael McConnell)撰写。麦康奈尔指出,若联邦官员在执行公务时的行为既无必要亦不合理,便可对其提起诉讼。

And that ruling has held?

这项裁决至今依然有效。

I think the best that can be said is it’s the law of the Tenth Circuit right now. Minnesota is in the Eighth Circuit. So we’re in a place where there’s no obvious binding authority on this issue for state or local prosecutors.

目前最乐观的说法是,这属于第十巡回上诉法院的管辖范围。明尼苏达州位于第八巡回区。因此,无论是州级还是地方检察官,在这个问题上都缺乏明确的约束性判例可循。

But let’s say that state or local prosecutors in Minnesota decide that that’s a good standard that you laid out from McConnell. Could you potentially have a situation where the question of whether what the federal officials were doing was “necessary and reasonable” would go to court?

但假设明尼苏达州的州或地方检察官认为,你引用的麦康奈尔提出的标准是合理的。那么是否可能出现这种情况:联邦官员的行为是否“必要且合理”,最终需要由法庭来裁决?

I think the way it would have to happen—and who knows if this is how it actually will happen—is that you would have prosecutors in Minnesota bringing an indictment against one or however many officers they believe they can charge. Those officers would then remove the case to federal court under what’s known as the Federal Officer Removal statute, but it would still be a state prosecution. And then I think the next step would be that the officer or officers would move to dismiss on the grounds that they have this immunity. That’s the moment, before this case could really ever get off the ground, that you’d have to have, almost certainly, a federal judge deciding the immunity question, which as you say is a question of both what the standard is and whether the standard is satisfied here.

我认为事情的发展路径很可能是这样——当然,没人知道现实是否会如此演变——首先由明尼苏达州的检察官对他们认为可以起诉的一名或多名涉事警官提起指控。随后这些警官会依据《联邦官员案件移转法案》将案件移交联邦法院审理,但这本质上仍是州级诉讼。接下来,我认为涉事警官会以享有豁免权为由申请撤销案件。就在这个节点上,在案件真正进入审理程序之前,几乎必然需要联邦法官对豁免权问题作出裁决——正如你所说,这既涉及豁免标准的界定,也关乎当前案情是否符合该标准。

If we can set aside the specifics of what we have been witnessing the past few weeks in Minneapolis, what do you think the Constitution says on this matter? And what do you think is a proper way for judges to figure this question out?

暂且不谈过去几周我们在明尼阿波利斯目睹的具体事件,您认为宪法对此有何规定?法官又该如何恰当地厘清这个问题?

The missing piece from any effort to tie this conversation to current events is the role that federal-state coöperation has played historically in mooting this question. No history of the United States would tell a story in which the federal government and the states have always got along. But the blue-sky ideal here is that you don’t need these state-level cases—that when it is a close enough call, when a federal officer has acted in a way that raises that many concerns, then the officer would face consequences under federal law first. And so I guess from a structural constitutional-law perspective, what I worry about is how much those federal consequences have disappeared. It is so hard today to use federal law to hold federal officers accountable for violating our constitutional rights. Criminal prosecutions require a President and a Department of Justice willing to prosecute their own officers. And civil liability has been all but foreclosed by the Supreme Court in a series of cases over the past twenty-five years. All that has put pressure on states, whether state prosecutors or state courts through civil suits, to try to find their own ways of filling the gap.

要将这场讨论与当下时事联系起来,缺失的一环是联邦与州之间的合作在历史上如何消解了这一问题。任何一部美国史都不会说联邦政府与各州始终和睦相处。但这里的理想愿景是,你本不需要这些州级案件——当情况足够接近临界点,当联邦官员的行为引发了如此多的关切时,这位官员本应首先根据联邦法律承担后果。因此,从宪法体系结构的角度来看,我担忧的是这些联邦层面的追责机制已消失到何种程度。如今,要依据联邦法律追究联邦官员侵犯宪法权利的责任可谓难如登天。刑事起诉需要总统和司法部愿意起诉自己的官员。而民事赔偿责任在过去二十五年的一系列最高法院判例中几乎已被完全阻断。这一切都将压力转移到了各州身上——无论是州检察官还是通过民事诉讼的州法院——迫使它们尝试寻找自己的方式来填补这一空白。

My own preference, and I think the better reading of the Constitution, is that we’re better off with a uniform system of federal remedies, but if the choice is state remedies or nothing, then I think it’s just as clear that the answer should be at least in some cases, state remedies, or else the Constitution can’t be enforced at all.

我个人的倾向,也是我认为对宪法的更好解读是,我们最好有一套统一的联邦救济体系。但如果选择是州级救济或什么都没有,那么我认为同样清楚的是,答案至少在某些情况下应该是州级救济,否则宪法将完全无法执行。

You recently wrote, “A world in which the Constitution is only enforceable against the federal government prospectively is a world in which the federal government and its officers can do whatever it wants to the people. . . . This is why, for instance, it has proven so much easier to enforce the Second Amendment (where government restrictions are creating forward-looking consequences) than the Fourth (where the violation is usually a one-off).” Can you talk a little bit about the distinction you’re drawing there between the Second and Fourth Amendments?

你最近写道:“在一个宪法只能对未来联邦政府行为产生约束力的世界里,联邦政府及其官员就可以对人民为所欲为……这就是为什么,举例来说,执行第二修正案(政府限制会产生前瞻性后果)比执行第四修正案(侵权行为通常是一次性的)要容易得多。”能否谈谈你在这里对第二和第四修正案所做的区分?

Yeah, so the law has this long-standing distinction between what the lawyers would call prospective relief and retrospective relief. With prospective relief, the classic example is an injunction where we are trying to stop the defendant, whether it’s the government or a private party, from continuing to do something that’s wrongful. Retrospective relief is when the wrongful act has already ended, and all we’re trying to do is get the defendant to make the plaintiff whole. And for better or for worse the Supreme Court, with some help from Congress, has got us to a place where it is almost impossible to get retrospective relief against the federal government and especially against federal officers, but actually pretty easy to get prospective relief, often in the form of an injunction, such as someone challenging President Trump’s birthright-citizenship executive order to prevent it from being enforced. But when the harm has ended, whether it’s the use of excessive force by a law-enforcement officer or an assault or an unlawful search, those remedies usually are only retrospective, and that’s where it’s become so difficult.

是的,法律界长期存在着律师们所称的“前瞻性救济”与“追溯性救济”的区分。前瞻性救济的典型例子是禁令——我们试图阻止被告(无论是政府还是私人主体)继续实施不当行为。而追溯性救济适用于不当行为已经结束的情况,我们只求被告对原告进行补偿。无论好坏,最高法院在国会的协助下,已经将司法实践推向这样的境地:针对联邦政府(尤其是联邦官员)寻求追溯性救济几乎不可能实现,但获取前瞻性救济(通常以禁令形式)却相当容易——比如有人挑战特朗普总统关于出生公民权的行政令,要求阻止其实施。然而当损害已经造成时,无论是执法人员使用过度武力、实施人身侵害还是进行非法搜查,这些情况通常只能寻求追溯性救济,而这正是当前司法救济最困难的领域。

I don’t want to sound naïve and pretend that this Supreme Court or any Supreme Court is just going to call balls and strikes, to quote Chief Justice John Roberts. What are the possible ideological ways that conservative and liberal Justices might approach the question of federal immunity?

我不想显得天真,假装这个最高法院——或者任何最高法院——会像首席大法官约翰·罗伯茨曾说的那样,仅仅“当好裁判”。那么,保守派和自由派大法官在联邦豁免权问题上,可能有哪些意识形态上的不同处理方式?

It is interesting. There is a bit of an ideological bent to the debate over whether, for example, federal courts can provide remedies for unconstitutional actions by federal officers without an express act of Congress. I actually argued one of the more recent cases, which was decided in 2020, and it split the Court right down ideological lines. I lost five to four. This was the Hernandez case, which is about whether a Border Patrol agent could be held liable for the allegedly unprovoked cross-border shooting of a fifteen-year-old Mexican national. And on the Court there has been, for better or for worse, a deeply ideological split about whether federal courts can provide their own remedies for damages in cases like that.

这确实耐人寻味。关于联邦法院能否在缺乏国会明确立法的情况下,为联邦官员违宪行为提供救济的争论,确实带有某种意识形态倾向。我本人就曾参与辩论近年的一起相关案件——该案于2020年判决,最高法院恰好沿着意识形态分界线产生分裂。我以五比四的票数败诉。这就是埃尔南德斯案,争议焦点在于边境巡逻队员是否应对一起据称无端发生的跨境枪击案承担责任——受害者是位十五岁的墨西哥少年。无论好坏,最高法院内部对此类案件中联邦法院能否自主裁定损害赔偿,始终存在着深刻的意识形态分歧。

But the criminal-prosecution question is a little different because it really is two different doctrines running headlong into each other. One of them is executive power, where this Court has obviously been as sympathetic to broad readings of Article II as any of its predecessors. The other is states’ rights, and the conventional principles of federalism under which states are allowed to have their own accountability regimes.

但刑事起诉问题略有不同,因为它实际上是两种不同原则的正面碰撞。其一是行政权力原则——本法院显然与历任前辈一样,对《宪法》第二条的宽泛解读持包容态度。其二是州权原则,以及联邦制下的传统准则,即允许各州建立自身的问责机制。

So you have two ostensibly conservative principles running into each other.

于是,两个表面上都符合保守主义的原则在此狭路相逢。

One hundred per cent. And that’s why, by the way, I think it is interesting that the most recent leading case on this very topic in the courts of appeal was written by Michael McConnell, because he’s exactly the kind of judge for whom that intersection would pose some interesting quandaries.

百分之百。顺便说一句,我认为最近上诉法院关于这个议题的权威判例是由迈克尔·麦康奈尔(Michael McConnell)撰写的,这很有意思,因为他正是那种会在这种交叉点上遭遇棘手困境的法官。

I was struck that a federal judge has just ordered the federal government to refrain from “destroying or altering” evidence in the Pretti shooting. Is that normal?

令我惊讶的是,一位联邦法官刚刚下令,要求联邦政府不得“销毁或篡改”普雷蒂枪击案中的证据。这正常吗?

Nothing about this is normal. It is unusual to ask a federal judge to tell the federal government to not do something it already is not allowed to do. The difference is that getting a federal judge to do it brings with it the contempt power. Obtaining an injunction—or, I think it’s a temporary restraining order, for now, in this case—is basically just a way of giving that legal prohibition teeth.

这一切都极不寻常。要求联邦法官去命令联邦政府不要做它本就不被允许做的事,这本身就非同寻常。关键在于,一旦联邦法官介入,便意味着藐视法庭的强制力随之而来。获得禁令——或者就本案而言,我认为目前只是临时限制令——本质上就是为这项法律禁令装上牙齿。

What can the federal government do, though, if it wants to throw a wrench into this? Are there specific things that you’d be worried about?

不过,联邦政府若想从中作梗,又能采取哪些手段呢?是否有某些具体措施会让您感到担忧?

I’m worried already about, for example, just how thoroughly the federal government ran forensics on the scene of Saturday’s shooting. Just how carefully they documented the witnesses. Did they run, for example, forensics to figure out which guns fired shots? Did they do gunshot residue tests on each of the officers who were present, in terms of their hands and clothing? One of the problems here is this ship may have already sailed, but there’s also the concern that many of the witnesses to whatever happened on Saturday were apparently brought down to the federal building. The concern is the spectre of intimidation—and whether these individuals were told that they could leave at any time and/or consult an attorney. And so I think the concern is that, if the federal government didn’t do everything by the book, that could make it harder in any future prosecution, frankly, by anybody, whether it’s the states, whether it’s this Administration, or a future Administration.

我已经开始担心,比如说,联邦政府对周六枪击现场的取证工作到底有多彻底。他们对目击者的记录有多细致。他们有没有做弹道分析来确定哪些枪支开了火?有没有对在场的每一位警员的手部和衣物进行枪击残留物检测?问题在于,现在可能已经错过了最佳时机,但还有一个担忧是,周六事件的许多目击者显然被带到了联邦大楼。人们担心这背后存在恐吓的阴影——这些人是否被告知他们可以随时离开和/或咨询律师。所以我认为,关键在于如果联邦政府没有严格按程序办事,坦白说,这可能会让未来的任何起诉——无论是州政府、本届政府还是未来政府——都变得更加困难。

I suppose if you wanted to be really cynical, there’s a way in which intentionally doing things not by the book could screw up any prosecution.

若真要往最坏处想,故意不按规矩办事,或许反倒能搅黄一场起诉。

Right. And I think that’s why you saw the state and local authorities run to federal court on Saturday night. We should all hope that it wasn’t necessary.

没错。我想,这就是为什么州和地方当局周六晚上会紧急赶往联邦法院。我们都希望这并非必要之举。

We don’t need to be naïve about this. There’s no chance that the federal government will prosecute these people.

我们不必对此抱有天真的幻想。联邦政府绝无可能起诉这些人。

No, no, no. There’s no chance.

不,不,不。绝无可能。

I would also imagine that a reason any case needs to be done in state court as opposed to federal is that the President cannot pardon people in a state prosecution, right?

我猜想,任何案件需要在州法院而非联邦法院审理的另一个原因,恐怕在于总统无权赦免州级起诉中的涉案人员,对吗?

It’s sadly accurate. And even though a state prosecution of a federal officer would almost certainly end up in federal court, it is still a state prosecution, and so it would still be exempt from the President’s pardoning power. It shouldn’t be the case that we’re worried about reflexive pardons from the President, but that’s yet another reason why a state criminal prosecution might seem attractive to so many people at this particular moment.

这说法令人沮丧,却切中要害。尽管对联邦官员的州级起诉几乎必然会上诉至联邦法院,但它本质上仍是州级诉讼,因此仍可豁免于总统的赦免权。我们本不该为总统可能滥用赦免权而忧心忡忡,但在这个特殊时刻,这恰恰成为州级刑事起诉对许多人显得颇具吸引力的又一缘由。

While we continue not being naïve, am I correct in thinking that there would be a relatively easy legislative fix for some of these questions? I realize the odds of that happening in the next year are also close to zero.

在我们保持清醒认识的同时,我是否可以认为,针对其中某些问题,立法层面的修正方案其实相对容易实现?当然我也明白,这类修正案在未来一年内通过的概率同样微乎其微。

So, if our goal is to insure that there’s some measure of accountability when federal officers violate our rights, then, yes, Congress could fix that in a one-sentence statute. Congress could create a robust damages remedy for federal officers who violate the Constitution. Congress could have it be either the officers or the federal government who’s liable. Congress could legislate what defenses the officers would and would not be allowed to have in those cases. The politics of that are unfortunately messy, but the law is not.

因此,如果我们的目标是确保联邦官员侵犯公民权利时存在某种问责机制,那么是的,国会完全可以通过一句话的法案来解决这个问题。国会可以为联邦官员违宪行为设立强有力的损害赔偿救济机制;可以规定由涉事官员或联邦政府承担赔偿责任;还可以立法明确此类案件中官员可援引与不可援引的抗辩理由。虽然相关政治博弈令人遗憾地复杂,但法律层面的解决方案其实清晰明了。

The criminal prosecution piece is harder. I think it would be very hard for this Congress, at least while we have this Supreme Court, to find ways of making it easier for the federal government to prosecute its own officers in cases where the President doesn’t want to. This is part of why I’ve spent really so much of my career pushing for a more robust damages framework. Damages aren’t perfect in these cases, but a broadly available, meaningful damages remedy would not just be a way of making the victims whole when their constitutional rights are violated—it would also hopefully deter federal officers from engaging in at least some of the conduct that we’ve been seeing over the last year. ♦

刑事检控这一块更难。我认为,至少在我们拥有目前这个最高法院的情况下,本届国会很难找到办法,让联邦政府在总统不情愿的情况下更容易起诉自己的官员。这就是为什么我职业生涯中花了这么多时间,推动建立一个更健全的损害赔偿框架。在这些案件中,损害赔偿并非完美方案,但一个广泛可用、有实际意义的损害赔偿救济,不仅能在宪法权利受到侵犯时让受害者得到补偿——它也有望阻止联邦官员从事至少一部分我们在过去一年中所看到的行为。 ♦

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