Letter from Trump’s Washington

Can Donald Trump Win a War with Iran If He Can’t Explain Why He Started It?

如果特朗普连开战理由都说不清,他能在与伊朗的战争中取胜吗?
So far, explanations are few and the goals—from regime change to ending a nuclear program the President already claimed to have “obliterated”—are many.
迄今为止,解释寥寥无几,而目标却五花八门——从政权更迭到终结一个总统早已宣称“彻底摧毁”的核计划。
Donald Trump wears suit and tie and walks in an indoor space with a neutral expression
Source photograph by Jim Lo Scalzo / EPA / Bloomberg / Getty

In the two and a half days since Donald Trump unleashed a new war in the Middle East, the President and his Administration have come up with an astonishing array of different, even contradictory, rationales for the American military attack on Iran. By my count, and I’m sure I’ve missed a few, these include outright regime change, assistance to the oppressed peoples of the Islamic Republic, stripping Iran of “the ability to project power outside its borders,” stopping future Iranian-sponsored terrorist attacks while exacting revenge for past ones, preëmptive action against an imminent Iranian threat to attack U.S. forces, preëmptive action to block Iran from building ballistic missiles that could hit the U.S. mainland, and preëmptive action to stop the Iranian nuclear program that Trump had, as recently as last week, claimed was “obliterated.” Many of these explanations are based on false premises; some already seem to have been abandoned.

自唐纳德·特朗普在中东挑起新一轮战火以来的两天半时间里,这位总统及其政府为美军袭击伊朗的行动,提出了一系列令人瞠目结舌、甚至自相矛盾的理由。据我统计——当然肯定还有遗漏——这些理由包括:彻底颠覆伊朗政权、援助伊斯兰共和国的受压迫人民、剥夺伊朗“向境外投射力量的能力”、阻止伊朗未来可能发动的恐怖袭击并为过去的袭击复仇、针对伊朗即将袭击美军的威胁采取先发制人行动、阻止伊朗制造能够打击美国本土的弹道导弹、以及阻止伊朗的核计划——而就在上周,特朗普还声称该计划已被“彻底摧毁”。这些解释大多基于虚假前提,其中一些似乎已被悄然放弃。

All of which raises perhaps the most urgent question thus far about the most dramatic military action undertaken by the United States since the 2003 invasion of Iraq: Can the U.S. win a war of its choosing when it cannot explain why it chose to fight or what, exactly, victory would mean?

这一切引出了一个或许是迄今为止最紧迫的问题——关于美国自2003年入侵伊拉克以来采取的最戏剧性军事行动:当美国既无法解释为何选择开战,也无法确切说明胜利意味着什么时,它能否打赢一场自己选择的战争?

Trump himself has been the author of most of the confusion. In an eight-minute video, which was released in the predawn hours of Saturday morning, soon after the strikes began, the President vaguely warned of “imminent threats,” while offering a litany of decades-old complaints about Iran’s long and deadly campaign of terror against the U.S. and its allies. His call for regime change was explicit, though the level of American assistance to achieve that was notably ambiguous: he told Iranians that “the hour of your freedom is at hand” and “now you have a President who is giving you what you want,” and he called on them to help topple “this very wicked, radical dictatorship.”

特朗普本人正是这场混乱的主要制造者。周六凌晨,空袭开始后不久,他发布了一段八分钟的视频。视频中,这位总统含糊其辞地警告“迫在眉睫的威胁”,同时历数伊朗数十年来针对美国及其盟友漫长而致命的恐怖主义行径。他明确呼吁政权更迭,但美国将为此提供何种程度的支持却语焉不详:他告诉伊朗人“你们自由的时刻即将来临”,“现在你们拥有一位给予你们所求的总统”,并呼吁他们协助推翻“这个极其邪恶、激进的独裁政权”。

But in several quick phone interviews that he conducted with various news outlets over the weekend Trump offered a different vision for victory, suggesting to the Times that “the perfect scenario” would be a repeat of his recent intervention in Venezuela, where, after removing Nicolás Maduro from power, he abandoned the U.S.’s long-standing support for the democratic opposition and endorsed Maduro’s Vice-President to run the country. As for Iranians choosing who would rule them, our democratically elected President seemed to rule that out, all but announcing that he and he alone would pick who would run the country next.

但在周末与多家新闻媒体进行的几通简短电话采访中,特朗普却描绘了另一幅胜利图景。他向《纽约时报》暗示,“最理想的局面”是重演近期委内瑞拉的干预模式——在推翻尼古拉斯·马杜罗政权后,他放弃了美国对民主反对派的长期支持,转而支持马杜罗的副总统接管国家。至于伊朗人民能否选择自己的统治者?我们这位民选总统似乎排除了这种可能性,几乎是在宣告:唯有他,且仅凭他一人,将决定谁将执掌这个国家的未来。

On Monday morning, the Pentagon leadership held its first press conference since the start of the attacks, and the Defense Secretary, Pete Hegseth, responded to the increasingly loud concerns about what the U.S. hoped to achieve by saying that the goal of Operation Epic Fury was to “destroy” Iran’s Navy, its missiles, and its nuclear ambitions. “This is not a so-called regime-change war,” he insisted, “but the regime did change.” Like much of what we’ve heard from the Trump Administration over the past few days, this was both confusing and misleading—Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, was killed in the first wave of strikes, but his repressive government, at least for now, remains. The Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, hardly cleared things up when he announced, a few hours later, that the focus of the operation was “destruction of their ballistic-missile capabilities,” with regime change downgraded to a “hope,” not an “objective.”

周一上午,五角大楼高层举行了袭击开始以来的首场新闻发布会。面对外界对美国行动目标日益高涨的质疑,国防部长皮特·赫格塞斯回应称,“史诗之怒”行动旨在“摧毁”伊朗海军、导弹系统及其核野心。“这不是所谓的政权更迭战争,”他坚称,“但政权确实更迭了。”这番言论与我们过去几天从特朗普政府听到的许多表态一样,既令人困惑又具有误导性——伊朗最高领袖阿亚图拉·阿里·哈梅内伊已在首轮打击中身亡,但他领导的压迫性政府至少目前依然存在。几小时后,国务卿马可·卢比奥的声明也未能澄清局势,他宣布行动重点是“摧毁其弹道导弹能力”,而政权更迭已降级为“期望”而非“目标”。

When the President, in his first public remarks about the military campaign, appeared at the White House on Monday, he didn’t say a word about regime change, aspirational or otherwise, or even nod to the brave protesters whom he had so recently urged to rise up against their leaders. He also did not discuss the consequences—from oil-price spikes to possible terrorist reprisals in the U.S.—that Americans can expect as the war unfolds. Nor did he so much as mention America’s partner in the war, Israel, or the conflict’s rapid spread—Iran has already launched retaliatory strikes on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Iraq, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which have made this the widest-ranging war in the Middle East in decades.

周一,总统在白宫就此次军事行动首次公开发表讲话时,对政权更迭——无论是理想化的还是其他形式的——只字未提,甚至没有向那些他不久前还敦促其奋起反抗领导人的勇敢抗议者们致意。他也没有讨论随着战争展开,美国人可能面临的后果——从油价飙升到美国境内可能发生的恐怖主义报复行动。他甚至没有提及美国的战争伙伴以色列,也没有提及冲突的迅速蔓延——伊朗已经对巴林、约旦、科威特、伊拉克、以色列、阿曼、卡塔尔、沙特阿拉伯和阿拉伯联合酋长国发动了报复性打击,这使得这场战争成为中东地区数十年来波及范围最广的冲突。

But you wouldn’t have known that from Trump’s few sentences of bluster. He offered no evidence beyond bald assertion that Iran posed an “intolerable threat” to the region and the American people. Nor did he explain why he had initiated this war without permission from Congress or a more robust effort to seek the approval of the public, who, according to polls since the strikes began, are not in favor of Trump’s action. Perhaps most remarkably, as a politician who has spent years promising his followers “no new wars” and an end to the folly of endless U.S. military engagement in the quagmire of the Middle East, he did not even bother to address his epic flip-flop from war-hater to warmonger.

但从特朗普那几句虚张声势的话里,你根本听不出这些。除了赤裸裸地断言伊朗对该地区和美国人民构成“无法容忍的威胁”外,他未提供任何证据。他也没有解释为何未经国会授权就发动这场战争,为何没有更努力地争取公众支持——自空袭开始以来的民调显示,民众并不赞成特朗普的行动。最令人惊讶的或许是,这位多年来一直向支持者承诺“不再发动新战争”、发誓要终结美国在中东泥潭中无休止军事介入的政治人物,甚至懒得解释自己为何从反战者摇身变成了战争贩子。

He did, however, promise to remain intensely focussed on defeating Iran for however long it takes, even if that turned out to be “far longer” than four to five weeks, which is how long he said he expected the war to last. “I don’t get bored,” he insisted. “There’s nothing boring about this.” Forty-six seconds later, he began waxing about the “very, very beautiful” new White House ballroom he’s building, which he thinks will be “the most beautiful ballroom anywhere in the world.”

不过,他确实承诺,无论需要多久,都将持续高度专注于击败伊朗——即便这最终需要“远不止”四到五周的时间,而后者正是他预计这场战争将持续的时长。“我不会感到无聊,”他强调道,“这件事一点都不无聊。”四十六秒后,他开始兴致勃勃地谈起自己正在修建的“非常、非常漂亮”的白宫新舞厅,他认为那将成为“全世界最美丽的舞厅”。

If there has ever been a more politically tone-deaf pivot from an American President, I can’t think of one. In fact, until Trump came along, I am pretty sure there has never been a White House speech that veered from sombre matters of war and peace to our Commander-in-Chief’s brilliant interior-design decisions. Six U.S. service members have so far died in this war, and Trump has acknowledged that there will “likely” be more. But what he really seems to care about is the color of the White House drapes.

若论美国总统在政治敏感度上的惊人转向,恐怕没有比这更令人瞠目的了。事实上,在特朗普登场之前,白宫的演讲从未出现过如此场景:从战争与和平的沉重议题,陡然转向三军统帅对室内装潢的英明决策。截至目前,已有六名美军士兵在这场战争中丧生,特朗普也承认“很可能”会有更多伤亡。但他真正在意的,似乎是白宫窗帘的颜色。

There is a certain method to this madness, of course. As Robert Satloff, director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, observed to me on Monday, Trump, by presenting a “Chinese menu of possible objectives,” spanning “everything from total regime change to getting rid of the nuclear program and all variations in between,” is leaving open the possibility to claim victory no matter what happens. In the end, “it will be what Trump says in retrospect was the objective.”

当然,这种疯狂背后自有其章法。正如华盛顿近东政策研究所所长罗伯特·萨特洛夫(Robert Satloff)周一对我所言,特朗普通过提供一份“涵盖从彻底政权更迭到废除核计划及其间所有变体的'中式菜单式目标清单'”,为日后无论局势如何发展都能宣称胜利留下了空间。最终,“目标将取决于特朗普事后如何定义”。

The question of why Trump did this might be almost as hard to answer as what he hopes to achieve. During his first term, Trump repeatedly confronted the possibility of large-scale action against Iran, but pulled back, siding with military advisers who counselled caution, such as his first-term Defense Secretary, Jim Mattis, over his more hawkish aides, including the national-security adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who were longtime advocates of striking Iran. “His risk tolerance was lower then,” one of Trump’s senior national-security officials from his first term recalled. “More of his notion was to get out of things rather than to get into them.”

特朗普为何这么做,这个问题或许和他希望达成什么目标一样难以回答。在第一个任期内,特朗普曾多次面临对伊朗采取大规模行动的可能性,但最终都选择了退缩。他站在主张谨慎行事的军事顾问一边,比如他第一任期的国防部长吉姆·马蒂斯,而不是那些更为鹰派的助手,包括国家安全顾问约翰·博尔顿和国务卿迈克·蓬佩奥,这两人长期以来一直主张打击伊朗。特朗普第一任期的一位高级国家安全官员回忆道:“他当时的风险承受能力较低,更多是想抽身而退,而不是卷入其中。”

Part of the difference can be explained by personnel: Trump, in his second term, is advised by a collection of sycophants purposely selected to say yes to whatever he wants. Another crucial difference is the facts on the ground in the Middle East, which has been transformed since the terrorist attack on Israel by the Iranian-funded proxy group Hamas on October 7, 2023. Israel’s response has been not only to wage war on Hamas in Gaza but to effectively destroy much of Iran’s regional capabilities and, acting in concert with Trump last June, to knock out key facilities associated with its nuclear program. Despite Trump’s loud claims of imminent attack, the most rational case for his decision to launch the war now is to take advantage of Iran’s weakness, not its strength.

部分差异可以归因于人事因素:特朗普在第二任期内,身边围绕着一群精心挑选的谄媚者,他们的任务就是对总统的所有想法表示赞同。另一个关键差异在于中东地区的现实局势——自2023年10月7日伊朗资助的代理人组织哈马斯对以色列发动恐怖袭击以来,这片土地已发生深刻变革。以色列不仅对加沙地带的哈马斯发动战争,更实质性地摧毁了伊朗在该地区的诸多军事能力,并于去年六月与特朗普协同行动,摧毁了伊朗核计划的关键设施。尽管特朗普高调宣称伊朗即将发动袭击,但此刻发动战争最合理的解释,恰恰是要利用伊朗的虚弱而非强势。

To a legacy-obsessed leader who is seeking opportunities to write his name in the history books, the chance to topple a regime that has tormented American Presidents since 1979 may have been simply too tantalizing to turn down. All the more so because Trump has gotten used to the sheer rush from his repeated, relatively low-risk, high-reward deployments of American force around the world. America’s most performatively macho President has always been attracted to spectacular displays of military power; in his first year back in office, he ordered attacks on seven different nations—more than any other modern President.

对于一位执着于历史定位、渴望在史册上留名的领导人来说,推翻一个自1979年以来始终困扰美国总统的政权,这样的诱惑实在令人难以抗拒。更何况特朗普早已习惯在全球各地反复动用美国武力所带来的刺激感——这些行动往往风险相对较低,回报却相当可观。这位美国史上最擅长表演强人形象的总统,向来痴迷于炫耀军事力量的壮观场面;在他重返白宫的第一年里,就曾下令对七个不同国家发动袭击,其频率远超任何一位现代总统。

Last year, when Trump insisted on renaming the Department of Defense as the Department of War, despite not having the legal authority to do so, it might have seemed a discordant note from a draft dodger who was, at the time, insistent upon styling himself the “President of PEACE.” But, to me, it was the moment when this conflict took on a certain inevitability: when he created a War Department, sooner or later he was always going to have to have a real war. ♦

去年,特朗普坚持要将国防部更名为战争部——尽管他并无这样做的法律授权——这或许显得有些不协调,毕竟这位曾逃避兵役的人当时还执意自诩为“和平总统”。但在我看来,这正是这场冲突开始具有某种必然性的时刻:当他设立战争部的那一刻起,一场真正的战争便注定迟早会到来。♦

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