The Lede

Benjamin Netanyahu’s War at Home

本雅明·内塔尼亚胡的国内战争
The Israeli Prime Minister’s government is bringing radical change to the country’s democratic institutions.
以色列总理领导的政府正对该国的民主制度进行激进变革。
Benjamin Netanyahu points his finger upward.
Photograph by Ronen Zvulun / AFP / Getty

On April 20th, Alex Sinclair, a novelist and part-time lecturer in Jewish education at Hebrew University, was typing away on his laptop at his favorite café in the city of Modi’in. On his head was a knitted kippah, or yarmulke, that he had worn for twenty years, embroidered with both the Israeli and the Palestinian flag—a tribute, he later wrote in a Facebook post, to “the messy ambivalence of my Jewish-Zionist identity.” (He immigrated to Israel from England, in 1997, at the age of twenty-five.) As he worked, he wrote, “a religious man came over to me with an angry face and shouted at me that my kippah is against the law.” Sinclair denied that it was and invited the man to sit down and talk. Not appeased, the man called the police. Five minutes later, two officers appeared, and one—a policewoman who, Sinclair said, looked about his kids’ age—declared the kippah illegal and said that he would be “detained.”

4月20日,小说家兼希伯来大学犹太教育兼职讲师亚历克斯·辛克莱(Alex Sinclair)正在莫迪因市他最爱的咖啡馆里敲击笔记本电脑键盘。他头上戴着一顶编织的基帕(kippah,即犹太小圆帽),这顶帽子他已戴了二十年,上面绣着以色列和巴勒斯坦两国国旗——他后来在脸书帖子中写道,这是对“我犹太复国主义身份中那种混乱的矛盾心理”的致敬。(他于1997年从英国移民到以色列,当时二十五岁。)他写道,正在工作时,“一个宗教人士怒气冲冲地走过来,冲我大喊,说我的基帕违法。”辛克莱否认违法,并邀请那人坐下谈谈。对方不为所动,报了警。五分钟后,两名警察出现,其中一名女警——辛克莱说,她看起来和他孩子差不多大——宣布这顶基帕违法,并称他将被“拘留”。

In fact, displaying the Palestinian flag is protected speech in Israel, affirmed by the Supreme Court in a landmark decision in 2003. The Court, however, also ruled that an exception might be made in cases of “substantial, deep and severe injury,” such as waving the flag in front of victims of “terrorist activities.” Sinclair knew that Itamar Ben-Gvir, the extremist national-security minister, had exploited that exception, urging the police to remove the flag from public places, citing a danger of “incitement.” But, surely, Sinclair told me, the “top of my head presented no such danger.” Still, he surrendered his kippah when the officers demanded it. They also took his laptop, his phone, and the contents of his pockets, and then drove him to a police station, he said, where he was locked in a cell. But Sinclair was not arrested, and after twenty minutes his belongings, except for the kippah, were returned, and he was told that he could go. He said that he wouldn’t leave without the kippah. A minute later, the young officer gave it back to him; the Palestinian flag had been cut out.

事实上,在以色列展示巴勒斯坦国旗是受保护的言论自由,这一点在2003年最高法院的一项里程碑式判决中得到确认。然而,法院也裁定,在可能造成“实质性、深刻且严重伤害”的情况下,比如在“恐怖活动”受害者面前挥舞旗帜,可以例外处理。辛克莱知道,极端派国家安全部长伊塔马尔·本-格维尔(Itamar Ben-Gvir)正是利用了这一例外,以“煽动”危险为由,敦促警方将国旗从公共场所移除。但辛克莱告诉我,毫无疑问,“我的头顶并不会构成这种危险”。尽管如此,当警察要求他交出圆顶小帽时,他还是照做了。他说,他们还拿走了他的笔记本电脑、手机和口袋里的所有物品,然后把他带到警察局,关进了一间牢房。但辛克莱并未被逮捕,二十分钟后,除了那顶小帽,他的物品都被归还,并被告知可以离开。他说,没有小帽他就不走。一分钟后,那名年轻警官把小帽还给了他——上面的巴勒斯坦国旗已经被剪掉了。

“I filed a complaint with the police’s internal-investigation unit for unlawful detention and destruction of property,” Sinclair told me. “I’m not holding my breath.” But he also posted before-and-after photos of the kippah online, which were circulated widely in Israeli media and reported on CNN and the BBC. “I am happy to be a catalyst,” he said, “but I also feel a little guilty that this trivial thing gets so much attention, and we ignore much more disturbing incidents involving Ben-Gvir’s police—anti-government demonstrators being roughed up, or settler attacks tolerated by the border police and Army in the Occupied Territories.”

“我已向警方内部调查部门投诉,指控他们非法拘留和毁坏财物,”辛克莱告诉我,“但我并不抱太大希望。”不过,他还是在网上发布了圆顶小帽的前后对比照片,这些照片在以色列媒体上广泛传播,并被CNN和BBC报道。“我很高兴能成为一个催化剂,”他说,“但我也感到有些内疚,因为这件小事吸引了如此多的关注,而我们却忽视了本-格维尔领导的警方所涉及的更令人不安的事件——反政府示威者遭到粗暴对待,或是在被占领土上,边境警察和军队纵容定居者的袭击。”

Sinclair’s humility does him credit, but—credit also to memes—it’s hard to imagine a more vivid symbol of what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition government has wrought: anti-Palestinian bigotry; politicization of the police; defiance of the courts; and the suppression of a more heterodox Judaism. Netanyahu is also laying the groundwork to cast doubt on any election in which his government does not prevail. After a thousand days of war with Iranian proxies, most recently with Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Prime Minister is trying, and failing, to effect regime change in Tehran. But he is having more success bringing radical change to governing structures in his own country.

辛克莱的谦逊值得称赞,但——同样值得称赞的还有网络迷因——很难想象还有比这更生动的象征,来体现本雅明·内塔尼亚胡总理的联合政府所造成的一切:反巴勒斯坦的偏执;警察的政治化;对法院的蔑视;以及对更异质化的犹太教的压制。内塔尼亚胡还在为质疑任何他政府未能获胜的选举结果铺路。在与伊朗代理人进行了长达一千天的战争后——最近一次是在黎巴嫩与真主党交战——这位总理正试图在德黑兰实现政权更迭,但未能成功。不过,他在改变本国治理结构方面,却取得了更大的成功。

“Bibi put Ben-Gvir into the police” in 2022, and, more recently, “a messianic settler in command of the Shin Bet”—the secret security service—Hirsh Goodman, a veteran security reporter and the retired founding editor of The Jerusalem Report, a biweekly news magazine, told me. The summer session of the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, began on May 10th and runs to July, Goodman continued, “so there is time enough to put other lackeys in watchdog positions—a new state comptroller, a new civil-service commissioner. The government is overwhelming the Supreme Court and the Attorney General with myriad assaults, so that professional civil servants trying to preserve a functioning democracy are forced to shove fingers everywhere into a leaky dike.” Yohanan Plesner, the president of the Israel DemocracyInstitute, a nonpartisan think tank, is similarly alarmed. He told me that his group has identified some eighty initiatives, “some brazen and urgent, some on a back burner,” by which Netanyahu’s government is seeking to impair or subordinate the judiciary and the civil service—what the Prime Minister calls the “deep state.” (Netanyahu has repeatedly denied allegations that his government is attacking democracy.)

资深安全记者、双周刊《耶路撒冷报道》退休创始主编赫什·古德曼(Hirsh Goodman)告诉我,2022年,“比比把本-格维尔塞进了警察系统”,而最近,“一个弥赛亚式的定居者掌控了辛贝特”——即秘密安全机构。古德曼接着说,以色列议会(Knesset)的夏季会期于5月10日开始,将持续到7月,“所以有足够的时间把其他走狗安插到监督岗位上——新的国家审计长、新的公务员委员会主任。政府正以无数攻击淹没最高法院和总检察长,以至于那些试图维护民主运作的专业公务员被迫四处堵漏,手指塞进千疮百孔的堤坝。”无党派智库以色列民主研究所(Israel Democracy Institute)主席约哈南·普莱斯纳(Yohanan Plesner)同样感到震惊。他告诉我,他的团队已识别出约八十项举措,“有些明目张胆、迫在眉睫,有些则暂时搁置”,内塔尼亚胡政府正通过这些举措试图削弱或控制司法系统和公务员体系——也就是总理所谓的“深层政府”。(内塔尼亚胡多次否认其政府正在攻击民主的指控。)

Start with the police. Ben-Gvir’s management of it has been so disquieting that the Attorney General, Gali Baharav-Miara, a former Tel Aviv district attorney, filed a sixty-eight-page petition to the Supreme Court requesting that Netanyahu be made to defend his refusal to fire him. Ben-Gvir, she claims, has enforced a “system of pressure” to push the police force toward his extremist views. In one infamous case, he blocked the advancement of an officer who had investigated Netanyahu and then testified against him in a corruption trial, and the officer was finally promoted only when the Attorney General intervened. (Ben-Gvir has argued that he is responding to a mandate from voters and called Baharav-Miara a “crook.”) He also ousted the Tel Aviv police commissioner, who had accused him of demanding excessive force against protesters; and last year, in Jerusalem, police officers threw the leader of the Democratic Party to the ground during a protest against the Gaza war. Meanwhile, the policing of Arab Israeli cities has apparently been so lax that, since Ben-Gvir’s appointment, in 2022, more than seven hundred citizens of the Arab community have been murdered, a yearly homicide rate double what it had been in the year before he took office. “This is not a failure,” Gilad Kariv, a Democratic Party Knesset member, said. “It is a deliberate and planned act of neglect.” (The police have responded that the force treats violence within the Arab community “with the highest level of seriousness.”)

先说警方。本-格维尔对警方的管理令人不安,以至于前特拉维夫地区检察官、现任总检察长加利·巴哈拉夫-米亚拉向最高法院提交了一份长达68页的请愿书,要求内塔尼亚胡为其拒绝解雇本-格维尔的行为作出辩护。她声称,本-格维尔推行了一套“施压体系”,试图将警方推向他的极端主义立场。在一个臭名昭著的案例中,他阻止了一名曾调查内塔尼亚胡并在腐败案中作证指控他的警官晋升,直到总检察长介入,这名警官才最终获得升职。(本-格维尔辩称,他只是在回应选民的授权,并称巴哈拉夫-米亚拉为“骗子”。)他还罢免了特拉维夫警察局长,后者曾指责他要求对抗议者过度使用武力;去年在耶路撒冷,警方在一次反对加沙战争的抗议活动中将民主党领袖摔倒在地。与此同时,对阿拉伯裔以色列城市的治安管理显然极为松懈——自2022年本-格维尔上任以来,阿拉伯社区已有超过700名公民被谋杀,年凶杀率是他上任前一年的两倍。“这不是失职,”民主党议员吉拉德·卡里夫说,“这是蓄意且有计划的忽视行为。”(警方回应称,他们“以最高级别的严肃态度”对待阿拉伯社区内的暴力事件。)

In addition, Ben-Gvir’s border police have failed to prevent—and, according to the human-rights monitor B’Tselem, have abetted—Israeli settler attacks on West Bank towns; since 2022, more than forty Palestinians have been killed and more than two thousand injured, and these numbers do not include attacks by the police and the military. (Ben-Gvir has distributed more than two hundred and thirty thousand gun permits to communities deemed vulnerable to attack—including, in January, eighteen new West Bank settlement outposts.) Suspects in these attacks are rarely prosecuted, but Ben-Gvir induced the Knesset to enact the death sentence for Palestinian “terrorists.” (For his birthday, this May, he celebrated with a cake decorated with a noose.) He has further recruited what is arguably, in effect, a personal militia, a three-brigade, two-thousand-person force that is nominally part of the border police but operates within Israel’s borders without the oversight structures that govern that force. Since its inauguration, in January, 2025, it has been deployed in Jerusalem’s Old City and, this past winter, in Bedouin towns in the Negev desert—raiding homes for weapons, subjecting residents to checkpoints and a curfew, and violently breaking up demonstrations, including with the use of tear gas.

此外,本-格维尔的边防警察未能阻止——据人权监督机构“以色列占领领土人权信息中心”(B'Tselem)称,甚至纵容了——以色列定居者对约旦河西岸城镇的袭击;自2022年以来,已有超过四十名巴勒斯坦人被杀、两千多人受伤,而这些数字还不包括警察和军方发动的袭击。(本-格维尔向被认为易受攻击的社区发放了超过二十三万份持枪许可证——其中包括今年一月新设立的十八个约旦河西岸定居点前哨站。)这些袭击案的嫌疑人极少被起诉,但本-格维尔却推动以色列议会通过了对巴勒斯坦“恐怖分子”判处死刑的法案。(今年五月,他庆祝生日时,蛋糕上装饰着绞索图案。)他还进一步招募了一支实际上可视为私人武装的力量——一支由三个旅、两千人组成的部队,名义上隶属于边防警察,却在以色列境内活动,不受管辖该部队的监督体系约束。自2025年1月成立以来,这支部队已被部署在耶路撒冷老城,并在去年冬天被派往内盖夫沙漠的贝都因城镇——他们闯入民宅搜查武器,对居民设置检查站和宵禁,并暴力驱散示威活动,包括使用催泪瓦斯。

On April 15th, when the complaint against Ben-Gvir by the Attorney General, Baharav-Miara, finally came before the Supreme Court, the attorney for the government, David Peter, issued a not-so-veiled threat against the Court. Peter invoked Actaeon, the hunter from Greek mythology who angered the gods by overstepping his boundaries, and who was, he said, “hunted down by his own dogs, his body torn to pieces.” The court subsequently declined to issue a decision, but sent Ben-Gvir and Baharav-Miara back into negotiations for a deal to curb the former’s undue influence over the police, though he has blatantly violated such deals in the past.

4月15日,总检察长巴哈拉夫-米拉(Baharav-Miara)对本-格维尔(Ben-Gvir)的起诉书终于提交至最高法院时,政府律师大卫·彼得(David Peter)向法院发出了一道毫不掩饰的威胁。他援引希腊神话中因越界触怒众神而被“自己的猎犬撕成碎片”的猎人阿克泰翁(Actaeon)作为隐喻。最高法院随后拒绝作出裁决,而是要求本-格维尔与巴哈拉夫-米拉重新谈判,以限制前者对警方的过度干预——尽管此人过去曾公然违反此类协议。

Not coincidentally, Netanyahu’s coalition—which dominates the Knesset with a majority of sixty-four seats, out of a hundred and twenty—has renewed its legislative assault on the court. There are fifteen Supreme Court justices, who serve until the age of seventy, and are appointed by an appointments committee. This group has historically been composed of three justices and two Cabinet ministers, including the Justice Minister—currently Yariv Levin, a member of Likud—two Knesset members (including one from the opposition), and two Bar Association representatives. Seven votes were needed for an appointment. A year ago, the Knesset enacted a law to change the composition of the committee, swapping the Bar Association representatives for two lawyers nominated by the Knesset, one of whom is appointed by the government coalition, and lowering the number of votes needed to seat a justice to five—giving mainly coalition politicians, not jurists, what Baharav-Miara tactfully calls “precedence.” There are currently four vacant seats on the court, but they cannot be filled, because the government has retained a veto until the new law kicks in, after the elections.

并非巧合的是,内塔尼亚胡的执政联盟——在以色列议会(Knesset)一百二十个席位中占据六十四席的多数——再次对最高法院发起立法攻势。最高法院共有十五名大法官,任职至七十岁,由任命委员会遴选。该委员会传统上由三名大法官、两名内阁部长(包括司法部长,现任为利库德集团成员亚里夫·莱文)、两名议会议员(其中一人来自反对党)以及两名律师协会代表组成。任命需七票通过。一年前,议会通过一项法律,修改委员会构成,将律师协会代表替换为由议会提名的两名律师(其中一人由执政联盟任命),并将任命大法官所需票数降至五票——这实质上让执政联盟的政治人物而非法律专家占据了巴哈拉夫-米亚拉委婉所称的“优先地位”。目前最高法院有四个空缺席位,但因政府在新法律于选举后生效前保留否决权,这些席位至今无法填补。

The Attorney General herself has come under attack. The Religious Zionist Party, which is part of the coalition, submitted a bill, which the Knesset approved in a preliminary vote, to dismantle the Attorney General’s power, separating her role as the cabinet’s legal adviser from her role as chief prosecutor—and making the Attorney General only the government’s in-house counsel, not its watchdog. Last summer, the Cabinet held an unprecedented vote to fire her. The Supreme Court unanimously annulled the firing in December, but this has sunk the country only further into a constitutional crisis.

总检察长本人也未能幸免于攻击。联合政府中的宗教犹太复国主义党(Religious Zionist Party)提交了一项法案,并在议会初步投票中获得通过。该法案旨在削弱总检察长的权力,将其作为内阁法律顾问与首席检察官的职责分离开来——使总检察长仅担任政府内部法律顾问,而非其监督者。去年夏天,内阁史无前例地投票决定解雇她。去年十二月,最高法院一致裁定该解雇决定无效,但这反而使国家更深地陷入宪政危机。

Such threats to the judiciary mirror others to the media and academia. Netanyahu’s administration has tried to close down the army radio, Galatz, which offers nonpartisan programming; it continues to broadcast only because of a court injunction. The coalition is advancing bills that appear aimed at shuttering or privatizing Kan, the public TV and radio broadcaster, and it is pushing a bill to put all broadcast-news sites and other media under a new regulatory council, with a majority of members chosen by the Communications Minister. At the same time, Netanyahu’s government is advancing a bill to put the Council of Higher Education—and its five-billion-dollar budget—under the direction of the Education Minister. The council manages university accreditation, authorizes programs, and controls academic salaries. The law would, in the words of the presidents of all nine of Israel’s public research universities, who signed a letter of protest, place oversight “into political hands.”

对司法系统的威胁,与对媒体和学术界的威胁如出一辙。内塔尼亚胡政府曾试图关闭提供无党派节目的军方电台Galatz,该电台目前仅凭法院禁令才得以继续播出。执政联盟正在推进多项法案,意图关闭或私有化公共广播电视机构Kan,并推动一项将全部新闻广播网站及其他媒体置于新监管委员会之下的法案——该委员会多数成员将由通信部长任命。与此同时,内塔尼亚胡政府正推动另一项法案,拟将高等教育委员会及其五十亿美元预算置于教育部长管辖之下。该委员会负责管理大学认证、审批课程项目并掌控学术人员薪资。正如以色列九所公立研究型大学校长联署抗议信所言,这项法律将把监管权“交到政治势力手中”。

Finally, there is the general election, which must be held by the end of October, perhaps sooner if ultra-Orthodox leaders in Netanyahu’s coalition follow through on a threat to vote for the dissolution of the Knesset later this week. Since the founding of Israel, in 1948, ultra-Orthodox youth have been effectively exempt from the military draft. The Supreme Court had long ruled their exemption to be unconstitutional; and in 2024 it unanimously ruled that the Army must begin conscripting them. But Netanyahu’s coalition, supported by ultra-Orthodox parties, has tapped only small numbers of willing men, and has been promising to advance a bill—one opposed by more than four-fifths of Israelis—that would supersede the court’s ruling. Indeed, Netanyahu’s Likud is itself divided on the question; so Netanyahu, apparently reluctant to go to an election as the exemption’s champion, first delayed, then tried and failed to fast-track the bill. In any case, it is to the delay that ultra-Orthodox parties have been responding, but they would have nowhere to go other than to a notional Likud coalition after the next election, and Likud, in turn, will need them. All the major opposition parties are united on the need to spike Netanyahu’s authoritarianism and to democratize the draft. Current polls show that Netanyahu’s bloc is not likely to win many more than fifty seats.

最后是大选,必须在十月底前举行,如果内塔尼亚胡联盟中的极端正统派领导人本周晚些时候兑现威胁,投票解散议会,大选甚至可能更早到来。自1948年以色列建国以来,极端正统派青年实际上一直免于服兵役。最高法院长期裁定他们的豁免违宪;2024年,最高法院一致裁定军队必须开始征召他们入伍。但内塔尼亚胡的联盟在极端正统派政党的支持下,只招募了少数自愿入伍者,并一直承诺推进一项法案——这项法案遭到超过五分之四的以色列人反对——以取代法院的裁决。事实上,内塔尼亚胡领导的利库德集团内部在这个问题上也存在分歧;因此,内塔尼亚胡显然不愿以豁免支持者的身份参加大选,先是拖延,随后试图加速推进该法案,但未能成功。无论如何,极端正统派政党一直在对拖延做出回应,但除了在下次大选后加入名义上的利库德集团联盟,他们别无选择,而利库德集团反过来也需要他们。所有主要反对党都一致认为,必须遏制内塔尼亚胡的威权主义,并实现兵役民主化。目前的民调显示,内塔尼亚胡的阵营不太可能赢得超过五十个席位。

Facing these and other headwinds, Netanyahu and his allies have been working to undermine the Central Elections Committee, an independent body that manages Knesset elections. The committee is made up of about thirty members, who are appointed by Knesset parties in proportion to their current representation, and it is presided over by a chair who is a Supreme Court Justice. The committee also has a legal adviser, a civil servant who, while reporting to the chair, may serve indefinitely, interpreting election law, representing the committee in court, certifying candidates' qualifications, and insuring a fair count at polling places. The adviser may also be asked to advise the chair on more controversial matters, such as determining whether a party’s messaging is “scurrilous”—a deep-fake advertisement or social-media post, for example—and so must be taken down, pending appeal on free-speech grounds. The outgoing legal adviser, Dean Livne, who held the job for thirteen years, told me that, in 2019, the chair had to issue an injunction to prevent “some parties” from placing “operatives with cameras in polling places.” (The polling stations were in Arab communities.)

面对这些及其他阻力,内塔尼亚胡及其盟友一直在试图削弱中央选举委员会——这个负责管理以色列议会选举的独立机构。委员会由约三十名成员组成,由议会各党派按当前议席比例任命,主席则由一名最高法院法官担任。委员会还设有一名法律顾问,这是一位公务员,在向主席汇报工作的同时,可无限期任职,负责解释选举法、代表委员会出庭、认证候选人资格,并确保投票站的公平计票。法律顾问还可能被要求就更具争议性的事务向主席提供建议,例如判定某个政党的宣传内容是否“恶意诽谤”——比如深度伪造的广告或社交媒体帖子——从而必须被撤下,等待基于言论自由的上诉。即将离任的法律顾问迪安·利夫内(Dean Livne)担任该职务十三年,他告诉我,2019年,主席不得不发布禁令,阻止“某些政党”在投票站“安插携带摄像头的特工”。(这些投票站位于阿拉伯社区。)

The current chair of the committee is Noam Sohlberg, a Supreme Court justice who has proved to be the most sympathetic to the Netanyahu governments. Nevertheless, Likud has contested the Committee’s impartiality, filing a petition to the Supreme Court challenging the competence of the new legal adviser, Yifat Siminovski, a senior Intel executive who has experience in managing risk and A.I. deep fakes. (Sohlberg dismissed the petition, calling it “baseless.”) The playbook seems to be: gain control over the levers of voter suppression, and, if that fails, foment skepticism about the election results. In this context, the Elections Committee has a crucial additional responsibility: it can seek to disqualify individuals or parties for violating codified legal standards. “One cannot run if one negates Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, or incites racism, or supports armed struggle by a hostile state or a terrorist organization,” Livne told me. But those standards can be easily stretched by demagogues, and a simple majority on the committee is enough to ban a party, though a panel of nine Supreme Court justices can overturn the decision on appeal. In 2019 and 2022, for example, the small Arab Israeli party Balad was banned for allegedly “seeking to eliminate Israel as a Jewish state” and supporting violent Palestinian resistance, but in both cases was reinstated by the court.

该委员会现任主席是最高法院法官诺姆·索尔伯格(Noam Sohlberg),他已被证明是对内塔尼亚胡政府最为同情的法官。尽管如此,利库德集团仍对委员会的公正性提出质疑,并向最高法院提交请愿书,质疑新任法律顾问伊法特·西米诺夫斯基(Yifat Siminovski)的资质——这位英特尔高管在风险管理与人工智能深度伪造领域经验丰富。(索尔伯格驳回了请愿书,称其“毫无根据”。)其策略似乎是这样:先试图掌控压制选民的杠杆,若此计不成,便煽动对选举结果的质疑。在此背景下,选举委员会肩负着另一项关键职责:它有权以违反成文法律标准为由,取消个人或政党的参选资格。“如果某人否定以色列作为犹太民主国家的属性,煽动种族主义,或支持敌对国或恐怖组织的武装斗争,就不能参选,”利夫内告诉我。但这些标准极易被煽动者曲解,委员会只需简单多数即可禁止某个政党参选,尽管最高法院九名法官组成的合议庭可在上诉时推翻这一决定。例如在2019年和2022年,规模较小的阿拉伯裔以色列政党巴拉德党(Balad)因被指控“试图消灭以色列作为犹太国家的属性”并支持巴勒斯坦暴力抵抗而被禁,但两次均被法院恢复参选资格。

The status of the Arab Israeli parties will be particularly important this year, moreover. Opposition parties should gain a comfortable majority; but Arab-Israeli parties will likely win ten or more seats, which means that their support for any opposition coalition may be pivotal. And, according to consistent polling since October 7, 2023, a majority of Jewish Israelis, particularly first-time voters, have begun identifying as right-wing. Arab Israelis, meanwhile, have recoiled from the pitiless methods by which the I.D.F. has prosecuted the war in Gaza, which Jewish Israelis tend not to confront—according to Molad, a liberal think tank, television coverage of Palestinian suffering has been sparse—and most anguish primarily over the welfare of their conscripted sons and daughters. As a consequence, according to a recent poll from the Israel Democracy Institute, more than seventy per cent of Jewish Israelis oppose including Arab parties in the government.and key opposition leaders have pledged not to rely on them. So a few thousand votes could make the difference between the election of a new government or, in effect, a stalemate that forces new elections, leaving Netanyahu in power as a “caretaker” Prime Minister for many months to come.

今年,阿拉伯裔以色列政党的地位将尤为关键。反对党本应轻松获得多数席位,但阿拉伯裔以色列政党可能赢得十个或更多席位,这意味着它们对任何反对派联盟的支持都可能成为决定性因素。而根据2023年10月7日以来持续的民调,大多数犹太裔以色列人——尤其是首次投票的选民——已开始认同右翼立场。与此同时,阿拉伯裔以色列人对以色列国防军在加沙战争中采取的冷酷手段感到震惊,而犹太裔以色列人往往回避这一问题——据自由派智库莫拉德(Molad)称,电视上对巴勒斯坦人苦难的报道少之又少——他们最痛心的是自己应征入伍的子女的安危。因此,根据以色列民主研究所(Israel Democracy Institute)最近的一项民调,超过70%的犹太裔以色列人反对将阿拉伯政党纳入政府,主要反对派领导人也承诺不会依赖它们。于是,几千张选票的差距,可能决定是产生一个新政府,还是陷入僵局、被迫重新选举,从而让内塔尼亚胡在未来数月继续以“看守”总理身份掌权。

Netanyahu, presumably, is hoping for just such a stalemate. That is likely why his coalition is planting the idea that the Elections Committee’s legal adviser is incompetent. The government’s majority on the committee seems poised to ban various Arab politicians, though the Supreme Court seems poised to reinstate them. Netanyahu, for his part, is already attacking the Jewish opposition parties as potential stooges of the Arab parties, and he’s setting up the Supreme Court—and the Elections Committee legal adviser, who would facilitate the appeals of banned parties—to be blamed for handing the balance of power to non-“Zionists.” Anti-Arab propaganda on the right might then be amplified by Netanyahu’s “poison machine”—Channel 14, and its related social media.

内塔尼亚胡想必正寄望于这种僵局。这很可能就是他的联盟在散布选举委员会法律顾问不称职这一说法的原因。尽管最高法院似乎准备恢复某些阿拉伯政治人物的参选资格,但内塔尼亚胡政府在委员会中占据多数席位,似乎已准备好禁止这些阿拉伯政客参选。而内塔尼亚胡本人已在攻击犹太反对派,称其可能成为阿拉伯政党的傀儡,同时他正将最高法院和选举委员会法律顾问——后者将负责受理被禁政党的上诉——塑造成将权力平衡拱手让给非“犹太复国主义者”的替罪羊。右翼的反阿拉伯宣传随后可能通过内塔尼亚胡的“毒药机器”——第14频道及其相关社交媒体——被放大。

It’s worth noting that most of the state institutions, including the Supreme Court, are in Jerusalem, where political violence is not unknown, and where the parties in Netanyahu’s coalition collectively won more than seventy per cent of the vote last time—and won more than eighty per cent in the surrounding settlements. If Netanyahu, like Donald Trump, were to go so far as to call his base into the streets to reject the election results, it’s not hard to imagine that some of Jerusalem’s neighborhoods would respond. As with Sinclair’s kippah, the point is to cut the Palestinians out—something that Israeli democracy could not survive. “I still have some faith in the professionalism of the police rank and file,” Yohanan Plesner said, “but even if there is no Israeli January 6th I’m worried about the process of delegitimizing our democratic institutions as a whole.” Spurious claims against those institutions, and against the judiciary that protects them, have curdled into polarizing hatreds. “The danger is people saying after the election that this is the outcome the Supreme Court, not the majority, wanted.” ♦

值得注意的是,包括最高法院在内的大多数国家机构都位于耶路撒冷,那里并非政治暴力的真空地带,内塔尼亚胡联盟中的各党派在上次选举中赢得了该市超过70%的选票——在周边定居点更是赢得了超过80%的选票。如果内塔尼亚胡像唐纳德·特朗普那样,号召其基本盘走上街头拒绝接受选举结果,不难想象耶路撒冷的一些社区会做出响应。正如辛克莱的圆顶小帽所暗示的那样,关键在于将巴勒斯坦人排除在外——而以色列民主制度无法承受这样的代价。“我仍然对普通警察的专业素养抱有一定信心,”约哈南·普莱斯纳说,“但即使以色列不会发生'1月6日'事件,我仍担心我们的民主制度整体上正在被去合法化。”针对这些机构及其保护它们的司法系统的虚假指控,已经发酵成两极分化的仇恨。“危险在于,选举后人们会说,这是最高法院想要的结果,而不是多数人的意愿。”♦

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