The Lede

Behind the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Transgender Athletes

最高法院关于跨性别运动员的裁决背后
The decision, unanimous on Title IX but split 6–3 on equal protection, upheld bans in twenty-seven states on transgender female athletes playing on girls’ and women’s teams.
这项裁决在《教育法修正案第九条》问题上达成一致,但在平等保护问题上以六比三产生分歧,维持了二十七个州禁止跨性别女性运动员参加女子和女性团队的规定。
Figures hold two trans flags in front of the Supreme Court.
Photograph by Kent Nishimura / Bloomberg / Getty

In January, during oral arguments in the Supreme Court, in a case about whether states may exclude transgender female athletes from girls’ sports teams, the lawyer for Becky Pepper-Jackson, a transgender teen-ager, made a point of emphasizing her athletic mediocrity. Competing on her school’s track-and-field and cross-country teams, “where nobody was cut,” her lawyer said, “she came in near the back.” Becky (known in the case as B.P.J.) hadn’t gone through male puberty, and didn’t have male testosterone levels, because she had taken puberty blockers and was on female hormones. The other transgender plaintiff, an Idaho college student named Lindsay Hecox, had gone through male puberty, but, her brief said, she “was not fast enough” to make her university’s N.C.A.A. cross-country and track teams, so she played club sports instead. The plaintiffs’ strategy—to convince the Court that the fact that a girl is transgender doesn’t mean she is bound to be a champion—was understandable. The concern about transgender girls competing on girls’ teams stems from a belief that they have an inherent sex-related athletic advantage over other girls. If the advantage goes away, the plaintiffs’ reasoning went, the concern should go away, too.

今年一月,在最高法院就各州是否可以将跨性别女性运动员排除在女子运动队之外一案进行口头辩论时,跨性别少女贝基·佩珀-杰克逊(Becky Pepper-Jackson)的律师特意强调了她的运动成绩平平。她的律师说,在她学校“无人被淘汰”的田径和越野队里,“她的名次接近末尾”。贝基(本案中称为B.P.J.)没有经历男性青春期,也不具备男性睾酮水平,因为她服用了青春期阻断剂并注射女性激素。另一位跨性别原告、爱达荷州大学生林赛·赫考克斯(Lindsay Hecox)经历了男性青春期,但她的辩护状称,她“速度不够快”,无法进入所在大学的NCAA越野和田径队,因此转而参加俱乐部运动。原告方的策略——让法院相信一个女孩是跨性别者并不意味着她注定成为冠军——是可以理解的。对跨性别女孩参加女子团队的担忧,源于一种信念,即她们相对于其他女孩拥有与生俱来的、与性别相关的运动优势。原告方的逻辑是,如果这种优势消失了,那么担忧也应该随之消失。

Twenty-seven states have laws—including the ones at issue in this case, West Virginia and Idaho—that separate sports teams based on sex identified at birth, or “biological sex,” thereby excluding transgender girls from girls’ and women’s teams. (The N.C.A.A. and the International Olympic Committee have adopted similar rules.) On Tuesday, the Court unanimously decided that such policies do not violate Title IX, the federal law that prohibits federally funded schools from discriminating “on the basis of sex.” All nine Justices agreed that it is consistent with Title IX’s meaning for schools to define “sex” as “biological sex” for the purpose of separating athletic teams by sex—that schools may exclude transgender girls, or “biological males,” from girls’ and women’s sports teams.

二十七个州——包括本案所涉的西弗吉尼亚州和爱达荷州——制定了法律,根据出生时确定的性别或“生理性别”来划分运动队,从而将跨性别女孩排除在女子和女性团队之外。(NCAA和国际奥委会也采取了类似规则。)周二,最高法院一致裁定,此类政策不违反《教育法修正案第九条》(Title IX),这部联邦法律禁止接受联邦资助的学校“基于性别”进行歧视。所有九位大法官都同意,学校为按性别划分运动队而将“性别”定义为“生理性别”——即学校可以将跨性别女孩或“生理男性”排除在女子和女性运动队之外——这符合《第九条》的含义。

But the Court split 6–3 on whether these bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal-protection clause. The distance between the majority of six conservatives and the dissent from three liberals was simultaneously narrow and vast. A policy that limits participation on girls’ and women’s sports teams to “biological females” is plainly a sex-based classification; under the Court’s equal-protection doctrine, it is valid only if it satisfies “intermediate scrutiny,” meaning that it is substantially related to an important state interest. Justice Brett Kavanaugh, writing for the Court’s six conservative Justices, started with the “undisputed proposition that biological males generally possess inherent physical advantages in sports”—which was indeed a premise for both sides. He concluded that the policy of excluding transgender girls from girls’ teams is substantially related to the important interest of promoting equal athletic opportunities for females by protecting the safety and competitive fairness of girls’ and women’s sports.

但最高法院在这些禁令是否违反第十四修正案的平等保护条款问题上,以六比三产生分歧。六名保守派多数与三名自由派异议者之间的距离,既狭窄又广阔。将女子和女性运动队的参与资格限制在“生理女性”的政策,显然是一种基于性别的分类;根据最高法院的平等保护原则,它只有在满足“中度审查”标准时才有效,即它与一项重要的州利益有实质性关联。代表最高法院六名保守派大法官撰写意见书的布雷特·卡瓦诺(Brett Kavanaugh)大法官,从一个“无可争议的命题”出发,即“生理男性在体育运动中通常拥有先天的身体优势”——这确实是双方的共同前提。他得出结论,将跨性别女孩排除在女子团队之外的政策,与通过保护女子和女性运动的安全性和竞争公平性来促进女性平等运动机会这一重要利益,有实质性关联。

The plaintiffs in this case didn’t assert that all transgender girls should be allowed to compete on girls’ teams. They argued only that some transgender girls, who have taken puberty blockers and hormones, do not possess the athletic advantages that biological males generally have and that it is unconstitutional to exclude those particular athletes from girls’ teams. In other words, the state’s interests in safety and competitive fairness are not furthered by sweeping up for exclusion that subset of trans girls, along with all biological males. It was on these lines that Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by the two other liberal Justices, dissented in part. She thought the Court should have sent the case back to the district court, to determine whether transgender girls like Becky, who have not experienced male puberty and who receive hormone treatment, in fact have an inherent athletic advantage. But, she also wrote, “None of this is to suggest what the eventual outcome of this litigation would have been, or even should have been,” had the case proceeded that way. She stated that “West Virginia may well have satisfied its burden and seen its ban upheld.” That is, if it were established that, despite receiving gender-affirming treatments, a transgender girl still retained an athletic advantage because of her sex assigned at birth, it was clear that Sotomayor would affirm a ruling against her.

本案原告并未主张所有跨性别女孩都应被允许参加女子团队。他们仅辩称,某些服用了青春期阻断剂和激素的跨性别女孩,并不具备生理男性通常拥有的运动优势,将这部分特定的跨性别女孩排除在女子团队之外是违宪的。换句话说,将这部分跨性别女孩连同所有生理男性一并排除,并不能增进州在安全性和竞争公平性方面的利益。正是基于这些理由,索尼娅·索托马约尔(Sonia Sotomayor)大法官与其他两位自由派大法官一起,发表了部分异议。她认为最高法院应将案件发回地区法院,以确定像贝基这样未经历男性青春期并接受激素治疗的跨性别女孩,是否事实上拥有先天的运动优势。但她也写道,“这一切都不是在暗示,如果案件按此路径推进,这场诉讼的最终结果会是什么,甚至应该是什么。”她表示,“西弗吉尼亚州很可能已经满足了其举证责任,其禁令本应得到维持。”也就是说,如果能够证明,尽管接受了性别肯定治疗,跨性别女孩仍因其出生时被指定的性别而保留了运动优势,索托马约尔显然会确认一项不利于她的裁决。

The disagreement boiled down to a perennial question in constitutional cases: How much overinclusion or underinclusion in a law is acceptable? Nobody in this case was challenging the practice of separating sports teams into male and female categories. The division of people into these two groups for athletic purposes is accepted as, roughly, good enough, even though some male and female individuals have inborn physical attributes that make them outliers for their sex. And people don’t generally find it unfair that Michael Phelps’s extraordinary wing span, or Serena Williams’s unusual muscle mass, provides an advantage over competitors. The Court understood a state’s decision to divide sports into “biological male” and “biological female” teams as similarly good enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny. “Not every biological male athlete is bigger, stronger, faster, or otherwise more athletically able than every biological female athlete,” Kavanaugh wrote. The fact that some transgender girls may, through gender-affirming medical treatment, eliminate the athletic advantages typical of biological males and have athletic capabilities typical of biological females did not, in the Court’s view, make it unconstitutional to exclude all transgender girls from girls’ teams.

这一分歧归根结底是宪法案件中的一个老问题:一项法律中多大程度的过度包容或包容不足是可以接受的?本案中没有人质疑将运动队分为男性和女性类别的做法。出于运动目的将人们分为这两组,大致上被认为足够好,尽管有些男性和女性个体拥有天生的身体特征,使其成为自身性别的异类。人们通常也不会觉得迈克尔·菲尔普斯(Michael Phelps)非凡的臂展或塞雷娜·威廉姆斯(Serena Williams)不同寻常的肌肉量,为竞争对手带来了优势是不公平的。最高法院理解,一个州将运动分为“生理男性”和“生理女性”团队的决定,同样足以满足中度审查标准。“并非每个生理男性运动员都比每个生理女性运动员更高、更强壮、更快或在其他方面更具运动能力,”卡瓦诺写道。在最高法院看来,某些跨性别女孩可能通过性别肯定医疗消除了生理男性典型的运动优势,并具备了生理女性典型的运动能力,这一事实并不使得将所有跨性别女孩排除在女子团队之外的做法违宪。

Kavanaugh described the alternative world—the one the dissenters were after—in which a court’s conclusion must depend on whether a particular transgender girl actually poses a risk to safety and competitive fairness, as a “judicial quagmire.” “Individuals come in all shapes and sizes, with different height, weight, muscle mass, heart capacity, lung capacity, strength, speed, endurance, jumping ability, and so on,” he wrote. Kavanaugh balked at the prospect of courts “determining the effects of the puberty blockers and hormones taken by transgender athletes—and then comparing each of those transgender athletes’ abilities to those of other individual biological males and individual biological females in the relevant sport.” He said it would be “almost impossible” for a judge to do it equitably. It is, however, the kind of complicated factual inquiry that trial courts are routinely asked to undertake.

卡瓦诺将异议者所追求的那个替代世界——在那里,法院的结论必须取决于某个特定的跨性别女孩是否确实对安全性和竞争公平性构成风险——描述为一个“司法泥潭”。“个体形态各异,身高、体重、肌肉量、心脏容量、肺活量、力量、速度、耐力、弹跳力等等各不相同,”他写道。卡瓦诺对法院“判定跨性别运动员服用的青春期阻断剂和激素的效果——然后将每个跨性别运动员的能力与相关运动中其他个体生理男性和个体生理女性的能力进行比较”的前景望而却步。他说,法官要做到公平“几乎是不可能的”。然而,这正是初审法院经常被要求进行的那种复杂的事实调查。

Courts also commonly sort through medical science presented by opposing sides. In this case, neither side could confidently trumpet the science, even though their arguments circled around it. Last year, in United States v. Skrmetti, the Court declined to invalidate a state ban on the use of puberty blockers and hormones to treat minors’ gender dysphoria, in part because it didn’t wish to “second-guess” the legislature’s decision in the face of medical uncertainty on the long-term outcomes of those treatments. The medical science regarding the effect of gender-affirming treatments on athletic advantage is unsettled; the International Olympic Committee stated, in March, that “there is no current evidence that testosterone suppression or gender-affirming hormone treatment eliminates this advantage.” Following Skrmetti’s lead in the face of uncertain science on the question, the Court declined to find that states were wrong to believe that “at least some biological males who have taken puberty blockers or hormones still retain physical advantages over females.”

法院也常常梳理对立双方提出的医学科学证据。在本案中,尽管双方的论点都围绕着科学展开,但哪一方都无法自信地吹嘘科学站在自己这边。去年,在“美国诉斯克梅蒂案”(United States v. Skrmetti)中,最高法院拒绝推翻一项禁止使用青春期阻断剂和激素治疗未成年人性别焦虑的州法律,部分原因是它不愿在医学上对这些治疗的长期结果存在不确定性的情况下,“事后质疑”立法机构的决定。关于性别肯定治疗对运动优势影响的医学科学尚无定论;国际奥委会在三月份表示,“目前没有证据表明睾酮抑制或性别肯定激素治疗能消除这种优势。”面对该问题上不确定的科学,最高法院遵循斯克梅蒂案的先例,拒绝认定各州相信“至少有些服用了青春期阻断剂或激素的生理男性仍然保留着相对于女性的身体优势”是错误的。

Kavanaugh’s opinion left the strong impression of a Justice who has skin in the game, so to speak. It is well known that Kavanaugh has been a coach of his daughters’ youth-sports teams. His paean to female athletics read like a proud sports dad speaking up for his daughters—or a cross between a Nike ad and a tampon commercial: “They spend extraordinary time and effort to train in the heat and in the cold, to work out early in the morning and late at night, to get a little faster, to become a little stronger, to jump a little higher, to shoot a little better, to watch a little more video, to make the lonely journey back from an A.C.L. tear, to scrap for playing time, to start, to win the game, to win a championship, to hang a banner, to bring home a medal, to be all-tournament, all-county, all-State, or all-American. They put a championship trophy or all-league award on their bedroom shelf—and it stays there forever as a reminder of their love of the game and pride in their achievements.”

卡瓦诺的意见书给人留下了强烈的印象,即这位大法官可以说是有切身利害关系的。众所周知,卡瓦诺一直是他女儿们青少年运动队的教练。他对女性体育运动的赞歌,读起来像是一位自豪的运动老爸在为他的女儿们发声——或者像是耐克广告和卫生棉条广告的结合体:“她们花费非凡的时间和精力,在酷暑和严寒中训练,清晨和深夜都在锻炼,只为跑得快一点,变得更强壮一点,跳得高一点,投篮准一点,多看一点录像,从前交叉韧带撕裂的伤痛中孤独地回归,争取上场时间,成为首发,赢得比赛,赢得冠军,升起一面旗帜,带回家一枚奖牌,成为全赛事、全县、全州或全美最佳。她们把冠军奖杯或全联盟奖项放在卧室的书架上——它永远留在那里,提醒着她们对这项运动的热爱和对自身成就的自豪。”

Kavanaugh emphasized that “sports are generally zero sum”—meaning that an athlete who makes a team, gets playing time, wins a match, or earns an athletic scholarship “deprives another athlete” of that opportunity. There are winners and losers. Justice Kavanaugh’s heart bleeds for girls participating in “the human drama of athletic competition, to overcome the agony of defeat and know the thrill of victory.” He seems to have a clear sense that a loss for transgender girls in this case is a win for other girls. And, as if to model the lesson of sportsmanship, he made a point of stating that “we greatly admire the desire of all students, including transgender students, such as B.P.J., who want to participate in sports.” As if to display the opposite, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in a concurrence that “Men and boys with gender dysphoria are not women or girls, even if they believe that they are.”

卡瓦诺强调,“体育运动通常是零和博弈”——意味着一个运动员入选团队、获得上场时间、赢得比赛或获得运动奖学金,就会“剥夺另一名运动员”的同等机会。有赢家就有输家。卡瓦诺大法官为那些参与“竞技体育中的人性戏剧,要克服失败的痛苦并体会胜利的激动”的女孩们感到痛心。他似乎清楚地意识到,本案中跨性别女孩的失利,就是其他女孩的胜利。而且,仿佛是为了示范体育精神的教益,他特意指出,“我们非常钦佩所有学生,包括像B.P.J.这样的跨性别学生,他们想要参与体育运动的愿望。”仿佛是为了展示反面,克拉伦斯·托马斯(Clarence Thomas)大法官在一份协同意见书中写道:“患有性别焦虑的男性和男孩不是女性或女孩,即使他们相信自己是的。”

A pair of realities cast a pall over the case in the months leading to the decision. Last September, Lindsay informed the Court that she had made the “extremely difficult decision to cease playing women’s sports.” It was an unsuccessful attempt to moot her case so that the Court would dismiss it, which would have left in place her win in the Ninth Circuit. She had sued to vindicate the right of transgender girls and women to compete, but by then it was clear that her Supreme Court case would likely bring about the opposite result. And, awkwardly, after Becky’s lawyer had attempted to assure the Justices of her inability to dominate her sport, this spring she became the state champion in shot put. Did she defeat her competitors to win a title because of the time and effort she put into training, or because of sex-related biological athletic advantages, or because of an athletic prowess detachable from sex? Those are the sorts of questions that the dissenting Justices would have wanted answered before deciding that the Constitution permits the state to ban her from competing as a girl. But, for the Court, a general rule of exclusion was good enough for government work. ♦

在裁决前的几个月里,一对现实给此案蒙上了阴影。去年九月,林赛通知法院,她已做出“极其艰难的决定,停止参加女子运动”。这是一次试图使她的案件失去实际意义、以便最高法院驳回案件的失败尝试,若成功,她在第九巡回法院的胜诉判决将得以维持。她提起诉讼是为了维护跨性别女孩和女性参与竞争的权利,但到那时,很明显她在最高法院的案件很可能会带来相反的结果。而且,尴尬的是,在贝基的律师试图向大法官们保证她没有能力主宰她的运动项目之后,今年春天,她成了铅球项目的州冠军。她击败对手赢得冠军,是因为她投入训练的时间和努力,还是因为与性别相关的生理运动优势,抑或是因为一种与性别无关的运动才能?这些正是持异议的大法官们在裁定宪法允许该州禁止她作为女孩参赛之前,希望得到回答的那类问题。但是,对最高法院而言,一项普遍性的排除规则对政府工作来说已经足够好了。 ♦

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