Open Questions

Are We Living in the Age of Epstein?

我们是否生活在爱泼斯坦时代?
The scandal suggests that everything awful we’ve ever believed is true.
这桩丑闻似乎印证了我们所有最糟糕的猜想。
Illustration of a figure falling thorough a whirlwind of information
Illustration by Josie Norton

It was odd, for many reasons, to be a journalist in 2016 and 2017, just after the election of Donald Trump. Part of the oddness was that seemingly every story had to include him. If a reporter travelled somewhere to gather material on something apparently unrelated—a natural disaster, a sporting event, a scientific discovery—it felt important to explore whether the people who lived there had voted for Trump, and why. Writing about individuals, one found it crucial to note whether they liked Trump. His rise was connected to so many aspects of modern American life, from reality television and information technology to gender politics and deindustrialization, that weaving it in seemed not just natural but inevitable. We were in Trump’s America, and so to understand Trumpism was to understand the country, and vice versa. That’s an intellectual way of putting it. From another perspective, Trumpism was a mood that infected everything; it still is.

2016年和2017年,也就是唐纳德·特朗普当选总统之后的那段时间,当记者是件奇怪的事,原因有很多。奇怪之处在于,似乎每个故事都必须提到他。如果记者去某个地方收集与特朗普显然无关的素材——比如自然灾害、体育赛事或科学发现——那么探究当地人是否投票给特朗普以及原因,似乎就变得很重要。在写个人故事时,记者发现必须注明他们是否喜欢特朗普。他的崛起与现代美国生活的方方面面都有联系,从真人秀和信息技术到性别政治和去工业化,因此将其融入报道似乎不仅自然,而且不可避免。我们身处特朗普的美国,因此,理解特朗普主义就是理解这个国家,反之亦然。这是一种理智的说法。从另一个角度来看,特朗普主义是一种感染一切的情绪;现在依然如此。

One of the central contentions of Trump’s movement was that the world was run by a corrupt, deviant, and rootless élite, a cabal of cosmopolitan globalists who held themselves out as enlightened but were actually callous, self-interested, and predatory. (Trump positioned himself as an alternative to this group: if the rich weren’t like you and me, he was the exception.) Another Trumpist tenet was that our society had become lawless, its justice system far too lenient. (He promised rough justice: “Lock her up!”) Yet another was that the technocratic experts were part of a deep state, and weren’t telling the truth. (He knew better.) And then there was a claim about power, which was to be enjoyed and employed nakedly, in place of the nuanced manipulations of norms and bureaucracies.

特朗普运动的核心主张之一,是认为世界被一群腐败、堕落、无根的精英所掌控——这些世界主义的全球主义者自诩开明,实则冷酷自私、巧取豪夺。(特朗普将自己定位为这个群体的对立面:如果说富人阶层与普通人截然不同,他便是例外。)另一条特朗普主义信条是,我们的社会已陷入无法无天的境地,司法体系过于宽纵。(他承诺以严厉手段伸张正义:“把她关起来!”)还有一条是,技术官僚专家们属于“深层政府”的一部分,他们并未说出真相。(他比谁都更明白真相。)此外,关于权力也有一套说辞——权力应当被赤裸裸地享受和运用,以取代那些通过规范和官僚体系进行的精微操控。

This wasn’t exactly an unprecedented mix of ideas, and yet, just a year or two earlier, it hadn’t been anywhere close to taking over America. How had it ascended so quickly? I started seeing Trumpism’s arrival through the metaphor of a kaleidoscope. In the ones my kids own, translucent plastic pieces tumble into new designs as the barrel rotates, creating patterns that, after periods of hesitation, click into place. Politics, I came to think, were a kind of dark kaleidoscope. Familiar fears and anxieties shifted until they assumed novel, captivating configurations. Trumpism was such a pattern. It was a grim vision of society that didn’t make sense logically but, for some, held together for reasons of emotion or identity. If there really was a class of unaccountable, libertine global élites plundering the world, then wasn’t Trump obviously a member? You weren’t bothered by such questions if you liked what you saw through the kaleidoscope. For you, Trump was the one spinning the barrel—an observer of the pattern, rather than a part of it.

这种观念的混合并非史无前例,然而就在一两年前,它还远未到主宰美国的地步。它何以如此迅速地崛起?我开始透过万花筒的隐喻来理解特朗普主义的降临。在我孩子们的万花筒里,半透明的塑料碎片随着镜筒转动而翻滚,形成新的图案;经过片刻迟疑后,这些图案便会咔哒一声各归其位。我逐渐意识到,政治恰似一种暗黑版万花筒——熟悉的恐惧与焦虑不断位移,最终组合成新颖而迷人的形态。特朗普主义正是这样一种图案。它描绘的社会图景阴郁晦暗,逻辑上难以自洽,却因情感认同或身份归属的黏合作用,在某些人心中牢不可破。倘若世上真存在一群恣意妄为、不受约束的全球精英在掠夺世界,特朗普本人岂非正是其中一员?但若你沉醉于万花筒中的景象,便不会为此类问题困扰。在你眼中,特朗普是那个转动镜筒的人——是图案的观察者,而非构成图案的碎片。

A kaleidoscope is always shifting, with new patterns coming into focus. The Jeffrey Epstein scandal has been fascinating and horrifying onlookers for more than a decade; in addition to being an actual set of appalling events that involved real perpetrators and real victims, it’s been a political wild card and a conspiratorial lure. But it’s only recently—with the release of millions of documents, which anyone can read for themselves—that its pieces have really snapped into place. Trump, for many, is now inside its pattern, along with a lot of other people, organizations, and institutions. A different dark vision of society has emerged. Suddenly, we seem to be living in the age of Epstein. We tell ourselves that by understanding his rise to power we might understand the world.

万花筒的图案总在变幻,新的图景不断浮现。杰弗里·爱泼斯坦(Jeffrey Epstein)的丑闻十多年来始终令人既着迷又惊骇;这既是一系列涉及真实加害者与受害者的骇人事件,也是政治场中的变数、阴谋论的诱饵。但直到最近——随着数百万份任何人都能查阅的文件被公开——所有碎片才真正拼合成型。对许多人而言,特朗普如今已置身这幅图案之中,与众多其他人物、组织、机构共同构成新的图景。一种截然不同的社会暗面已然浮现。我们仿佛骤然置身于爱泼斯坦的时代。我们告诉自己:若能理解他如何攫取权力,或许就能理解这个世界。

The Epstein scandal further rearranges many of the kaleidoscopic elements that Trump already rearranged. An evil global cabal, an ineffectual justice system, the exercise of unchecked power by untrustworthy experts—these are familiar themes. But the Epstein story also brings together other elements, many of which have been in the mix for decades.

爱泼斯坦丑闻进一步重组了特朗普早已打乱的诸多万花筒般的元素。邪恶的全球阴谋集团、低效的司法体系、不可信的专家滥用不受制约的权力——这些都是人们熟悉的主题。但爱泼斯坦事件还汇聚了其他元素,其中许多已在舆论场中酝酿数十年。

We might start with the institutional sex scandals of the two-thousands and twenty-tens. It was in 2002 that the Boston Globe, with its Spotlight investigations, showed that widespread sexual abuse had been covered up by the Catholic Church. In 2017, reporting in the Times and this magazine helped break open the Harvey Weinstein scandal, which reflected not only one man’s abuses but a larger predatory power structure within the entertainment industry. In between, we learned about coaches, including Jerry Sandusky and Larry Nassar, who preyed upon their athletes; about admirable figures, such as Bill Cosby and Jimmy Savile, who abused victims and were protected by de-facto conspiracies of enablers; and about sexual abuse in the military of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, and also among service members. For many people, these scandals finally proved the assertions of those feminists, journalists, and researchers who had long argued that sexual abuse, including abuse of young children and teen-agers, was more widespread than was commonly acknowledged. It was especially disturbing to see how the abuses had been carried out within big, respected, and highly visible organizations. It became natural to look at any organization or institution and wonder if it was protecting an abuser—some well-loved man who had it all, and used his power for predation.

我们可以从二十一世纪头二十年间的机构性丑闻说起。2002年,《波士顿环球报》的“聚焦”调查揭露了天主教教会如何掩盖了普遍存在的性侵行为。2017年,《纽约时报》和本刊的报道帮助揭开了哈维·韦恩斯坦的丑闻,这不仅反映了一个人的恶行,更揭示了娱乐业内部更大的掠夺性权力结构。在这期间,我们了解到杰里·桑达斯基和拉里·纳萨尔等教练如何侵害运动员;了解到比尔·科斯比和吉米·萨维尔等备受尊敬的人物如何虐待受害者,并受到实际上的共谋者网络的保护;还了解到阿布格莱布监狱中对囚犯的性虐待,以及军队内部的性侵事件。对许多人来说,这些丑闻最终证实了女权主义者、记者和研究者长期以来的主张:性虐待——包括对儿童和青少年的侵害——远比公众认知的更为普遍。尤其令人不安的是,这些恶行竟发生在庞大、受尊敬且备受瞩目的组织内部。人们开始习惯性地审视任何组织或机构,怀疑它们是否正在包庇施虐者——那些拥有一切、受人爱戴却利用权力进行掠夺的男人。

Broadly speaking, these scandals were contained within org charts. But, over the same period, there was an increasing awareness of how networks of knowledge and power could cross institutional and even national lines. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the Occupy movement argued that a global overclass was taking advantage of the rest of us: members of the one per cent may have worked for competing governments or financial firms, but at the end of the day they enriched one another, like pro athletes playing in the same league. It wasn’t only progressives who worried that capital and control were flowing into globalized spaces, accessible mainly to the private-jet set. In 2004, the conservative political theorist Samuel Huntington explored the idea of “Davos men”—“transnationalists” who “view national boundaries as obstacles that thankfully are vanishing, and see national governments as residues from the past whose only useful function is to facilitate the elite’s global operation.” Huntington warned that the “growing differences between the leaders of major institutions and the public” weren’t just economic but cultural—he suggested, for example, that members of the global élite tended to be indifferent or even hostile to traditional values, including religion.

大体而言,这些丑闻都被限制在组织架构图之内。但与此同时,人们越来越意识到知识与权力的网络如何能够跨越机构乃至国界。2008年金融危机后,“占领华尔街”运动提出,全球上层阶级正在利用我们其他人:那百分之一的人可能为相互竞争的政府或金融公司工作,但归根结底他们是在互相充实,就像在同一联盟中竞技的职业运动员。不仅仅是进步派人士担心资本与控制权正流向全球化空间——那里主要是私人飞机阶层能够触及的领域。2004年,保守派政治理论家塞缪尔·亨廷顿探讨了“达沃斯人”的概念——这些“跨国主义者”“将国界视为正在幸运消失的障碍,并将各国政府视为过去的残余,其唯一有用的功能就是促进精英的全球运作”。亨廷顿警告说,“主要机构领导人与公众之间日益扩大的差异”不仅是经济上的,更是文化上的——例如他指出,全球精英成员往往对包括宗教在内的传统价值观漠不关心甚至怀有敌意。

These new understandings—both of the powerful and of the diffuse hierarchies within which they operate—are two elements of the Epstein kaleidoscope. Another is a new conception of the public. In the days before social media, public opinion might have been characterized through surveys or “man on the street” reporting, or ventriloquized by leaders who claimed to know what people thought. But the same decades that saw a rethinking of the élite also saw a reinvention of the public as a networked, online entity—a sort of hive mind. Huntington’s analysis, at the turn of the millennium, had contrasted the élite class with a traditional public that cared about God and country. But the new public was stranger than that. Its hive mind could think out loud, surfacing, organizing, and analyzing vast quantities of information in real time, as in the Steubenville rape case in 2012, or the crash of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, in 2014. And yet its thinking was hardly objective. Shaped by for-profit viral and ad-targeting algorithms, it was drawn to ideas that were lurid, divisive, and provocative. It was often—in a word—crazy.

这些新的理解——既关乎权势阶层本身,也关乎他们运作其中的弥散性权力结构——构成了爱泼斯坦事件万花筒中的两个棱面。第三个棱面则是对“公众”概念的重新定义。社交媒体时代之前,公众意见或许还能通过民意调查或“街头采访”来捕捉,抑或由那些自称洞悉民意的领袖代为发声。然而就在学界重新审视精英阶层的这几十年间,公众本身也经历了蜕变——他们演化为网络化的在线存在,形成某种蜂巢式集体意识。亨廷顿在世纪之交的分析中,曾将精英阶层与关心上帝与国家的传统公众对立起来。但新型公众远比这更为奇异。他们的蜂巢思维能够实时发声,如同2012年斯托本维尔轮奸案或2014年马航MH17空难事件中那样,将海量信息浮出水面、组织整合并加以分析。然而这种集体思维远非客观。在逐利的病毒式传播算法与广告定向算法的塑造下,它总被那些耸人听闻、制造分裂、煽动情绪的观点所吸引。简而言之——它常常是疯狂的。

The new public was hyperglossic, with its human subunits constantly typing and posting. Its thoughts explored every possibility: anything that could be said would be said, no matter how horrible or outlandish. And these tendencies collided with an unprecedented growth in accessible data. Increasingly, the hive mind could find pretty much anything it wanted to see in the Earth-size Rorschach blot available for its analysis. End-to-end encryption had been invented, but not widely adopted, and so the powerful often used Gmail and Outlook like the rest of us. Their secret societies weren’t actually that secret. There were endless documents to be WikiLeaked.

这个新的公众群体是超级多语的,其人类子单元不断打字、发帖。他们的思想探索着每一种可能性:任何可以说出的话都会被说出,无论多么可怕或离奇。这些倾向与可访问数据前所未有的增长相碰撞。蜂巢思维越来越能在地球大小的罗夏墨迹中找到它想看到的几乎任何东西,供其分析。端到端加密技术虽已发明,但尚未广泛采用,因此权贵们也像我们一样使用Gmail和Outlook。他们的秘密社团其实没那么秘密。有无穷无尽的文件可供维基解密。

As the hive mind sifted through the data, norms began to change, and these shifts raised difficult questions. What should we think about people who had acted badly in the past, but who said they were acting within the norms of that time? What about those who had enabled bad behavior, maybe just by looking the other way? Cancellation was, among other things, a response to the new understanding of power: it recognized that powerful people, despite their differences, found common cause through shared tacit values, and that the maintenance of predatory or unjust values was therefore a malign and damaging exercise of power. And, actually, it wasn’t always so complicated: lots of people had done things that were plainly against the norms of both their time and ours. Before #MeToo, young women who wanted to work in the culture industries were frequently assaulted or harassed, and, if they talked about it, they were dehumanized. Defenders of this behavior suggested that it might have been normal to harass women back then. But maybe it wasn’t—maybe everyone knew it was wrong—in which case the norm that was actually in effect centered on bowing and scraping to powerful people. This was the central norm that needed to be overturned. Commonsense morality had to be reasserted.

当集体意识筛选着这些数据时,社会规范开始发生变化,而这些转变引发了棘手的问题。对于那些过去行为不端、却声称自己只是遵循当时规范的人,我们该如何看待?那些纵容恶劣行为的人呢——或许他们只是选择了视而不见?“取消文化”在某种程度上是对权力新认知的回应:它认识到有权势者尽管存在分歧,却通过共享的隐性价值观形成利益共同体,而维护掠夺性或非正义的价值观本身就是一种有害的权力行使。实际上,事情并非总是如此复杂:许多人的行为明显违背了他们所处时代和我们当下的双重规范。在#MeToo运动之前,渴望进入文化产业的年轻女性经常遭遇侵犯或骚扰,而若她们敢于发声,就会被非人化。这种行为的辩护者暗示,当时骚扰女性或许司空见惯。但事实可能并非如此——或许人人都心知肚明这是错的——在这种情况下,真正生效的规范其实是向权贵卑躬屈膝。这才是需要推翻的核心规范。常识性的道德准则必须被重新确立。

All these elements evolved against a dispiriting backdrop. Wrongdoing was being discovered everywhere, and yet so little was happening—everyone could agree on this, no matter their politics. Mueller and #MeToo failed to wound Trump. Hunter Biden got off easy. The January 6th hearings didn’t stop the pardons. The impunity of the powerful was measured by the inefficacy of the outraged. And, also, although it was hard to accept, there seemed to be no way to evade the fact that lots of people were simply evil. Mass shootings were bad enough—and nothing was being done about them—but many awful crimes had a sexual character. It turned out, for example, that the social-media networks employed armies of workers to “moderate” endless waves of depraved content, including material involving child pornography and murder. They often worked overseas, and a lot of them were traumatized. The hive mind had nightmares that couldn’t be eradicated, because they were real.

这一切都发生在一个令人沮丧的大背景下。不法行为无处不在,却鲜有后果——无论政治立场如何,所有人都认同这一点。穆勒调查和#MeToo运动未能伤及特朗普分毫。亨特·拜登轻松脱罪。1月6日国会山暴乱听证会未能阻止特赦令。当权者的逍遥法外,恰恰印证了愤怒者的无能为力。更令人难以接受的是,我们似乎无法回避这样一个事实:许多人就是纯粹的恶。大规模枪击案已足够骇人——却始终未见任何实质行动——但更多令人发指的罪行往往带有性犯罪色彩。例如,社交媒体公司竟雇佣大批员工“审核”源源不断的淫秽内容,其中甚至涉及儿童色情与谋杀影像。这些审核员多在海外工作,许多人因此遭受心理创伤。蜂巢思维滋生的梦魇无法根除,因为它们真实存在。

The Epstein story, of course, was part of the capsule history we’ve just reviewed. It was always there, contained in the pattern. Recently, though, it’s become the pattern. If a movie starts out normally, with a family moving into a new house, and then the family discovers a demon in the basement, then the whole movie is changed—it was always a horror movie. That’s what this feels like.

爱泼斯坦的故事,当然是我们刚刚回顾的这段浓缩历史的一部分。它始终存在,蕴含于模式之中。但近来,它已演变为模式本身。如果一部电影以寻常场景开场——一家人搬进新居,随后在地下室发现恶魔——那么整部电影的性质就改变了:它自始至终都是一部恐怖片。这正是我们此刻的感受。

Summing up the whole picture is impossible, and attempting to do it requires treading carefully, so as to maintain important boundaries between what is definitely true and what seems likely or merely speculative. (Those boundaries, it’s worth noting, have been irrevocably blurred by the long-term mishandling of Epstein’s crimes.) It’s beyond doubt that there were hyper-élite individuals—Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell—orchestrating the trafficking and sexual abuse of women and children at a scale that outstrips the plausible demands of one man. Their globe-spanning efforts required help from many individuals in many countries, almost none of whom have been charged with crimes. The alleged abuse often happened in transnational spaces—a private island, a private jet—or in other locations that seemed beyond the law. Actual “Davos men,” well-respected and supposedly enlightened people, really did look the other way, acting as though it were normal for a plutocrat to be surrounded by a rotating cast of very young girls. And it seems reasonable to say that, in conjuring this larger social group, Epstein weaponized the power of norms and networks to provide his enterprise with a form of protection.

要描绘出事件的全貌是不可能的,任何尝试都需格外审慎,以维系确凿事实与看似可能或纯属推测之间的重要界限。(值得注意的是,这些界限因爱泼斯坦罪行长期被不当处理而变得不可逆转地模糊。)毫无疑问,存在极少数精英个体——爱泼斯坦和吉丝兰·麦克斯韦——策划着规模远超一人合理需求的妇女儿童贩运与性侵。他们横跨全球的行动需要多国众多人士协助,而其中几乎无人被起诉。据称的侵害常发生在跨国空间——私人岛屿、私人飞机——或其他似乎超越法律管辖的场所。真正的“达沃斯人”,那些备受尊敬且据称开明的精英,确实选择了视而不见,表现得仿佛富豪被轮换的年轻女孩们环绕是常态。可以说,爱泼斯坦通过构建这个更庞大的社会网络,将规范与关系网的权力武器化,从而为他的犯罪行径提供了某种形式的保护——这样的判断似乎合乎情理。

Perhaps because this strategy worked, the experts in charge of investigating and stopping the abuse almost certainly failed to do so. (Though the Southern District of New York’s indictment of Epstein focussed on crimes allegedly committed between 2002 and 2005, many civil suits have alleged that his activities continued long after that.) Meanwhile, ineffectual investigators left behind a trove of millions of documents, many of them outrageously disturbing. In a manner that’s historically unprecedented, the hive mind can actually click through them; online, people can learn about connections between Epstein and a former British Prince, a former Prime Minister of Norway, a billionaire who chaired the Museum of Modern Art, a former president of Harvard, the leading architect of Trumpism, and the world’s richest man, among many others. On sites like Jmail.world, they can puzzle over the names that appear only glancingly in Epstein’s e-mail correspondence and decide for themselves what to make of them. The internet resounds with calls for rough justice. Meanwhile, in Congress, people identifying themselves as victims stand up and indicate that they contacted investigators but were never interviewed. The Attorney General of the United States deflects and denies. It seems that e-mails between Epstein and the President have not yet been released.

或许是因为这一策略奏效了,负责调查和制止此类虐待行为的专家们几乎肯定未能履行其职责。(尽管纽约南区对爱泼斯坦的起诉主要针对据称发生在2002年至2005年间的罪行,但许多民事诉讼指控他的活动在那之后仍持续了很长时间。)与此同时,调查不力却留下了数以百万计的文件,其中许多内容令人震惊不安。在一种史无前例的方式下,网络群体思维得以逐一点击查阅这些文件;人们可以在网上了解到爱泼斯坦与一位英国前王子、一位挪威前首相、一位担任现代艺术博物馆主席的亿万富翁、一位哈佛大学前校长、特朗普主义的主要设计师以及世界首富等众多人物之间的联系。在Jmail.world等网站上,他们可以仔细琢磨那些在爱泼斯坦电子邮件往来中仅惊鸿一瞥的名字,并自行判断其意义。互联网上回荡着要求严惩的呼声。与此同时,在国会中,自称受害者的人们站起来表示,他们曾联系过调查人员,但从未被约谈。美国司法部长则闪烁其词并予以否认。爱泼斯坦与总统之间的电子邮件似乎尚未公布。

Just how bad was the abuse, and how many of the “Davos men” knew about it, or even participated in it? Who was merely a social or business connection, and who engaged in conduct that was criminal, or at the very least worthy of opprobrium? One document that has been shared describes the torture of a small child by a group of men. Did that really happen on Epstein’s island, or at his town house or mansion? In a prior version of America, these questions would’ve been passed to a select group, who would’ve produced a report—an Epstein version of the 9/11 Commission. Now they’ve simply been handed over to the public, along with enormous quantities of semi-redacted material spanning decades and provenances. Inevitably, our views of such questions will be shaped by our assumptions about human nature; about power; about the prevalence of horrific sex crimes; and about the trustworthiness of accounts of abuse, among other things. Given the past two decades of American life, it’s fair to say that even people who aren’t conspiracy theorists will find some of the worst scenarios plausible. A moral duty and intellectual necessity, in cases like this, is to remain rooted in specifics—to attend to the particular victims, the real crimes, so that an exacting and appropriate form of justice can be delivered. (What other kind is there?) But, for many, what is known for sure is dwarfed by what might possibly hang together. The darkest versions of the Epstein story fit perfectly within patterns we now take for granted.

这些虐待究竟恶劣到何种地步?有多少“达沃斯精英”知情甚至参与其中?哪些人仅仅是社交或商业往来,哪些人却涉足犯罪行径,或至少应受谴责?一份流传的文件描述了多名男子虐待幼童的暴行。这真的发生在爱泼斯坦的私人岛屿、联排别墅或豪宅中吗?若在从前的美国,这类问题会交由特定委员会处理,最终形成类似“9·11事件调查委员会报告”的专项文件。如今,海量经过部分删改、横跨数十年的档案材料被直接抛向公众。不可避免地,我们对这些问题的判断将受制于对人性的预设、对权力的认知、对性犯罪普遍程度的估量,以及对虐待指控可信度的评估等种种因素。 鉴于过去二十年来美国社会的种种现实,即便非阴谋论者也会承认,某些最恶劣的设想完全可能成立。在此类事件中,道德义务与理性思考都要求我们立足具体事实——关注特定受害者与确凿罪行,方能实现精准而恰当的正义(难道还有其他形式的正义吗?)。但对许多人而言,确凿证据在可能存在的关联网络面前显得微不足道。爱泼斯坦事件最黑暗的版本,恰恰契合了我们如今习以为常的某种模式。

Where does all this lead? Recently, I took my son to a preseason Little League clinic. While he and the other boys practiced their swings, I stood near a group of dads, who were talking quietly about Epstein. They had all been learning about the files, and were unanimous in thinking that many of the ultra-rich men in Epstein’s orbit had engaged in the abuse. They differed only in how far they allowed their imaginations to go. One man believed there had been many murders on the island, including killings of teen-age girls and young children. Another maintained that Epstein was still alive—living in Israel, he suggested, with Charlie Kirk. I couldn’t tell if he was serious; maybe he himself couldn’t tell. But the emotion beneath it all was a very real disgust. “I just don’t know what to do with this,” one father said of the scandal, while watching the kids. “My life is here, and look what’s going on with the people running the world.” It’s hard to imagine the gulf between the public and its leaders getting any wider. ♦

这一切将导向何方?最近,我带儿子参加了一场小联盟季前训练营。当他和别的男孩练习挥棒时,我站在一群父亲旁边,他们正低声谈论着爱泼斯坦。他们都看过那些文件,一致认为爱泼斯坦社交圈里许多超级富豪都参与了性侵。分歧只在于他们允许自己的想象力走多远。一位男士相信岛上发生过许多谋杀案,包括杀害少女和幼童。另一位坚称爱泼斯坦还活着——他说可能在以色列,和查理·柯克在一起。我分不清他是否认真;或许连他自己也分不清。但所有猜测背后涌动着的,是一种非常真实的厌恶。“我真不知道该怎么面对这件事,”一位父亲看着孩子们,这样评价丑闻,“我的生活在这里,而看看那些掌管世界的人正在做什么。”很难想象公众与其领导者之间的鸿沟还能变得更深。♦

2 free previews left — register to get 30 translations a month