Global Notes

A “Good Populism” Rises in the United States

一种“好的民粹主义”正在美国兴起
Can the same thing happen in Europe?
同样的事情会在欧洲发生吗?
Supporters of James Talarico cheer during an Election Night watch party in Austin Texas.
Photograph by Chip Somodevilla / Getty

Since Donald Trump descended that escalator and ushered in a new geopolitical age, eleven years ago, the United States and Europe have each been conducting a similar—if not identical—conversation about the future of their politics and their societies. As an upstart Republican challenger, Trump set himself on course for the Presidency by importing wholesale the language and the animus of the European far right, grandstanding over the threat of Syrian refugees and Muslim migration by drawing on security fears that had little to do with the realities of the United States. He saw the British vote for Brexit, in 2016—a thumb in the eye of an overweening liberal establishment—as a boon for his own incipient political movement. His victory in 2024 was celebrated by fellow-travellers across the Atlantic as a harbinger of things to come; his second term has dovetailed with a surge in support for European far-right parties, some of which want to carry out Trump-style campaigns of mass deportations. In early 2025, Spain’s far-right Vox party convened a gathering of European ultranationalists under the banner of “Make Europe Great Again.” It included some factions that either were already in power or seemed on the precipice of winning it. “Yesterday, we were the heretics; today, we’re mainstream,” then Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán announced. “People thought we represented the past; today, everyone sees that we are the future.”

自从十一年前唐纳德·特朗普走下那部自动扶梯、开启一个全新的地缘政治时代以来,美国和欧洲各自都在进行一场相似——即便不完全相同——的对话,关乎各自政治与社会的未来。作为一个异军突起的共和党挑战者,特朗普把欧洲极右翼的语言和敌意整套搬了过来,借此铺就通往总统宝座之路。他拿叙利亚难民和穆斯林移民的威胁大做文章,所倚仗的安全焦虑与美国现实几乎毫无关系。他把2016年英国的脱欧公投——对傲慢的自由派建制派的一记响亮耳光——视为自己方兴未艾的政治运动的利好。他2024年的胜选被大西洋彼岸的同路人当作未来之事的预兆来庆祝;他的第二个任期恰好与欧洲极右翼政党支持率飙升同步,其中一些政党想要推行特朗普式的大规模驱逐行动。2025年初,西班牙极右翼政党呼声党召集了一场欧洲极端民族主义者聚会,打出“让欧洲再次伟大”的旗号。与会者中包括一些要么已经掌权、要么似乎即将赢得权力的派系。时任匈牙利总理欧尔班·维克托宣称:“昨天我们还是异端;今天,我们已是主流。人们曾以为我们代表过去;今天,所有人都看到我们才是未来。”

In fact, everyone did not. Orbán’s tenure is, of course, now in the past. He was defeated resoundingly in an election earlier this year by a Hungarian opposition committed to unravelling his illiberal, autocratic legacy. The European leader whom Steve Bannon once described as “Trump before Trump” can model for the lame-duck President what it’s like to be out of office, and his ideological allies elsewhere have recalibrated their positions. Even before last week, when the U.S. midterm elections delivered a historic rebuke to Trump’s project, some in the vanguard of Europe’s new right—including the Italian Prime Minister, Giorgia Meloni, and France’s Marine Le Pen—were keeping their distance from him, aware of his profound unpopularity among Europeans and the ways in which their nationalist ambitions were better served untethered from MAGA’s gravitational pull. And their ascension proceeds: in France, rolling social unrest and a sputtering economy may catapult Le Pen and her party into power next spring, and, in the United Kingdom, an economic malaise compounded by anti-migrant xenophobia may cause the Labour Party to suffer major losses in local elections next year. Meanwhile, Germany’s AfD, a far-right party classified as an extremist organization by the country’s own domestic-intelligence agency, is already the largest opposition party in the Bundestag, Germany’s parliament; it could be poised to take power in an eastern German state by the end of this year, and is, state by state, growing at the expense of the increasingly unpopular center-right Christian Democrats and center-left Social Democrats, who are jointly running the country in a coalition government.

事实上,并非所有人都这么看。欧尔班的执政期当然已经成了过去。今年早些时候,他在一场选举中被匈牙利反对派以压倒性优势击败,后者致力于拆解他那套反自由、威权主义的政治遗产。这位曾被史蒂夫·班农称为“特朗普之前的特朗普”的欧洲领导人,如今可以给这位跛脚鸭总统示范一下卸任后的滋味,而他在其他地方的意识形态盟友也已重新校准各自的位置。甚至在上周美国中期选举对特朗普的事业作出历史性否定之前,欧洲新右翼先锋中的一些人——包括意大利总理焦尔吉娅·梅洛尼和法国的玛丽娜·勒庞——就已经在与他保持距离。他们清楚特朗普在欧洲人当中极不受欢迎,也明白自己的民族主义抱负若脱离“让美国再次伟大”的引力场,反而能得到更好的施展。而他们的上升势头仍在继续:在法国,持续不断的社会动荡和低迷的经济可能让勒庞及其政党在明年春天一举掌权;在英国,经济萎靡加上反移民的排外情绪,可能使工党在明年的地方选举中遭受重大损失。与此同时,被德国国内情报机构列为极端组织的极右翼政党德国选择党,已经是德国联邦议院中最大的反对党;它有可能在今年年底前在德国东部的一个州掌权,并且正一个州接一个州地壮大,蚕食着日益不受欢迎的中右翼基民盟和中左翼社民党的地盘——这两党目前正联合执政。

Then, there’s Spain, where Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, currently Europe’s longest-serving center-left leader, gambled on a snap election later this month in an attempt to strengthen his fragile coalition. Opinion polls still show right-wing parties favored to form the next government, after eight years of Sánchez’s leadership and a damaging set of corruption scandals involving figures within the Prime Minister’s inner circle. But after the Democratic Party scored its biggest series of congressional wins in half a century, Sánchez and his allies are feeling encouraged. Their platform centers on implementing significant progressive reforms to alleviate the country’s housing crisis, and they hope their compatriots will see events in Spain on a continuum with the recent victory of Brazil’s leftist incumbent President and the Democrats’ overwhelming popular mandate. After years of keeping right-wing populism at bay in Spain, they see themselves marshalling a left-wing populist response.

然后是西班牙。首相佩德罗·桑切斯目前是欧洲在任时间最长的中左翼领导人,他孤注一掷地在本月晚些时候提前举行大选,试图强化他那脆弱的执政联盟。在桑切斯执政八年、且其核心圈人物卷入一系列破坏性腐败丑闻之后,民调仍显示右翼政党更有可能组建下一届政府。但在民主党取得半个世纪以来最大规模的国会选举胜利之后,桑切斯和他的盟友感到备受鼓舞。他们的政纲核心是推行重大进步改革以缓解该国的住房危机,他们希望同胞们能把西班牙的事态与巴西左翼现任总统最近的胜选、以及民主党获得的压倒性民意授权放在同一条脉络上看待。在西班牙多年将右翼民粹主义挡在门外之后,他们视自己正在集结一股左翼民粹主义的回应力量。

In a phone call last week, José Manuel Albares, Spain’s foreign minister, talked to me about his world view, which, he said, “puts forward dialogue and coöperation,” and “respect for international law.” It’s a vision in line with that of the new Democrats arriving in Washington, such as Michigan’s senator-elect Abdul El-Sayed, who has said that the United States “should be the first among equals to enforce international law.” Albares noted that the victorious progressives in the United States and Brazil focussed on addressing economic inequity and hardship (“the things that matter to the people”), a belief that redistribution has to accompany economic growth, and an explicit embrace of the diversity of their countries. The Democrats, after all, won on platforms that promised to bring down prices, tackle corruption, reckon with inequality, expand health-care access, reject nativism, and take on the wealthiest of the élites. They are, arguably, America’s true populists. “The winners are people that really think that there is a place for everybody in the society, and that everyone needs equal opportunities,” Albares told me. The alternative, he said, would be to “scapegoat” migrants as his party’s rivals on the right have done, and return to “the law of the jungle,” where “the strong can impose their will on the weakest.”

在上周的一次通话中,西班牙外交大臣何塞·曼努埃尔·阿尔瓦雷斯向我谈了他的世界观。他说,这种世界观“主张对话与合作”,以及“尊重国际法”。这一愿景与即将抵达华盛顿的新一代民主党人一脉相承,比如密歇根州当选参议员阿卜杜勒·埃尔-赛义德,他曾表示美国“应当成为执行国际法方面的同侪之首”。阿尔瓦雷斯指出,美国和巴西获胜的进步派都聚焦于解决经济不平等和民生困顿(“那些对人民真正重要的事情”),都相信再分配必须伴随经济增长,也都明确拥抱各自国家的多样性。毕竟,民主党是在承诺降低物价、打击腐败、正视不平等、扩大医保覆盖面、拒绝本土排外主义、并向最富有的精英阶层开刀的政纲上获胜的。可以说,他们才是美国真正的民粹主义者。“赢家是那些真正认为社会里每个人都有位置、每个人都需要平等机会的人,”阿尔瓦雷斯对我说。他说,另一种选择就是把移民当作“替罪羊”——正如他所在政党在右翼的对手们所做的那样——并回到“丛林法则”,让“强者可以把自己的意志强加给最弱者”。

Earlier this year, the political scientists Pepper Culpepper and Taeku Lee identified two competing strains of populism, in an essay for the Journal of Democracy. There are the populist tendencies that come out of a narrative of political failure—the fury of the AfD over refugee arrivals, the rage of the MAGA base that wanted to “drain the swamp” and who demonized migrants. Then, there’s another tendency, which emerges from a shared sense of economic unfairness and which, as Lee, a professor of government at Harvard, told me, is pluralist in its ethos, “does not scapegoat targeted groups, like immigrants and marginalized minorities,” and puts the blame on big business and billionaires. This, in Lee and Culpepper’s formulation, is “good populism” and that is the populism that prevailed in the United States last week. “You can only go so far in blaming immigrants for your unhappiness before you have to start looking elsewhere,” Lee said. “The sheer scale and astonishing arc of this Tuesday’s elections in America bends in the direction of good populism.” In an interview with the Times, Gina Hinojosa, the governor-elect of Texas, explicitly embraced the tag of “economic populism,” arguing that “this has to be the politics of the moment to meet the challenges of the moment.”

今年早些时候,政治学者佩珀·卡尔佩珀和李泽九在《民主杂志》的一篇文章中区分了两种相互竞争的民粹主义脉络。一种民粹主义倾向源于政治失败的叙事——德国选择党对难民涌入的愤怒,以及想要“抽干沼泽”、把移民妖魔化的“让美国再次伟大”基本盘的怒火。另一种倾向则源于对经济不公的共同感受,正如哈佛大学政府学教授李泽九对我所说,这种倾向在精神气质上是多元主义的,“不会把移民和边缘化少数群体等特定群体当作替罪羊”,而是把矛头指向大企业和亿万富翁。按照李泽九和卡尔佩珀的表述,这就是“好的民粹主义”,也正是上周在美国胜出的那种民粹主义。“你把不幸归咎于移民,只能走到一定地步,之后就得开始往别处找原因了,”李泽九说。“本周二美国选举的庞大规模和惊人走向,正朝着好的民粹主义的方向弯曲。”在接受《泰晤士报》采访时,得克萨斯州当选州长吉娜·伊诺霍萨明确接受了“经济民粹主义”这个标签,主张“这必须成为当下应对当下挑战的政治”。

For now, Europe still seems on a different trajectory. Economies like France’s are grappling with a growing public-debt crisis, while Germany’s powerhouse manufacturing industries are facing existential pressure from Chinese competition. Increased military spending is forcing hard conversations about outlays for existing social-safety nets, while, as in the United States, the energy-price shocks triggered by the war in Iran have contributed to spiked inflation. The appeal of nativist culture wars endures, while more establishment parties are being pulled to the right. Germany’s center-right Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has stoked his unpopularity by attempting a raft of reforms and cuts on social spending, including to pensions. Isabella Weber, a German economist at the University of Massachusetts Amherst and the author of a new book, “Anti-Fascist Economics: In Defense of Affordability, Dignity, and Democracy,” points to the irony of Germany “turning to old recipes of the nineteen-nineties” with a campaign of austerity and deregulation at a moment when the United States is “the closest we have ever gotten to the Democrats breaking with neoliberalism and market fundamentalism.”

就目前而言,欧洲似乎仍走在一条不同的轨道上。法国等经济体正在应对日益严重的公共债务危机,而德国强大的制造业正面临来自中国竞争的生计攸关的压力。军费开支的增加迫使人们就现有社会保障网的支出展开艰难讨论,与此同时,与美国一样,伊朗战争引发的能源价格冲击也助推了通胀飙升。本土主义文化战争的吸引力经久不衰,而更多建制派政党正被拉向右转。德国中右翼总理弗里德里希·默茨试图推行一揽子改革和削减社会开支——包括养老金——的政策,这加剧了他的不受欢迎程度。德国经济学家伊莎贝拉·韦伯在马萨诸塞大学阿默斯特分校任教,也是新书《反法西斯经济学:为可负担性、尊严与民主辩护》的作者。她指出其中的讽刺之处:正当美国“前所未有地接近民主党与 neoliberalism 和市场原教旨主义决裂”的时刻,德国却“转向了上世纪九十年代的旧药方”,推行紧缩和去监管运动。

The AfD has gained from dissatisfaction with Merz and his big-tent coalition with the center-left Social Democrats. But, beyond promises to cut benefits for migrants and foreigners, the AfD’s economic program is far from populist; the Party wants to slash corporate taxes and abolish inheritance and wealth taxes. Tellingly, it has become the darling of Elon Musk, whose huge investment on behalf of Republicans this cycle proved ineffectual, and likely fomented a backlash against billionaires’ interfering in U.S. politics. In Germany, though, Musk has been a conspicuous ally of the far-right, urging Germans to move on from their guilt over the Nazi past while sounding alarms about the perils that immigrants supposedly present to white Europeans. These demographic anxieties pervade the Continent and seem to drive political calculations. Some centrists have pointed to the pragmatism of the so-called Danish model—the precedent set by center-left governments in Denmark, in the wake of the 2015 European migration crisis, that remained progressive on many social and economic issues but tacked hard to the right on questions of immigration. That approach kept the center left in power for more than a decade, but it’s no panacea. Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen’s Social Democrats suffered their worst electoral result in more than a century earlier this year, and remain in power thanks only to a four-party minority coalition. As Jan-Werner Müller, a political theorist at Princeton put it, they were unable to check the far-right even as they aped its demagoguery on migrants, while simultaneously losing younger voters, who reject xenophobic politics, to smaller parties on the left. “Never mind morality on any of this, but just electorally, it’s actually not such a great idea,” he told me. After the U.S. midterms, it’s the Democrats now who have a chance to bring Europe into their conversation. ♦

德国选择党从民众对默茨及其与中左翼社民党组成的大联合政府的不满中获益。然而,除了承诺削减移民和外国人的福利之外,德国选择党的经济纲领远谈不上民粹主义;该党想要大幅削减企业税,并废除遗产税和财富税。耐人寻味的是,它已经成了埃隆·马斯克的宠儿。马斯克在本轮选举中为共和党投入的巨额资金被证明收效甚微,而且很可能激起了民众对亿万富翁干预美国政治的反感。但在德国,马斯克却是极右翼的显眼盟友,他敦促德国人放下对纳粹历史的负罪感,同时就移民据称给白人欧洲人带来的危险发出警报。这类人口焦虑弥漫整个欧洲大陆,似乎驱动着政治盘算。一些中间派人士指出了所谓“丹麦模式”的务实之处——即2015年欧洲移民危机之后,丹麦中左翼政府开创的先例:在许多社会和经济议题上保持进步立场,但在移民问题上大幅右转。这一策略让中左翼执政超过十年,但它并非万灵药。丹麦首相梅特·弗雷泽里克森领导的社会民主党今年早些时候遭遇了一个多世纪以来最惨痛的选举结果,目前仅靠一个四党少数联盟勉强维持执政。正如普林斯顿大学政治理论家扬-维尔纳·穆勒所说,他们即便在移民问题上模仿极右翼的煽动手法,也未能遏制极右翼,同时还把拒绝排外政治的年轻选民拱手让给了更小的左翼政党。“且不说这一切在道德上如何,单从选举角度看,这其实也不是什么好主意,”他对我说。美国中期选举之后,现在轮到民主党有机会把欧洲拉入他们的对话之中了。♦

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