The Lede

A Former Prisoner of the Iranian Regime Watches Trump’s War

一位伊朗政权的前囚犯,注视着特朗普的战争
A journalist who was wrongfully detained for five hundred and forty-four days never got to say goodbye to Tehran. Now he’s fielding messages about chaos and destruction in the home he left behind.
一位被错误羁押五百四十四天的记者,终究没能与德黑兰好好道别。如今,他正不断收到关于那座被迫离开的城市陷入混乱与毁灭的消息。
Destroyed residential building
Photograph by Vahid Salemi / AP

If, by chance, you know my story, you will understand why I’m spending my days fixated on the fast-changing news and the terrible images from Iran. I am an Iranian American, a citizen of both countries, the son of a rug merchant from Mashhad, a city in the northeast that is home to three and a half million people and to the holiest site in the country. In January, Mashhad was the scene of immense anti-regime protests. Now many of those protesters—the ones who survived the Islamic Republic’s violent backlash—are in prison, and the city is under bombardment.

如果你碰巧知道我的故事,就会明白为何这些日子我总盯着伊朗瞬息万变的新闻和骇人画面。我是伊朗裔美国人,拥有双重国籍,父亲是马什哈德的地毯商人——这座东北部城市有三百五十万人口,坐落着全国最神圣的宗教圣地。今年一月,马什哈德爆发了大规模反政权示威。如今,那些在伊斯兰共和国暴力镇压中幸存下来的抗议者大多身陷囹圄,整座城市正遭受着炮火洗礼。

For a long time, Iran was home. In 2001, while living in California, I started making periodic trips, and, in 2009, I fulfilled a dream by moving to Tehran, where I worked as a foreign correspondent, mainly for the Washington Post. In Tehran, I met and married an Iranian reporter, Yeganeh, and, for years, we did our work the best we could within one of the world’s most restrictive media landscapes. Over years of interviewing, we met countless people who dreamed of a day when the regime might give way to a more humane government, perhaps even a democratic one.

伊朗曾是我的家园。2001年,我住在加州,开始定期往返伊朗;2009年,我实现了梦想,搬到德黑兰,在那里担任驻外记者,主要为《华盛顿邮报》供稿。在德黑兰,我遇到并娶了伊朗记者叶加内(Yeganeh)。多年来,我们在全球最严苛的媒体环境中竭尽全力工作。通过多年采访,我们遇见了无数梦想着有朝一日政权能让位于更人道、甚至可能是民主政府的人们。

In July, 2014, at the height of negotiations between the Islamic Republic and world powers over Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, my wife and I were arrested and thrown into Evin Prison, a notorious facility known throughout Iran for its cruelty. She was never charged with a crime, and was released after seventy-two days. I was charged with espionage and became the latest American hostage of a regime that has never hesitated to use innocent people as bargaining chips. (There are currently at least six Americans wrongfully detained in Iran.)

2014年7月,正值伊朗伊斯兰共和国与世界各国就其核计划展开谈判的关键时刻,我和妻子遭到逮捕,被投入以残酷著称的德黑兰埃温监狱。她从未被正式起诉,在七十二天后获释。而我被指控从事间谍活动,成为这个惯于将无辜者当作谈判筹码的政权手中最新一名美国人质。(目前至少有六名美国人在伊朗遭受不公正拘押。)

After a year and a half in Evin, an experience that I describe in my memoir, I was released and immediately transported back to the U.S., with Yeganeh. We left behind many family members and countless friends. Now, as I follow the war—through telephone calls, WhatsApp and Signal messages, social-media D.M.s, and cable news—I am both here, living in the suburbs of Washington, and there, in a home we never properly said goodbye to. The reports I get arrive sporadically and without warning, and they describe the chaos and the destruction with a nonchalance that is unsettling.

在埃温监狱度过一年半后——这段经历我已在回忆录中记述——我获释了,随即与叶加内一同被送回美国。我们抛下了许多家人与无数朋友。如今,我通过电话、WhatsApp和Signal讯息、社交媒体私信以及有线电视新闻追踪着战事,既身在此处——生活在华盛顿郊区,又仿佛仍在彼处——在那个我们未曾好好道别的家中。我收到的报告断断续续、不期而至,它们以令人不安的淡漠口吻描述着混乱与毁灭。

During the first week of the war, I had not connected directly with anyone inside Iran until I saw an Instagram Story posted by a young relative in Tehran. Our grandmothers were sisters. He and his parents were our first family members to move from Mashhad to the capital. Their home, in northern Tehran, was the first one I ever visited in the country, a large flat on the top floor of a multi-unit building, with a view of the sprawling city below. When we first met, he was seven, precocious and always smiling. The image he shared, which I viewed just seconds after he posted it, was of an exploding building in the distance—I recognized the view—over which he had written, “Why won’t it end?”

战争第一周,我一直没能直接联系上伊朗国内的任何人,直到看到德黑兰一位年轻亲戚在Instagram上发的快拍。我们的祖母是姐妹。他和父母是我们家族里最早从马什哈德搬到首都的。他们家在德黑兰北部,是我在这个国家拜访的第一户人家——那是栋多单元住宅顶楼的大公寓,能俯瞰下方蔓延的城市。我们初次见面时他才七岁,早慧,总是面带笑容。他分享的图片我几乎是在发布瞬间就看到了:远处一栋爆炸的建筑——我认得出那个视角——他在画面上写着:“为什么还不结束?”

I sent him a message immediately to see if he was all right. “Hi cuz. I’m at home. I’m fine,” he wrote. “Stressful, though.” I pressed him with more questions, but I could tell by his vague responses that he was watching his words, aware of potential surveillance by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Even the V.P.N.s that many people use to get online are controlled by the government.

我立刻给他发了条信息,想确认他是否安好。“嗨,表弟。我在家。我没事,”他写道,“不过压力很大。”我又追问了几个问题,但从他含糊其辞的回应中我能感觉到,他正在字斟句酌——他知道伊斯兰革命卫队可能正在监控。就连许多人用来上网的虚拟专用网络(VPN)也受政府控制。

My cousin said he would check in whenever he could. I have not seen a digital trace of him since. Such wartime silences are common; my wife has two elderly relatives we were particularly concerned about, but they went silent, and we feared the worst. Several days passed before the husband phoned us. “Don’t worry. We’re alive,” he told me.

我的表兄说他会尽可能报平安。自那以后,我就再没收到过他的任何音讯。这种战时的沉寂很常见;我妻子有两位年迈的亲戚,我们特别担心他们,但他们也失去了联系,我们做了最坏的打算。几天后,那位丈夫才打来电话。“别担心,我们还活着,”他告诉我。

The few calls that we receive are always brief, revealing little information or emotion, but we do learn things. For example, people now take care to wear shoes at home in case an explosion shatters glass, or there’s a need to evacuate immediately. Most of the neighborhood bread kiosks that are still standing remain open, but there are strict limits on the amount individuals can purchase. Many checkpoints once manned by Basij paramilitary forces have been destroyed or abandoned.

我们接到的电话寥寥无几,且总是简短,透露的信息或情绪都很少,但我们确实了解到一些情况。例如,人们现在在家也会注意穿鞋,以防爆炸震碎玻璃,或是需要立即撤离。社区里尚存的面包亭大多仍在营业,但对个人购买量有严格限制。许多曾由巴斯基民兵把守的检查站已被摧毁或废弃。

As far as we know, none of our family members have been killed. We have been lucky. Another former Tehran correspondent, now living in Washington, heard from a childhood friend still living in Iran. Her aunt had resisted leaving the capital for two weeks, but was finally convinced to evacuate. Realizing she’d forgotten her medications, she returned home to retrieve them. Her apartment building was bombed as soon as she went back inside. Her niece watched it happen from the car.

据我们所知,家里没人遇难。我们算是幸运的。另一位曾驻德黑兰、现居华盛顿的记者收到伊朗发小的消息——发小的姑母在首都硬撑了两周,终于被说服撤离。想起忘带药品折返取药时,刚踏进公寓楼就遭遇轰炸。侄女在车里目睹了这一切。

Once communications return to normal, stories like this will be frequent. Yet there remains a stream of messages that are undeniably optimistic. There is a sense of hope that grows whenever another high-level official is killed. The latest was Ali Larijani, a fixture of Iranian politics and repression, and one of the slain Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s most unflinching loyalists.

一旦通讯恢复正常,这类消息将变得稀松平常。然而,仍有一股不可否认的乐观情绪在信息流中涌动。每当又一名高级官员遇袭身亡,希望的种子便悄然滋长。最新倒下的阿里·拉里贾尼(Ali Larijani)是伊朗政坛镇压机器的常青树,也是已故最高领袖阿里·哈梅内伊(Ali Khamenei)最死心塌地的追随者之一。

It’s impossible to say how much support the ongoing military campaign enjoys inside Iran, but it’s not insignificant. Even as civilian infrastructure is levelled, the fact that I’m still hearing this optimistic sentiment, almost four weeks into this operation, is a strong indication of how reviled the Islamic Republic has become inside Iran. That feeling could change if Trump follows through on threats he made over the weekend to “obliterate” Iran’s electrical power plants if the regime doesn’t fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz. (On Monday, Trump asserted that his Administration was engaged in “very strong talks” with Iran, and that he had instructed the U.S. military to postpone the strikes for five days.)

很难说伊朗国内对这场持续进行的军事行动支持度有多高,但绝非微不足道。即便民用基础设施正被夷为平地,在行动持续近四周后,我仍能听到这种乐观情绪,这强烈表明伊斯兰共和国在伊朗国内已变得多么令人憎恶。但如果特朗普真的实施他周末发出的威胁——若伊朗政权不完全重开霍尔木兹海峡,就将“摧毁”伊朗的发电厂——这种情绪可能会改变。(周一特朗普宣称,他的政府正与伊朗进行“非常强硬的谈判”,并已指示美军将空袭推迟五天。)

Some of those I hear from in Iran dream that the U.S. and Israel will somehow put an end to the Islamic Republic from the air. “I am staying because I truly hope this is the final battle and the regime gets the hell out of here,” a young software engineer from southern Tehran told me. “People are still in good spirits, even though the bombing is much worse than during the Twelve-Day War,” he said, referring to the conflict last June.

在伊朗,我听到的一些人梦想着美国和以色列会从空中终结伊斯兰共和国。“我留下来,是因为我真的希望这是最后一战,这个政权能滚出这里,”德黑兰南部的一位年轻软件工程师告诉我。“尽管轰炸比十二日战争期间猛烈得多,但人们依然士气高昂,”他说,指的是去年六月的那场冲突。

This kind of remark is not surprising. I’ve heard calls for foreign intervention from inside Iran since 2003, the year of the American invasion of Iraq. “When will it be our turn?” Iranians kept asking. “When are the American commandos coming to liberate us?”

这类言论并不令人意外。自2003年美军入侵伊拉克那年起,我就不断听到伊朗国内有人呼吁外国干预。“什么时候轮到我们?”伊朗人反复追问,“美国特种部队何时会来解放我们?”

Iranians’ desire for American intervention cooled as sectarian violence spread across Iraq—much of it fomented by Tehran’s regional proxies. After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government, Iraq’s Shiite holy sites in Karbala and Najaf reopened to international pilgrims. Iranians were among the first wave to visit, but they were witnesses not to liberation and prosperity but to chaos, violence, and ruin from terrorist attacks.

随着教派暴力在伊拉克蔓延——其中大部分由德黑兰的地区代理人煽动——伊朗人对美国干预的渴望逐渐冷却。萨达姆·侯赛因政权倒台后,伊拉克卡尔巴拉和纳杰夫的什叶派圣地重新向国际朝圣者开放。伊朗人是最早前往朝圣的群体之一,但他们目睹的并非解放与繁荣,而是恐怖袭击带来的混乱、暴力与废墟。

In many ways, Iran would have been far more prepared for a transition toward democracy at that time than either Iraq or Afghanistan, and, frankly, more prepared than it is right now. It was a society yearning for more social liberties and integration with the rest of the world. Time and again, in tightly controlled elections, Iranians voted overwhelmingly for candidates seeking to take steps to liberalize the country.

从许多方面来看,当时的伊朗本应比伊拉克或阿富汗更有条件向民主过渡,坦率地说,也比现在的伊朗更有准备。那是一个渴望更多社会自由、渴望与世界融合的社会。在一次次受到严密控制的选举中,伊朗民众都以压倒性多数投票给那些寻求逐步推动国家自由化的候选人。

Without diplomatic ties or other windows into Iran, the transformation taking place inside the country was difficult for Washington to imagine. Since the 1979 Revolution and the four hundred and forty-four-day siege of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that followed, hawkish policymakers like John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, Tom Cotton, and Lindsey Graham have built careers on seeking vengeance on Iran. “Boys go to Baghdad, real men go to Tehran” has been a favorite line of neocons who consider regime change in Iran to be the ultimate goal. This mentality underscores the U.S. foreign-policy community’s fundamental misunderstanding of Iranian society; for generations, our stance on Iran has been solely focussed on crippling the government, when our greatest leverage has always been with the Iranian people, who are among the world’s biggest believers in the American brand.

由于没有外交关系或其他了解伊朗的窗口,华盛顿很难想象该国正在发生的转变。自1979年革命及随后美国驻德黑兰大使馆被围困444天以来,约翰·博尔顿、迈克·蓬佩奥、汤姆·科顿和林赛·格雷厄姆等鹰派决策者一直以向伊朗复仇为政治资本。“男孩去巴格达,真男人去德黑兰”——这句新保守主义者偏爱的口号,将伊朗政权更迭视为终极目标。这种心态凸显了美国外交政策界对伊朗社会的根本误解:几代人以来,我们对伊朗的立场始终只着眼于削弱其政府,而我们最大的影响力其实始终在于伊朗人民——他们可是世界上最相信美国品牌的人群之一。

Yeganeh has always told me that, for Iranians, “America isn’t just a place or a government; it’s a phenomenon that happens to us.” People experience it in many ways, but it’s unavoidable—in the Islamic Republic’s official antagonism, and its calls for “death to America,” certainly, but more viscerally in the fragmented influence that America has on daily life, through popular culture beamed in via satellite and all manner of products that have managed to sneak in across porous borders.

叶加尼总对我说,对伊朗人而言,“美国不只是一个地方或一个政府;它是降临在我们身上的现象。”人们以多种方式体验着这种存在——伊斯兰共和国官方的敌意和“打倒美国”的口号固然是明证,但更切肤的感受来自美国对日常生活的碎片化渗透:通过卫星传输的流行文化,以及从千疮百孔的边境悄然流入的各式商品。

Most of all, Iranians covet an American education. This is a crucial element of American soft power that the Trump Administration has undermined, with attacks on U.S. universities, a reduction in the number of foreign students, and a travel ban on Iranians. At the height of U.S.-Iranian relations, in the nineteen-seventies, when Iranian women were wearing the latest styles from New York and Paris, nearly one in five foreign students in the U.S. was from Iran. Now such opportunities for Iranians are vanishingly rare.

最重要的是,伊朗人渴望接受美国教育。这是美国软实力的关键要素,但特朗普政府通过攻击美国大学、减少外国学生数量以及对伊朗人实施旅行禁令,削弱了这种软实力。在美伊关系的高峰期,即上世纪七十年代,当伊朗女性穿着纽约和巴黎的最新时尚时,美国近五分之一的外国学生来自伊朗。如今,伊朗人获得此类机会的可能性已微乎其微。

No one questions the power of U.S. military capabilities, but at this point it’s hard for Iranians to understand American intentions. There seems to be little plan for anything other than further strikes. After issuing confused bromides about “regime change,” the President has had little to say that is coherent about helping the Iranian people. It is more than likely that Trump, sensing the perils of rising oil prices, economic chaos, and political opposition, will, within a matter of weeks, declare victory and end the bombing. The announcement, last June, that the U.S. and Israel had inflicted “monumental damage” on Iran’s nuclear program proved only one thing: that there are no clear indicators of success, only manufactured victories.

无人质疑美国军事实力的强大,但此刻伊朗人很难理解美国的意图。除了继续发动袭击,美方似乎没有其他计划。总统在发表关于“政权更迭”的混乱安抚言论后,对如何帮助伊朗人民几乎没能提出任何连贯的表述。特朗普很可能意识到油价飙升、经济混乱和政治对抗的风险,会在几周内宣布胜利并停止轰炸。去年六月美以宣称对伊朗核计划造成“巨大破坏”的声明只证明了一件事:根本没有明确的成功指标,只有人为制造的胜利。

Regarding what will follow, several grim scenarios are possible. The regime will declare a victory of its own—its survival in the face of American and Israeli bombings—and it may well grow even more oppressive than before, increasing its hold on the economy and surveillance over its people. New crackdowns have already begun, including executions, last week, of protesters arrested in January. With each new round of repression, the country’s cycle of violence continues. The vehement desire for vengeance grows within the population as well, and hopes of a just future for Iran dwindle.

关于接下来的走向,几种严峻的可能性正浮出水面。伊朗政权或将宣告自己的胜利——在美国和以色列的轰炸中幸存下来——并很可能变得比以往更具压迫性,加强对经济的控制和对人民的监控。新一轮镇压已然开始,上周已有1月被捕的抗议者被处决。随着每一轮新的镇压,这个国家的暴力循环仍在继续。民众心中强烈的复仇欲望也在滋长,而伊朗走向公正未来的希望正日渐渺茫。

As analysts have pointed out, most of our leverage has been squandered, and the Islamic Republic may very well disdain all future negotiations and build the nuclear weapon that they could have built, but chose not to build, before. A more plausible and equally unattractive outcome is the kind of deal that Trump seems to want to strike with Tehran—one that would put limitations on uranium enrichment and missile production but totally ignore the plight of the Iranian people and the promises he has made.

正如分析人士所指出的,我们的大部分筹码已被挥霍殆尽,伊朗伊斯兰共和国很可能将藐视未来的所有谈判,制造出他们本可以制造、但此前选择不制造的核武器。更可能发生、也同样令人不安的结果,是特朗普似乎想与德黑兰达成的那种协议——限制铀浓缩和导弹生产,却完全无视伊朗人民的困境和他自己许下的承诺。

Following decades of antagonistic policy that has hurt Iranians by design, it was always unrealistic for them to expect to be liberated by the U.S. and Israel. But an outcome that sets them back in their quest to live in a free society will stand out as a cruel and historic mistake.

几十年来,美国与以色列对伊朗采取的政策始终充满敌意,其设计初衷就是要伤害伊朗人民。因此,指望由这两个国家来解放伊朗,从来就不切实际。但若因此导致伊朗人民追求自由社会的进程受阻,那将成为一个残酷的历史性错误。

Until the strikes stop and the aftermath becomes clearer, every analysis remains little more than an underinformed guess. For now, there is but one certainty—that the hopes and lives of Iranians don’t matter. Not to Israel, not to the U.S., and certainly not to their own regime, gunning them down in the street. ♦

在袭击停止、尘埃落定之前,任何分析都不过是信息匮乏的猜测。眼下只有一点是确定的——伊朗人的希望与生命无足轻重。对以色列如此,对美国如此,对他们自己的政权更是如此,后者正将枪口对准街头的民众。♦

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